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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the impact of the Korean system of performance budgeting on 
government spending programmes. It sets out to examine the associations between a 
programme‟s future budget and its past performance and also the impact of performance 
budgeting on managerial practices.  
 
Much of the study uses quantitative techniques – particularly regression analysis and 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). Regression analysis is used to examine the links 
between budget decisions and performance, by analysing the impact on budget changes 
of SABP (Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes) scores (or grades) of 
programmes which the SABP assessed from 2005 to 2007. Secondly, ANOVA is used to 
examine changes in seven managerial practices: goal clarity, goal difficulty, budget 
adequacy, budget flexibility, budget participation, procedure formalization, and support 
from higher management, using perceptual data of 807 administrators in the Korean 
central government.  
 
This thesis found evidence of two main effects of Korean performance budgeting on 
government operations. Firstly, budget decisions have a statistically significant 
correlation with the performance of programmes or SABP scores (or grades). Secondly, 
Korean performance budgeting tends to initiate changes in programme-managerial 
practices within spending organizations, and to improve programme performance.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Research Objectives 
 
A budgeting system for the public sector is something that has been evolving 
continuously ever since the first efforts were made to establish a modern format for 
recording and regulating public expenditure (Nah, 2007). In the early twentieth century, 
the line-item budgeting system was introduced into one US local government, mainly to 
control the arbitrary approach of bureaucrats to making and executing budgets. Later, in 
response to changes in financial circumstances, the orientation of budgetary practice 
was changed from controlling the budget to linking it to performance. Introducing the 
concepts of cost and performance into public budgeting triggered the implementation of 
various types of performance budgeting by the US federal government: Zero-Based 
Budgeting (ZBB); the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS); Management 
by Objectives (MBO); and others (Tyer and Willand, 1997).  
 
Since the 1980s, when public finance departments found themselves operating in 
tougher financial circumstance than ever, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and other developed countries have introduced performance 
budgeting systems in a variety of ever more elaborate types (Kim, 2003; Andrews, 
2003). They have continuously struggled to associate budget allocations with 
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programme results. For example, in 2002, the US federal government designed the 
Programme Assessment Rating Tool (PART) in order to assess individual programme 
performance. In 2005, the Korean central government devised Self-Assessment of 
Budgetary Programmes (SABP) with reference to the PART (MPB, 2006a). Although 
SABP has many similarities to PART, one difference as discussed below is that 
currently SABP, unlike PART is largely limited to capital programmes, because of the 
current accounting system and the fact that programme managers have little authority in 
choosing their staff. It is planned to introduce a new accrual accounting system in 2012 
that will partly address this issue. 
 
These above types of performance budgeting aim to improve government performance 
by linking budget allocations with measured performance. For example, since 
introducing SABP in 2005, the Korean central government has argued that Korean 
performance budgeting has associated budget decisions with performance, and that this 
has contributed to improving programme performance. It has even been argued that 
Korean performance budgeting, supported by SABP, tends to be particularly direct in 
the way it links budgets and performance, one example of this being the stipulation in 
the Budget Request Guidance issued by the Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB) 
that spending ministries and agencies should reduce by more than 10% the budget of 
any programmes assessed as „Poor‟ by SABP. Indeed, in the budget year 2006 the MPB 
reduced by 25% the budgets of programmes which had received the SABP grade „Poor‟; 
in the year 2007 the reduction to such programmes‟ budgets was 24 %; and in 2008 it 
was 15% (Park: 2006). 
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In practice, there may have been various arguments as to whether performance 
budgeting systems have served their primary purpose. Basically, there needs to be 
investigation of opposing arguments about whether, and how closely, performance 
budgeting models have linked budget allocations with programme performance. From 
the viewpoint of Giddens‟ theory of structuration (2007), an institution interacts with its 
actors. These interactions may lead to impacts on a wide range of government 
management areas such as organizational structure, finance, personnel. In this context, 
performance budgeting, as one of the institutions managing government, may affect 
personnel and organizational behaviour, for example, in managerial practices. In terms 
of its impact, there needs to be examination about how much they have improved the 
performance of individual programmes or government management.  
 
Studies are required to ascertain the efficacy of performance budgeting and its impact 
on government operations. Following their implementation of performance budgeting, 
various governments have argued that it has made a key contribution to improving 
public activities. For example, the Korean central government (2003) has argued that 
performance budgeting has changed decisions about budget allocations among 
programmes and that it has led to improved use of public finances. On the other hand, 
many studies have reported that performance budgeting models have not had such a 
great success. According to an OECD investigation (Curristine, 2005a), there is no 
evidence to support the thesis that performance budgeting has directly improved the 
performance of individual programmes or of aggregate public finance. Schick (2003. p 
83) concluded that „efforts to budget on the basis of performance almost always fail‟ 
due to difficulties in associating budget decisions with performance. Furthermore, there 
have been few studies about changes in managerial behaviour. 
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These opposing arguments, which have been made against a background of growing 
attention to performance budgeting, may result from practical and technical problems, 
rather than from problems inherent in performance budgeting itself. From a practical 
point of view, because performance budgeting encompasses diverse types or models 
which individual governments have developed, it may produce different impacts, 
depending on the particular approach, objective or phase of development (Curristine, 
2005a). As a result, it is difficult to identify universal impacts of performance budgeting. 
Different research studies tend to produce different conclusions. 
 
In addition, technical difficulties in measuring performance tend to make it harder to 
identify accurately the impacts of performance budgeting on public finance or 
government activities. Contemporary programmes require more elaborate and sensitive 
techniques for measuring performance, because the facets of performance and the 
interests of stakeholders are becoming more complex and intricate than ever. Measuring 
performance is a political process which becomes entangled with the interests of various 
stakeholders (Bouckeart and Halligan, 2008). As a result, performance tends to be 
defined in diverse ways, for example as economy, efficiency, or effectiveness, 
depending on the emphasis of the assessment. 
 
It is also the case that it is difficult to separate the impacts of performance budgeting 
from those of other reform measures, because the system tends to be introduced as part 
of a package of government management reforms. At the current stage of technological 
development, it has been difficult to provide tools capable of overcoming these more 
nuanced problems of performance measurement.  
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Inevitably, many researchers tend to take a case-by-case approach to identifying the 
efficacy or impact of performance budgeting. The Korean version of performance 
budgeting may be a particularly interesting object for research because, in assessing 
budgetary programmes with SABP, it translates programme performance into scores and 
grades. The numeric scores and grades of programmes are useful for identifying 
whether Korean performance budgeting has successfully linked budget allocations with 
programme performance. Furthermore, the Korean version of performance budgeting 
can be expected to help researchers address how it has changed programme-managerial 
practices and programme performance, because it uses checklists which may be closely 
related to both of these areas in assessing the results or status of programme execution.  
 
To date, there have been few empirical studies on the efficacy or impact of current 
Korean performance budgeting, because its history is so short. Regressing budget 
changes with SABP grades, Park (2006) reported that Korean performance budgeting 
had linked budget decisions with performance. The National Assembly Budget Office 
(2007) conducted an opinion survey of Korean central government civil servants to find 
out how SABP had impacted on public finance. The survey suggested that SABP had 
contributed to improving the performance of public finance. However, the two studies 
have some gaps that need to be filled. Park‟s conclusions are limited in that he analysed 
only about a third of programmes assessed with SABP. Nor did the National Assembly 
Budget Office‟s analysis reach a more helpful conclusion, because its survey dealt with 
the general impacts of SABP rather than with the specific impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting.  
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This research, in this context, aims to extend existing analyses of the impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting. It does this firstly by considering every programme assessed by 
SABP during the period under investigation, so that it gives more generalized 
suggestions about the links between budget decisions and performance. And secondly, it 
examines changes in programme-managerial practices and in programme performance, 
in an attempt to find more specific evidence about the dynamic impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting on public management.  
 
This study is expected to make a minor contribution to constructing a bridge over a 
small chasm which existing research has rather missed, because it employs a more 
comprehensive approach, considering changes in both budget allocations and 
programme-managerial practices. Indeed, there have been few previous research studies 
which have taken a comprehensive approach to identifying the impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting on government, despite the possibility that these may affect a 
wide range of government activities such as budget decision-making and managerial 
practices. Furthermore, this study provides empirical evidence of the impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting on budget decisions and programme-managerial practices. From 
a practical point of view, the research is expected to contribute to providing specific 
indications as to how current performance budgeting efforts could be improved. 
 
1.2 The Scope of the Research 
 
The primary objective of this research is to identify whether performance budgeting has 
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served its purpose. This is a hard task, as stated earlier, because of practical and 
technical problems. Thus, limiting the scope of this research may be helpful for 
achieving its goal. Although there have been various types and models of performance 
budgeting used by various governments, this research focuses on the Korean version of 
performance budgeting. As far as the analysis is concerned, it aims to identify how 
Korean performance budgeting has linked budget decisions with performance, and what 
impacts it has had on budgetary programme-managerial practices and programme 
performance within spending organizations of the Korean central government. 
 
The Korean central government, in 2000, introduced a performance budgeting system as 
one of the fiscal reform measures it put in place after the Asian Financial Crisis of the 
late 1990s. In 2005, the performance budgeting system was modified by the addition of 
SABP, so that budget allocations might rely more on programme results. SABP is a 
critical tool with which the Korean central government links budget decisions to 
performance. Before budgeting every year, the Korean budgetary authority assesses the 
results or performance of budgetary programmes using SABP. SABP produces numeric 
scores from 0 to 100 for programmes, and then translates these scores into one of four 
grades: „Poor‟, „Modest‟, „Somewhat effective‟, and „Effective‟. Following its 
implementation, SABP was used to assess 1717 budgetary programmes listed on the 
initial assessment plan for the year 2005 as follows: 555 programmes in 2005, 577 in 
2006, and 585 in 2007. For all these programmes, their performance was represented as 
a numeric score or as one of four grades. In aiming to describe the links between budget 
decisions and performance, the research concentrated on this three year period of the 
implementation of Korean performance budgeting. As regards the question of how far 
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the results of the study can be generalized, it should be noted that the study considered 
the SABP assessment of all budgetary programmes which had been scheduled for such 
assessments in the three years of its duration. 
 
As described above, Korean performance budgeting may have an effect on personnel 
and organizational behaviour, for example, in managerial practice. In the case of an 
assessment, an element of performance budgeting, this will be followed by a response. 
It is this response that may result in changing the behaviour of an organization or its 
personnel. According to both the National Finance Act and the Government 
Performance Assessment Act, the Korean central government assesses programmes 
using SABP and utilizes the assessments for making budget decisions and evaluating 
ministry (and agency) performance or personnel performance. As a result, Korean 
performance budgeting has the potential to cause changes in wide areas of government 
activities. However, this study is limited to changes in programme-managerial practices. 
This research uses the perceptions of administrators about the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting in relation to changes in seven programme-managerial practices 
(goal clarity, goal difficulty, budget adequacy, budget participation, budget flexibility, 
procedure formalization, and support from senior management) and in programme 
performance. Conducting a survey in 2009, this research used the survey to analyse the 
impacts which Korean performance budgeting had had on managerial practices or 
programme performance up until that time.  
 
To sum up, this thesis focuses on the impacts of Korean performance budgeting on 
government management. The analysis of links between budget decisions and 
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performance is confined to the three budget years 2006, 2007, and 2008. In terms of 
changes in the eight practice factors, this thesis measures them for the year 2009. 
However, the dynamic processes of their changes are beyond the scope of this research.  
 
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Figure 1-1 illustrates the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 1 introduces the objectives, scope, and configuration of this thesis.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a survey and analysis of existing research studies on performance 
and performance budgeting. This chapter first defines the concept of performance and 
then examines the factors which may influence programme performance within an 
organization. Following the descriptions of performance, a variety of performance 
budgeting systems implemented since the 1950s are introduced, and recent 
developments in performance budgeting are presented. Finally, this chapter describes 
the impacts of performance budgeting on government operations.  
 
As noted earlier, this thesis focuses on Korean performance budgeting. In Chapter 3, the 
process of Korean performance budgeting is specifically described. First, its historical 
background and details of its introduction by the Korean central government are 
presented. The framework of the current performance budgeting system is illustrated 
diagrammatically. The chapter then examines SABP, a critical tool for assessing 
programmes, comparing it with the Programme Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
developed in the United States. Finally, the impacts of Korean performance budgeting 
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are described in the context of reviewing existing research work. This chapter describes 
its possible contributions to changes in programme-managerial practices, focusing on 
checklists for SABP. 
 
Chapter 4 develops research questions and determines ways to address them. There are 
a large number of issues about performance budgeting that need to be dealt with. This 
thesis starts from the question of how performance budgeting associates budget 
decisions with performance, bearing in mind that, by linking budget decisions with 
performance, it aims to improve performance. Furthermore, the thesis raises the 
question of whether performance budgeting improves performance, and how it changes 
managerial practices. Chapter 4 introduces techniques for answering these questions. 
Employing a quantitative approach, in this chapter the thesis constructs models for 
regressing budget decisions on performance. For analysing changes in practices, seven 
practice variables and one performance variable are selected, with reference to the 
discussion in Chapters 2 (literature review) and 3 (Korean performance budgeting) 
about impacts of Korean performance budgeting on programme-managerial practices 
which may affect performance. An opinion survey is designed to measure these, and the 
demographic characteristics of this survey are described. 
 
Chapter 5 provides statistical descriptions of SABP results depending on programme 
types, and questions and sections in SABP checklists. It is expected to give some 
suggestions for analysing differences in budget linkages and managerial practice 
changes among programme groups in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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Chapter 6, using the techniques presented in Chapter 4, conducts an empirical analysis 
of how Korean performance budgeting has associated budget decisions with programme 
performance. After describing data, this chapter analyses the regression results of 
budget changes with SABP scores. More specifically, it identifies differences in the 
extent of links between ministries and agencies, and the four SABP grades. Also, it 
examines differences in the links, depending on types of programme. These empirical 
results are expected to give statistical evidence of whether SABP results have been 
reflected in budget decisions.  
 
Chapter 7, using the methods discussed in Chapter 4, analyses the impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting on programme performance and programme-managerial 
practices within spending organizations. In order to establish the reliability of data 
gathered in a survey of Korean government administrators, exploratory factor analysis is 
conducted. The contributions of performance budgeting toward changing eight variables 
are presented. Differences in these contributions between organizations, programmes, 
and the uses of SABP results are examined using analysis of variance (ANOVA). Finally, 
this chapter examines whether these seven practices make a difference to improving 
performance. 
 
Chapter 8 provides a summary of the thesis, and concludes by discussing the limitations 
and implications of this research.  
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Figure 1-1 Structure of this thesis  
 
 
 
 
  
1. Identifying performance factors 
2. Defining performance budgeting: 
basic elements 
3. Describing impact on government 
1. Identifying basic characteristics 
2. Analysing the SABP results 
3. Describing impact: budget link and 
programme-managerial practices 
Defining analysis methods: 
Regression analysis and ANOVA 
Developing research 
questions: 
 
 
 
2. What are the impacts of 
performance budgeting on 
programmes, particularly 
programme-managerial practices 
and programme performance? 
 
1. Are budget decisions linked to 
programme performance? 
Introduction: The objectives, scope, and structure of this thesis 
(Chapter 1) 
Reviewing the literature 
dealing with performance 
budgeting (Chapter 2) 
Examining Korean 
performance budgeting 
(Chapter 3) 
Constructing methodology 
(Chapter 4) 
Analyzing how budget 
decisions are linked with 
performance (Chapter 6) 
Conclusion: Summary, policy implications, and future research area 
(Chapter 8) 
Analysing SABP results 
(Chapter 5) 
Analyzing the impacts of 
performance budgeting on 
programmes (Chapter 7) 
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CHAPTER 2 DISCUSSIONS OF PERFORMANCE 
BUDGETING 
 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
A budget, a financial plan for what is being done or what it is intended shall be done 
(Musgrave, 1961), is a not uncommon feature in the life of an individual or an 
organization, whether the latter is in the private or the public sector. Fleischman and 
Marquette (1986; re-cited Tyer and Willand, 1997) noted that it is difficult to imagine 
governments without budgeting. Budgets play a critical role in public management. 
Wildavsky (1961) compared public budgets to the lifeblood of governments. That is to 
say, budgets are essential for the management activities of governments. 
 
Schick (1966) argued that a budget, basically, has three functions: control, management, 
and planning. The earliest modern budget systems placed an emphasis on the control of 
governments. However, as budget systems have evolved, with the invention of a variety 
of accounting techniques, auditing techniques, and controls for budget-implementing 
units, the control function of budgets has attracted less attention than their other 
functions.  
 
As government activities expanded in the post-World War 2 era, the voting public 
started to ask critical questions about what was being accomplished. In the mid-1980s, 
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when economic recession deepened, the demand on public services increased but the 
revenues that governments could call on to provide these were squeezed. To handle 
these difficult situations, governments concentrated on enhancing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public spending. Since then, governments have shown an increasing 
tendency to shift from detailed input control to a more results-oriented budget 
management. As a consequence, performance budgeting has regained the attention 
which it originally received in the 1960s. The new performance budgeting models aim 
to improve the performance of government operations by associating budget decisions 
with performance. 
 
Performance budgeting in the public sector has varied widely across the countries which 
have implemented it, because individual countries have constantly developed their 
practice. New Zealand, one of the leading countries in the field, began to introduce the 
present form of performance budgeting in the late 1980s, and was followed in the 1990s 
by Canada, Finland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. New Zealand has been 
shifting the emphasis of performance budgeting from outputs to outcomes. France has 
enacted a law which requires the measurement of outputs and outcomes in budget 
documentation for government programmes (Curristine, 2005a).  
 
On the other hand, performance budgeting, in particular as a reform lever, may have an 
impact on various government operations. For example, performance budgeting, at the 
very least, is required to give spending organizations and administrators increased 
flexibility so that they can reallocate funds within the controls on budget line items. At 
the same time it ensures their responsibility for the results of reallocated funds. Thus, 
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returning to performance budgeting may cause spending organizations and 
administrators to adjust their managerial behaviour. In turn, the adjustment of 
managerial behaviour specifically related to performance factors may influence the 
performance of spending organizations‟ activities, including their implementation of 
policies and programmes. Nonetheless, there have been many arguments about whether 
performance budgeting has served its primary purpose. Some authors have argued that 
performance budgeting has failed to link budget decisions with performance and to 
improve performance (Shick, 2003; Willoughby and Melkers, 2001). Others have 
reported that it has contributed to the improvement of public finance (MPB, 2006a; Park, 
2006; Reddick, 2003; Poister and Streib, 1999). 
 
Performance budgeting, as described above, has been implemented in different forms by 
many governments. It has contributed to various, and sometimes contradictory, 
reputations. In order to investigate why it has been viewed in different ways, this 
chapter reviews various existing literatures which discuss it. Firstly, Section 2.2 
examines what performance, a vital element of performance budgeting, is. In this 
section, the author examines definitions of performance, key performance factors, and 
some issues that relate to the measurement of performance. Section 2.3 defines what 
performance budgeting is: its history, definition, and types. Section 2.4 looks into the 
impact of performance budgeting on government operations. And the last section 
provides a discussion of the limitations of performance budgeting. 
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2.2 Performance in the Public Sector 
 
2.2.1 Definition of Performance 
It is not easy to define performance budgeting in the public sector in a single phrase, 
because performance has diverse definitions in both the practical and the technical sense. 
From performance budgeting‟s inception in 1950, the concept of performance in 
government has evolved in accordance with the objectives of budgeting systems or 
approaches. Ultimately, performance depends on the objectives of budget management 
systems (Diamond, 2005).   
 
If the budget management system is a traditional one, performance will be 
defined by measures of compliance and stewardship. On the other hand, if the 
budget management system is outcome focused, and judges success in terms of 
impact on society, in this case performance will be defined by measures of the 
effectiveness of outputs produced (Diamond, 2005, pp 4). 
 
First of all, starting from the general viewpoint that performance budgeting can be 
defined as a budget management system which places a focus on performance for 
managing budgets, performance needs to be conceptualized. In order to define 
performance, a simple logic model of public service production is employed in 
1
. As 
seen in the figure, this model illustrates four paths: input, process, output, and outcome. 
It adds an outcome process to the typical production model of the private sector. 
 
                                                
1
 This model is regarded as the basis for assessing performance, and has a long tradition (Diamond: 
2005.3). Bouckaert & Halligan (2008) state that for public organizations it is crucial to secure the trust of 
citizens, and so they add the trust stage to the process. 
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Figure 2-1 Definition of performance in the public service production process 
 
 
Input → Process → Output → Outcome 
      1                        2                                     3 
 
   1. input/input: economy    
   2. output/input: efficiency  
   3. outcome/output: effectiveness 
 
The process starts with an input stage. An input is the acquisition of resources such as 
personnel, infrastructure, finance and other physical assets. In this sense, it is relatively 
easy to quantitatively measure this stage. A process refers to activities for which inputs 
are used. Activities produce outputs through implementing policies, programmes, and 
other government activities. An output is the name given to direct goods and services 
produced by various government activities. And an outcome, „not what the program or 
organization itself did but the consequences of what the programme or organization did 
(Bovaird and Loffler, 2003, pp 130)‟, is taken to be the final or long-term consequences 
and the effects or impacts on the community of a policy or a programme. Outcomes are 
more difficult to measure, due to the fact that they are affected by various external 
factors.  
 
Based on this model, performance in the public sector has three dimensions. Firstly, 
economy, which is „the cost divided by the input (e.g. the cost per employee, the costs 
per office)‟ (Bovaird and Loffler, 2003, pp 131). In general, a traditional budget 
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management system concentrates on controlling input costs, and so places the emphasis 
on economy. Secondly, efficiency, which are defined as the ratio of output to input, as in 
the number of crimes solved by per police officer or the number of closures per 
inspection. Indeed, governments mainly tend to estimate efficiency, when measuring 
operation results. Finally, effectiveness is outcome divided by output, as in the amount 
by which transport expense is reduced by each Km of road extension. As outcome is 
more difficult to measure than input, effectiveness is not as easy to measure as economy. 
 
As the focus of budget systems has changed from input to output and outcome, 
measurement of performance has become a critical issue. Performance tends to be 
conceptualized to focus on the measurability of efficiency and effectiveness (Miller et 
al., 2001; Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008). Performance, in practice, needs to be defined to 
be measurable and utilizable for managing government operations in the public sector. 
In this sense, it is not easy or reasonable to define performance as a unique concept. 
Behn (2003) noted that no single performance measurement is appropriate for overall 
management. Bovaird (1996; re-cited Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008) makes a 
significant suggestion that performance „is not a unitary concept, within an 
unambiguous meaning. Rather, it must be viewed as a set of information about 
achievements of varying significance to different stakeholders‟. This approach may 
have the advantage of covering a diverse range of performance budgeting systems from 
the „performance budget‟ recommended by the Hoover Commission in the United States, 
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), and Zero-Based Budgeting 
(ZBB) to the „new‟ performance budgeting of the 1990s (Robinson & Brumby, 2005). 
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2.2.2 Determinants of Performance 
 
Many researchers have argued that the performance of an organization and the success 
of its programmes are influenced by both internal and external elements: these include 
the capability of its personnel; its organizational type; its administration; organizational 
strategy; its organizational culture; and the external environment in which it functions. 
More specifically, the performance of organizations is closely related to organizational 
characteristics such as organizational size and organizational structure, as well as to 
external environment (Andrew, 1980; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Burns and Stalker, 
1961; re-cited Keats and Hitt, 1985). 
 
The external environment is widely believed to have a major impact on organization 
performance. Some researchers have argued that the degree of congruence between an 
organization and its environment is one of the critical factors affecting performance. 
Burns and Stalker (1961) suggested that „the success of a firm stems, in part, from the 
adoption of an organizational structure sufficient to deal with changing competitive 
circumstances (Recited Lenz, 1981, pp 134).‟ Child (1975), in an examination of 82 
British companies, observed that the higher the performance, the greater the number of 
structured activities demonstrated, particularly in a stable environment. Also, Mason 
(1939) tested whether the market structure firms faced externally affected their conduct 
and, in turn, whether their conduct influenced performance. The results of the test 
indicated that market structure does explain the performance of an organization. The 
results of studies of the relationship between market structure and performance are often 
applied to public policy making (Lenz, 1981). 
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On the other hand, Pennings (1975) found, in sample-testing a „structural-contingency‟ 
hypothesis (the structure of organizations is associated with their environment and 
technology), that associations between organizational structure and external 
environment failed to explain the variance in effectiveness. Miner (1979) and Argyris 
(1973) concluded that the performance of an organization is affected more directly by 
how successfully its human resources are integrated than by its external environment. 
The variations in these theories produced by empirical studies may be the result of a 
discrepancy between the settings in which the organizations were situated (Lenz, 1981). 
Taking the different theories into account, external environment needs to be seen as a 
fundamental factor when research is conducted into an organization‟s performance. 
 
The characteristics of an organization, such as type, size, structure, and the technology 
which it uses, are widely argued to have a major influence on its performance. They 
affect the decision-making process and managerial practices, and make a difference to 
the quantity and quality of the organization‟s goods and services (Merget and Renee, 
1982; Jackson et al., 1989). After Banner and Gangne (1995) derived five common 
characteristics from their definitions of organizations – (1) goal direction, (2) relatively 
identifiable boundary, (3) social interaction, (4) deliberately structured activity system, 
and (5) culture – they suggested that these five elements are generally related to the 
performance of an organization. Likert (1976), also, established a „profile of 
organizational characteristics‟: leadership, motivation, communication, interaction, 
decision making, goal setting, and process control. The different profiles make a 
different organizational structure: bureaucracy, adhocracy, matrix structure, and so on. 
This, in turn, has an impact on organizational performance.  
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Many studies have indicated that organizational structure makes a difference in the 
performance of an organization. Organizational structure is believed to have an impact 
on individual behaviour as well as on organizational performance (Jackson et al., 1989). 
Studies of industrial organizations have observed that there is a significant relationship 
between organizational structure and organizational performance in a control situation 
(Marcus, 1969; Whittington, 1971; Child, 1974; Scheoffler, 1977; Steer and Cable, 
1978). These discussions stem, in part, from a belief in the interaction between 
organizational structure and participants in the organization. Organizational structure is 
not only formed by participants‟ thinking but also affects the way in which participants 
think (Lenz, 1981). Dalton et al. (1980, pp 60) concluded in their research review on the 
relationship between organizational structure and performance that „evaluations and 
generalizations concerning the nature and directions of these relationships are tenuous.‟ 
They suggested that micro-level studies of the relationship between organizational 
structure and performance should be conducted using organizational variables: degree 
of formalization, organizational size, and other „structural‟/„structuring‟2 dimensions. 
 
Boyne & Walker (2005) suggested at a symposium, „Determinants of performance in 
public organization‟, that „a growing number of studies show that management does 
matter. …… many issues remain to be addressed about how public management 
variables are related to organizational performance.‟ Also, in the public sector, many 
studies have suggested that management is one of the critical factors which affect the 
outputs and outcomes of programmes. Furthermore, performance-focused management 
                                                
2
 Campbell et al. (1974) made a distinction between the structural and structuring characteristics of 
organizations. The structural characteristics are physical attributes such as size, control span, and flat/tall 
hierarchy; and the structuring characteristics are policies or activities within an organization which 
regulate its members‟ behaviour, such as the degree of centralization, formalization and etc. 
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„not only has an impact on the key public management functions and components 
(HRM, finance, strategy, and etc.) but also changes the nature of policy and 
management in the public sector in itself (Bouckeart and Halligan, 2008, pp 2).‟  
 
Roughly speaking, studies of the relationship between public management and 
performance have two streams: they either focus on managers‟ behaviour; or they focus 
on the administrative and managerial arrangements as opposed to managers‟ behaviour 
(Coggburn and Schneider, 2003). Focusing on managers‟ behaviour, many researchers 
(Cohen, 1993; Riccucci, 1995; Denhardt, 1993; Ingraham, Thompson and Sanders, 
1998) have observed that managers‟ attributes and behaviour have a significant impact 
on organizational performance. Unlike the classical microeconomic assumption that 
managers are rational, managers‟ behaviour in an organization may be determined by 
such motives as maximization of a personal utility function (Williamson, 1963; McKean 
and Scott, 1975) or budget (Niskanen, 1971). Some researchers have argued that the 
level of motivation and skill of administrators have a positive relationship with 
organizational performance. Participation in making budget decisions is strongly argued 
to have a positive correlation with motivation and/or performance (Kenis, 1979).  
 
Organizational culture, as a concept which originated from anthropology, has a variety 
of definitions and has been applied to organizational studies in many ways (Smircich, 
1983). Organizational culture, put simply, refers to „the pattern of shared meanings in an 
organization (Trice and Beyer, 1993; recited Rainey, 2003, pp 308).‟ Among 
organizational researchers, organizational culture has been emphasized as a critical 
internal or external variable for organizational performance (Smircich, 1983). 
23 
 
Organizational culture has a critical role in the process of reforming an organization. 
For example, Flowers et al. (1999) observed, in the state of Florida in the US, that 
organizational culture was one of the main factors which had an effect on the 
implementation of a performance-based system. 
 
As has been seen by now, there are many factors, internal and external, which influence 
the performance of an organization or a programme. However, several performance 
factors have been examined more specifically, which suits the purpose of this study. 
Chung (2003) conducted empirical research into the effect of performance budgeting on 
performance of programmes and organizations in Korean central government. In this 
research, along with three characteristics of budget management, he distilled four major 
factors from organizational characteristics: goal clarity, leadership, the degree of 
decentralization (or centralization), and the degree of formalization. Centring mainly on 
these, this study gives more specific discussion to performance factors.  
 
Goals 
 
An organizational goal is generally defined as the mission or the objectives of an 
organization. It promotes the existence or survival of the organization and its activities 
in various vital ways, such as by providing a standard of performance, a basis for 
planning and management control, guidelines for decision-making, and so on (Banner 
and Gangne, 1995). If, for example, the goal for a policy or a programme is not set 
clearly, it may not be possible to evaluate the effects of that policy or programme 
appropriately. In this sense, a goal is often employed as an instrument for stimulating 
motivation, behaviour, and job performance. The effects can be made positive or 
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negative, depending on the characteristics of the goal, such as clarity, difficulty, number 
of objectives, and how it has been set (imposed or motivated) (Boyne and Chen, 2007). 
In addition, some researchers have stressed the importance of participation by members 
of an organization in the process of goal setting. Analyzing the effect of goal setting on 
performance under different task conditions, Hirst (1987) proposed that it was crucial 
for members to participate in setting goals in order to improve the performance of an 
organization. He found that a task might attain a less effective goal if participants had 
little knowledge of how their goal had been set.  
 
Of the possible qualities for a goal, clarity and difficulty have attracted much attention 
in academic and practical literatures. The clarity of goals has been defined as „the extent 
to which goals are stated specifically and clearly, and are understood by those who are 
responsible for meeting them‟ (Kenis, 1979, pp 709). „Goal clarity or goal ambiguity 
characterizes organizations‟ (Matland, 1995; recited Flowers et al., 1999). Flowers et al. 
(1999), in their comparative study of Florida, found that organizations with clear goals 
tended to implement policy using a „top-down‟ approach, and that organization with 
ambiguous goals used a „bottom-up‟ approach.  
 
With regard to the relationship between goal clarity and performance, Locke (1968; re-
cited Kenis, 1979) presumed that a goal controls an organization or the behaviour of the 
organization‟s personnel. He suggested that organizations with a specific goal are more 
productive than those with a vague goal, because an ambiguous goal gives grounds for 
employees‟ confusion, tension, and dissatisfaction. On the other hand, opponents of 
planning have stressed that quantified goals can have a negative impact on performance 
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because they can de-motivate members of the organization who disagree with them 
(Boyne and Chen, 2007). 
 
Goal difficulty is defined as „the level of performance required to achieve a goal (Hirst, 
1987, pp 774).‟ Hirst (1987) labelled goals as „easy (or low)‟ or „difficult (or high)‟ on 
the basis of an average level. The level of goal difficulty may make a difference in the 
performance in an organization. An inappropriate level of goal difficulty can de-
motivate members of an organization. Goals that are too easily attainable may fail to 
inspire or challenge the members of an organization, whereas unattainable goals may 
stimulate feelings of failure and frustration. Some studies have suggested that while 
easy or low goals result in lower performance, difficult or high goals result in higher 
performance (Locke, 1968; Likert, 1967). Other researchers have found that if goals are 
not possible to achieve, they result in poor performance (Stedry and Kay, 1966; 
Hofstede, 1967; re-cited Kenis, 1979). In conclusion, Hanson (1966) recommended that 
goals should be attainable and yet challenging if they are to result in higher performance. 
 
As noted above, setting goals with different characteristics may make a difference in the 
performance of an organization. 
 
Leadership 
 
There are many ways of defining leadership and interpreting its meaning, depending on 
the situation in which it is being demonstrated. In general, leadership is defined as a 
„relationship through which one person influences the behaviour or actions of other 
people‟ (Banner and Gangne, 1995, pp 246). Leadership, an interpersonal relationship, 
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is closely related to the motivation shown by members of an organization. A leader can 
encourage or discourage the members of their organization when it comes to being 
motivated towards achieving the organization‟s goals. Leadership has an effect on 
almost all activities related to the performance of particular personnel or of 
organizations as a whole. Organizations with effective leadership tend to produce high-
quality goods and services more efficiently (Wart, 2003). 
 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) suggested that leadership was one of the vital factors 
that affected the successful implementation of policies or the successful performance of 
institutions. The introduction of new institutions into an organization, in particular as a 
reform lever, requires the active and enthusiastic support of the leadership if these 
institutions are to attain their primary purpose. In the 1990s, when administrative 
reforms swept across the world, there were increasing leadership problems.  
 
Centralization/Decentralization 
 
The degree to which an organization is centralized or decentralized is related to the 
question of who has the authority to make decisions. If one or a small number of 
individuals exert particular influence on the decision-making within an organization, the 
organization is regarded as centralized. The extent of centralization is measured by the 
dispersion of decision-making authority through the organization. Accordingly, 
centralization tends to be described as organizational structures which reflect how 
decision-making authority is distributed among organization members. Decentralization 
is defined as the redistribution of decision-making authority down to lower levels in an 
organization. A decentralized organization is likely to make greater use of the ideas of 
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lower level employees. 
 
It is generally accepted that centralization or decentralization are elements which affect 
the performance of an organization. In particular, given that the running of organizations 
has recently become more complex and fast paced, many organizational researchers 
have proposed that centralization‟s weakness when it comes to providing a quick 
response to situations has a negative impact on performance (Dalton et al., 1980). And 
also, administrative reformers have paid more attention to decentralization. Accordingly, 
recent developments in public organizations tend to show a shift to flatter structures 
with a wider span of control, and so a shorter flow of decision-making.  
 
Formalization 
 
The degree of formalization in an organization is measured by the extent to which the 
organization‟s operations are defined formally by rules, policies, and procedures. 
Formalization regulates and controls the behaviour of personnel in an organization. In 
this sense, it is closely associated with standardization, which also prescribes the 
behaviour and procedures expected of personnel in an organization (Dalton et al., 1980). 
 
There have been many arguments about what effects formalization has on the 
performance of an organization. Proponents of formalization have argued that, because 
it enhances predictability and stability, it can diminish the cost of communication in 
operating an organization. They have suggested that an organization requires some 
degree of formalization in order to avoid role ambiguity among members, and that it 
therefore improves members‟ behaviour and performance (Rizzo et al., 1970). 
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On the other hand, formalization may lead to boredom and job dissatisfaction amongst 
members of an organization because of constraints on the scope of jobs (Hackman and 
Lawler, 1971). In this sense, it may be counterproductive. It may also generate role 
conflict because it limits the opportunity for negotiation (Spekman and Johnston, 1986; 
recited Michaels et.al, 1988). 
 
Similarly, the results of empirical research in this field have been mixed. Harrison (1974) 
reported that formalization had a positive relationship with performance in an 
organization. In contrast, some other authors have suggested that formalization has a 
negative relationship with employees‟ attitudes (Greene, 1978; Deshpande, 1982). 
Furthermore, Rogers and Mulnar (1976) found in an interview with 102 top-level 
county administrators that formalization was not associated with performance. These 
mixed results indicate that there may be an optimal level of formalization that reduces 
role ambiguity but provides employees with reasonable scope for doing their job 
(Dalton et al., 1980). 
 
Budgeting 
 
A budget, even though there may exist variations, depending on the emphasis given to 
particular elements, is generally defined as a financial plan for the activities of an 
organization. It is not only a financial plan, but also a key device for managing an 
organization. From the economic point of view, Musgrave (1980) presented three 
functions of budgets: allocation of resources, redistribution of income and wealth, and 
stabilization of employment and outputs. Also, a budget plays a variety of 
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administrative roles within an organization. Schick, in his article „The Road to PPB 
(1966)‟, suggested that a budget has three basic functions: planning, management, and 
control
3
. 
 
Budgeting is one of the management activities which may affect the success of an 
organization. Leonard et al. (1995) explained that a budget makes a crucial contribution 
to organizing management culture, and that changes in budgetary practices lead to 
changes in management culture and in incentives for managers. Because budgeting, as a 
management activity, tends to induce different reactions amongst the members of an 
organization (Miliani, 1975), it has a critical impact on the results of organizational 
management. Argyris (1953) proposed that because budgeting is one of the accounting 
techniques that provide rewards or punishments for organization members, it tends to 
affect them directly.  
The direction and strength of the impacts that budgets have depends very much on 
organizational characteristics related to budgeting: budget adequacy, budget 
responsibility, budget participation, and budget flexibility (Kenis, 1979). In an empirical 
examination of 169 department managers, Kenis (1979) reported that budget 
responsibility, budget participation, and budget goal clarity had a positive relationship 
with the job- and budget-related attitudes of managers.  
Budget adequacy is defined as the extent to which a budget is adequate to accomplish a 
programme. In a survey study on the relationship between budget participation and job 
                                                
3
 According to Schick, „Planning involves the determination of objectives, the evaluation of alternative 
courses of action, and the authorization of selected programmes. Management involves the programming 
of approved goals into specific projects and activities, the design of organizational units to carry out 
approved programmes, and the staffing of these units and the procurement of necessary resources. 
Control refers to the process of binding operating officials to the policies and plans set by their 
supervisors‟. 
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performance, Nouri and Parker (1998, pp 467) described budget adequacy as „the 
degree to which the individual perceives that budgeted resources are adequate to fulfil 
job requirements.‟ They proposed that budget adequacy works as an intervening 
variable between budget participation and job performance, and that it is likely to 
improve job performance directly and indirectly via organizational commitment.  
 
Budget participation has been described as members of an organization having an 
influence on, and being involved in, decisions related to their own budgets. Many 
management studies have examined how participation in making a budgetary decision 
affects the performance of an organization and its employees. Budget participation 
affects job or organizational performance directly or indirectly (Miliani, 1975). 
 
Some studies have indicated that budget participation has a positive impact on 
performance (e.g. Argyris, 1952; Merchant, 1981). Proponents of budget participation 
have argued that, although members of an organization have a different quantity and 
quality of information about programmes and about local conditions, they can share 
various kinds of information with each other by participating in a budgeting process. 
This may result in the creation of more accurate budgets. Nouri and Parker (1998, pp 
469) found that „subordinates often have better information about the level of budgetary 
support required to perform the subordinate‟s tasks than do superiors.‟ Other proponents 
have proposed that participation improves job or organizational attitude. Hanson (1966) 
stated that budget participation helps members to identify the goals of the budget and 
the organization. Miliani (1975) suggested, in a survey, that there was a positive 
correlation between budget participation and attitudes toward the participant‟s job and 
the organization as a whole.  
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It has been suggested that budget participation has a positive effect on the performance 
of a job and an organization. Nouri and Parker (1998) found that there was a positive 
relationship between budget participation and job performance via budget adequacy and 
organizational commitment. Furthermore, Brownell found, in a field study (1982), that 
participation and job performance formed a strongly positive relationship the extent of 
which differed according to the individuals‟ personality. Others, however, have reported 
that budget participation has a significantly negative relationship with performance 
(Bryan and Locke, 1967; Stedry, 1960). Such diverse results are likely to stem from 
diversities in the contexts in which jobs and organizations exist. 
 
Autonomy in budget execution is related to the flexibility which managers have in 
implementing budgets. Techniques for making budget execution flexible vary 
depending on budgetary purpose and the relationships between government agencies. 
For example, if control of the budget is emphasized, the line-item appropriation is more 
centred. Pitsvada (1983) presented six techniques which US federal agencies had used 
in budget execution, as follows: (1) object classification; (2) the appropriation structure; 
(3) contingency appropriations; (4) emergency provisions; (5) transfer authority; and (6) 
reprogramming authority. 
Budget flexibility has been widely argued to have an impact on programme 
performance. Nonetheless, there have not been many studies in the field. Pitsvada (1983, 
pp 84) criticized the fact that even though budget execution was a key factor in 
improving government performance, it remained „the most neglected area of budget 
research.‟ Hanson (1966) recommended that an increase in budget flexibility was 
required for enhancing the attainability of goals. A goal with an inflexible budget may 
become obsolete when circumstances changed.  
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More recently, there has been a growing emphasis on budget flexibility related to the 
increasing introduction of performance budgeting by governments. The first concern in 
this is to enlarge the autonomy of spending agencies to reallocate funds within the 
limitations of budget line items. There has been a growing trend towards giving 
organizations and managers greater freedom in operational decisions, instead of 
withholding from them more direct responsibility for results (Diamond, 2001). Against 
this background, the Korean financial authority announced that it would enlarge the 
budget flexibility of spending ministries and agencies, in response to the introduction of 
performance budgeting (MPB, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
 
2.2.3 Measurement of Performance 
 
2.2.3.1 Concepts and purposes 
 
Most OECD countries have not only implemented a performance management system 
but have also introduced performance information into budgetary documents (Curristine, 
2005). Performance management in the public sector has been spreading with the „new 
public management‟ movement. Neely (1999) specified the reasons for this prevalence 
as follows: the changing nature of work, increasing competition, specific improvement 
initiatives, national and international quality awards, changing organizational roles, 
changing external demands and, finally, the power of information technology. 
 
Measuring performance has recently been one of the main issues in public management. 
OECD members have a common tendency to concentrate on performance measurement, 
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in spite of diverse approaches to performance management (Curristine, 2005). Fifty per 
cent of surveyed OECD countries have used performance measurement results in order 
to set programme priorities and to allocate budgets among programmes (Curristine, 
2005). Berman and Wang (2000) found in a 1998 survey that 33.6% of U.S counties, 
even though the intensity with which they did it varied, measured performance and 
utilized the results. 
 
Performance measurement is defined as measuring the progress or achievements of 
activities with a series of measures (Wang, 2000). Similarly, the GAO (2005) described 
it as „the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program4 accomplishments, particularly 
progress toward pre-established goals.‟ Performance measurement must be 
distinguished from performance evaluation, which involves the conducting of individual 
systematic studies periodically or on an ad hoc basis to assess how well a programme is 
working (GAO, 2005). 
 
Performance measurement is not an end in itself. Rather, it is a means of performance 
management which collects a piece of information and ensures accountability (Osborne 
et al., 1995). Therefore, measuring performance is a key element underlying 
performance management. It provides analytical tools for managing organizations‟ 
planning, personnel, finance and other management activities. For example, it produces 
useful information for setting target levels in the process of designing a programme. The 
level of targets helps calculate an adequate amount of resources for the implementation 
of programmes. Also, managers can monitor programmes by checking actually-realized 
                                                
4
 A programme may be any activity, project, function, or policy that has an identifiable purpose or set of 
objectives. 
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performance against pre-established targets during the course of the programmes‟ 
implementation. Finally, performance measurement is used as a tool for reporting 
achievements. Many countries publish an annual performance report (Curristine, 2005).  
 
2.2.3.2 Considerations of measurement 
 
Although performance measurement in itself has diverse advantages, it is difficult and 
complex to quantify the performance of governments. The first factor creating this 
difficulty is the ambiguity or multiplicity of performance concepts. As noted previously, 
performance may be defined as economy, efficiency, or effectiveness, depending on the 
emphasis of an assessment. Performance measurement in the public sector requires 
consideration of „a particular set of political and societal values, ethics and assumptions 
that have been translated into legislative requirements by successive governments‟ 
(Rogers, 1995, pp 19). These considerations define the concept of performance in the 
public sector. The second factor is goal multiplicity or ambiguity of programmes or 
policies. The third factor is the long time it takes for some programmes to take effect. It 
is critical to recognize that for many activities, such as education and health, it can be a 
long time before the outcomes or impacts are realized.  
 
This difficulty in measurement tends to stem from the typical characteristics of public 
goods and services. Public goods and services are generally not transacted and are 
supplied free, or at an economically insignificant price. This means they cannot just be 
measured in terms of market price. Additionally, governments produce many intangible 
services for which attention needs to be focused on quality rather than quantity (Warner 
and Havens, 1968). 
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More seriously, measuring performance tends to be a political process in which the 
interests of various stakeholders are entangled. Bouckeart and Halligan (2008, pp 27) 
suggest that assessing performance „is not a neutral exercise. It is a managerial activity 
which …… affects the behaviour of individuals and organizations.‟ Although this may 
produce either advantages or disadvantages for improving performance, an 
inappropriate measure of success can cause unforeseen reactions. There are many 
examples of the use of inappropriate performance indicators leading to distorted and 
counterproductive responses. Take the example of a nail factory in an early socialist 
production system. Where performance is measured by quota or weight, the managers 
have an incentive to produce nails which the market does not demand. 
 
The manager of a nail factory, whose quota was set in terms of the number of 
nails, and who was rewarded as he made or exceeded his quota, was inevitably 
driven to producing large numbers of small nails, regardless of market 
requirements. With production quotas specified as a certain weight of nails, the 
same manager would necessarily concentrate on producing a smaller number of 
very heavy nails – again, regardless of market demand (Schultze, 1969, pp 36). 
 
To prevent this sort of thing from happening, some authors have recommended that 
performance measurement is integrated into a performance management system. 
Diamond (2005) warned that, if performance is measured in isolation, organizations run 
the risk of having the following problems: (1) overreliance on performance measures; it 
is usually not a comprehensive evaluation; (2) using inappropriate measures; (3) misuse 
of the measurement system by having different interpretations of performance indicators; 
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and (4) information overload and lack of selectivity due to oversimplification or 
multiple measures of performance. Furthermore, he recommended avoiding the above 
dangers by using the following strategies; (1) clarifying the purpose of performance 
measurement: Who will use the information? How will they use it? And why will they 
use it? (2) focusing on core information in order to prevent information overload; (3) 
aligning performance measurement with the practical needs of the agency; (4) 
producing a balanced perspective on performance: i.e., producing an appropriate mix of 
internally generated and external measures; (5) having a regular review of performance 
measures so that they reflect surrounding changes over time (6) ensuring the robustness 
of basic information. 
 
Apart from these problems, measuring performance entails cost. For example, it 
requires the support of an effective information system, in order to ensure that 
information is received at the time it is required. The cost of performance measurement 
may be higher than its benefits. 
 
2.2.3.3 Methods of measurement 
 
These difficulties of performance measurement lead to the development of different 
methods of measuring performance which take into consideration the conditions under 
which organizations operate and the purposes for which performance is being measured. 
The different methods produce different kinds of performance information of varying 
depth and scope. Furthermore, there is a growing awareness that financial 
measurements are necessary, but not necessarily all that is needed, for managing 
organizations in both the private and the public sectors. Typical financial measurements 
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have been criticized for promoting „short-termism‟ (Banks and Wheelwright, 1979; 
Hayes and Abernathy, 1980) and „local optimisation‟ (Goldratt and Cox, 1986). Eccles 
(re-cited Ghobadian and Ashworth, 1994) pointed out that financial measurements 
should be regarded as just one of a broader set of measures, rather than the main basis 
for performance measurement. In creating public budget documents, the use of non-
financial measurements has been increasing. Seventy two per cent of OECD members 
have reported presenting such measurements as part of documents requesting the setting 
of a budget (Curristine, 2005). 
 
Efforts have continued to develop one best method of measurement which matches 
various cases and purposes. Taken together, these efforts have brought a comprehensive 
and systematic approach to performance measurement. Assessing performance 
management models in the public sector, Boukaert and Halligan (2008) concluded that 
performance measurement has shifted from being intuitive and subjective to being 
systematic. For example, Kaplan and Norton (1992) presented a comprehensive 
performance measurement system – a balanced scorecard (BSC) – which allows 
managers to check achievement from four different perspectives: financial, customer, 
internal business, and innovating and learning.  
 
In this context, there has been a significant trend towards developing performance 
indicators since the 1980s. It played a key role in Margaret Thatcher‟s government 
reform strategy in the UK. At that time, there was a growing interest in consumer 
satisfaction and quality of service, rather than in traditional financial indicators (Carter, 
1991). Recently, such performance indicators have been used to measure performance 
in many countries. There are four variations, depending on the stage of public service 
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production that the indicators focus on: input indicator, process indicator, output 
indicator, and outcome indicator (Jun and Park, 2002). These variations in indicators 
tend to affect how performance information is used in budgeting. For example, using a 
high proportion of input indicators may fail to strengthen the links between budget 
decisions and performance (Schick, 2003). Diamond (2005) reported that there was 
increasing adoption of outcome-oriented indicators among OECD countries.  
 
However, Pollit (1986) stated that „how to measure performance is a perennially 
awkward question. The notorious absence of one best method raises formidable 
difficulties in principle and practice.‟ Cave et al. (1990, pp 11) pointed out that „there is 
no easy formula which can be widely applied; it is doubtful whether anyone could ever 
produce a standard guidebook to performance measurement for the whole of the public 
sector.‟ Similarly, there is no performance indicator which gives information that is 
always useful for all types of users. Technically, a performance indicator may not 
measure various facets of performance: outcome, output, process, or input. In addition, 
relevant performance indicators are changeable over time (Neely, 1999). More seriously, 
a performance indicator does not guarantee causality between a programme‟s activities 
and its outcomes (Diamond, 2005). As a result, it is hard to develop performance 
indicators which are broadly applicable and widely acceptable in the public sector 
(Behn, 2003). 
 
Accordingly, it is suggested that performance is measured from various aspects and at 
various levels. Relevant performance indicators consider differences in the purpose of, 
and requirements for, information at each level: a project or a team, a programme or a 
department, and a strategy (Osborne et al., 1995). As described in Table 2-1, Behn (2003) 
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suggested selection criteria for performance indicators in accordance with eight 
purposes of performance measurement: evaluation, control, budget, motivation, 
promotion, celebration, learning, and improvement, respectively. 
 
Table 2-1 Characteristics of performance indicators for different purposes 
Purpose To help achieve this purpose, public managers need 
Evaluate Outcomes, combined with inputs and with the effects of exogenous factors 
Control Inputs that can be regulated 
Budget Efficiency measures (specifically, outcomes or outputs divided by inputs) 
Motivate Almost-real-time outputs compared with production targets 
Promote  Easily understood aspects of performance about which citizens really care 
Celebrate  
Periodic and significant performance targets that, when achieved, provide people with a 
real sense of personal and collective accomplishment 
Learn  Disaggregated data that can reveal deviances from the expected 
Improve 
Inside-the-black-box relationships that connect changes in operations to changes in 
outputs and outcomes 
Source: cited Behn (2003, pp 593) 
 
To produce a useful piece of performance information, public managers, firstly, need to 
determine the purposes of measurement and then to select performance indicators which 
serve those purposes. That is, managers should try to develop some appropriate 
indicators which assess a specific management activity. 
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2.2.4 Conclusion 
 
There are various factors which affect the performance of an organization or a 
programme. Performance is the output of interaction among various elements, internal 
and external, such as organization structures, administrations, culture, and environments. 
In particular, this chapter focuses on examining goal setting, leadership, formalization, 
budget adequacy, budget participation, and budget flexibility. Existing researches have 
suggested that they, generally, have an impact on the performance of an organization. 
 
As discussed above, performance is defined in various dimensions: economy, efficiency, 
and effectiveness. Also, the products of government operations have different features 
from those of private companies. Public goods and services tend not to have a price 
fixed by the market as private goods do. Many activities produce intangible services 
(Warner and Havens, 1968). This multiplicity of performances and characteristics of 
public goods cause complex problems for the measurement of performance. Behn (2003, 
pp 599) warned that „what people measure often is not precisely what they want done.‟ 
These measurement problems often lead to unintended organizational behaviours and 
results. 
 
Recently, more attention has been paid to measuring, monitoring and evaluating the 
outputs of projects and the outcomes of policy initiatives (Shick, 2003). Nonetheless, 
this attention is still limited to identifying performance determinants and developing 
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techniques of performance measurement. The political risks and the costs of 
performance measurement do not receive so much attention from researchers and 
practitioners (Halchmi, 2005). For example, when an information system was developed 
for use in performance measurement, its main purpose was to measure performance 
against time targets. Against this background, Halchmi (2005) has warned that „while 
performance measurement has a potential, its use should be encouraged but not 
mandated by external bodies.‟ 
 
2.3 Performance Budgeting in the Public Sector 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
The modern budget system in the public sector is a product of the political struggle for 
financial power between monarch and citizens. The public budget system in Europe was 
developed in the course of constraining the monarch‟s financial supremacy, a struggle 
that had been going on in England since the signing of Magna Carta in 1215. In the 
United States, the legislative branch of government took the initiative on budget 
decisions until the early twentieth century, when the line-item budgeting system was 
introduced. Each department of government requested lump-sum budgets directly from 
the legislature without providing relevant data. At that time, each department was given 
common guidelines for budget preparation and requests. The legislature deliberated to 
determine budgets, taking the requests into account (Tyer and Willand, 1997; 
Fleischman & Marquette, 2003).  
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To improve these unsystematic budget activities, the line-item budget system was 
created. It had a simple structure which listed categories of expenditures, such as 
salaries, supplies, communication, and other things to be purchased. It has a relatively 
uncomplicated structure and is easy to understand. In addition, it allows public 
expenditures to be controlled more easily. However, it has some limitations when it 
comes to describing what government is doing in areas other than purchasing.  
 
Many local and central governments have been trying to improve budget systems in 
accordance with changes in the internal and external environment. As government 
expanded in the post-war period, the focal point of budget management shifted to 
efficient utilization of limited resources. As a result, performance budgeting began to be 
introduced into the public sector.  
 
Since the Hoover Commission first recommended performance budgeting to the federal 
government of the United States in 1949, the practice has evolved continuously. In the 
1960s, the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) was introduced, and 
Management By Objectives (MBO) and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) were 
experimented with in various countries in the 1970s and 1980s. However, these 
budgeting systems were not very successful because of the limitations of performance 
measurement and the multiplicity of programme goals in the public sector (OECD, 2004; 
Lauth, 1987; Jordan & Hackbart, 1999). 
 
What is more, Schick (1966) stated that budget reform alters the equilibrium of the three 
budgetary functions of planning, management, and control. Indeed, recent developments 
in budgeting systems have placed more of an emphasis on planning and management 
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than on control. More recently, market-oriented techniques have been actively 
introduced into public budget management. Cothran (1993) pointed out that public 
budget reform has tended to apply private budget management techniques such as 
decentralization and incentives, characterized as „entrepreneurial budgeting.‟ 
 
Looking back into history and at the current status of performance budgeting may lead 
to a comprehensive and deep understanding of the procedure‟s identity and suggest 
what future models will be like. The next sections examine the definitions, types and 
recent trends of performance budgeting. 
 
2.3.2 Definitions of Performance Budgeting 
 
Performance budgeting, a practical and technical term, aims to use performance 
information for managing budgets. However, due to differences in kinds of information 
used and the ways in which information is used, the term has various definitions and 
types. According to the concept of the GAO (1993), performance budgeting should link 
performance levels with specific budget amounts, so that it can encompass PPBS, MBO, 
and ZBB. The OECD (2003) defined performance budgeting as „a form of budgeting 
that relates funds allocated to measurable results‟. Also, many literatures define 
performance budgeting as a process of linking budget decision making to performance 
of programmes (Lauth, 1985). 
 
More broadly, Jordan and Hackbart (1999, pp 69) stated that it is „preparing the budget 
document with identified performance measures.‟ McGill (2001, pp 377) defined it as 
44 
 
„the process of linking expected results to budget levels but not to any particular 
approach.‟ He argued that there was, in the end, no definitive process of performance 
budgeting. 
 
Emphasizing the formality of producing performance information, Bobinson & Brumby 
(2005, pp 5) defined performance budgeting as „procedures or mechanisms intended to 
strengthen links between the funds provided to public sector entities and their outcomes 
and/or outputs through the use of formal performance information in source allocation 
decision-making‟. From the perspective of an administrative reform, Andrews & Hill 
(2003) explained performance budgeting as an institutional reform that shifted input-
oriented into outcome-oriented budgeting.  
 
These definitions of performance budgeting have two elements in common. The first 
element is that performance budgeting should produce a formal piece of performance 
information. It is closely related to performance measurement. Here, the reader is 
referred to previous discussions, in order to avoid repetition. The second element is that 
budget decisions should be linked with performance information. Links can be divided 
into two types on the basis of their timing: the ex ante link and the ex post link. The ex 
ante link is to link budget decisions with programme performance before the 
programmes are implemented. This link allows programmes to set targets related to 
budgets. The budget amounts of programmes become associated with the level of 
targets. The ex post link is defined as a link between budget and performance after the 
implementation of a programme. It is mainly used for punishments and rewards, 
checking achievement against pre-established targets (Chung, 2003; Park, 2007; Bang, 
2008). Affected by the „new public management‟ that emphasizes market disciplines, 
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performance budgeting tends to strengthen the ex ante link (Robinson and Brumby, 
2005).  
 
The strength of the link may be different depending on models or types of performance 
budgeting. Some researchers, as will be described later, categorized performance 
budgeting on the basis of the extent to which it associates budget decisions with 
performance (Mackay, 2007; Shah, 2006).  
The reality is that it is not common to associate resource allocation with performance. 
The OECD (2005) reported that many members would rather make an indirect link 
between fund allocation and performance than a direct link. Many governments tend to 
have reviewed performance information as one of various factors considered in 
budgeting. Curristine (2005, pp 135) reported that 18% of OECD members „link 
expenditure to all or most of their output or outcome targets.‟ However, a few countries 
made direct links in certain programmes, such as health and education.  
 
In recent times, performance budgeting has tended to be more closely associated with 
long/mid-term strategic planning or mid-term expenditure frameworks. Indeed, many 
governments tend to attach strategic plans to budget request documents. The strategic 
plans set objectives or goals for the organizations and activities, and these provide a 
guide for performance measurement. In this context, some researchers have defined 
performance budgeting as „requiring strategic planning regarding agency mission, goals 
and objectives, and a process that requests quantifiable data that provides meaningful 
information about program outcomes‟ (Melkers and Willoughby, 2003; re-cited 
Robinson and Brumby, 2005). However, Melkers and Willoughby‟s definition 
encompasses non-budgeting activities, so that it expands the concept of performance 
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budgeting to broader managing-for-results (Ronbinson and Brumby, 2005). 
 
Following the generally-accepted concept of performance budgeting, this study defines 
it as a process of linking budget decisions with performance, so that it can encompass 
various kinds of performance budgeting. The United States Government Accountability 
Office (1997, GAO) recommended that „given the complexity and enormity of federal 
budget process, performance budgeting …… will need to encompass a variety of 
perspectives in its efforts to link resources with results.‟ This study does not differentiate 
between performance-based budgeting, performance budgeting and result-oriented 
budgeting, insofar as they come within the same definition. Many researchers have 
already reviewed them as equivalents with different names (McGill, 2001). 
 
2.3.3 Types of Performance Budgeting 
 
Line-item budgeting was an initial attempt at a modern budget system, as well as a 
product of public finance reform. As many researchers have argued, it has been adopted 
by many governments, and at the same time it has itself been an object of budgetary 
reform. While its strength is that it facilitates budgetary control, one of basic functions 
of budgeting, it lacks budgetary flexibility, so that it constrains the achievement of 
efficiency (Wildavsky, 1978; Cothran, 1993). 
 
To address problems associated with line-item budgeting, various experiments have 
been conducted in the public and private sector over the decades. Cothran (1993) 
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observed that „since the 1950s, a relatively major reform has been proposed about once 
each decade in an effort to overcome some of the perceived deficiencies of incremental 
line-item budgeting.‟ In the 1950s, the US federal government introduced a 
„performance budgeting‟ system in accordance with the first Hoover Commission‟s 
recommendations. Later, the US federal government adopted the Planning-
Programming-Budgeting System in 1965, and Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) in 1977. 
Other countries too have continually made similar efforts to link budget decisions to 
performance. This has led to the development of new types of performance budgeting. 
 
Following the broad definition of performance budgeting as the linking of budget 
decisions to performance, the process can encompass existing budgetary institutions 
such as the PPBS and ZBB. Apart from these, performance budgeting may be 
categorized on the basis of its strength in helping to make the link between budget and 
performance. Mackay (2007) divided performance budgeting into three types: direct 
performance budgeting, indirect performance budgeting, and presentational 
performance budgeting. The first type allocates budgets directly using performance 
information. For example, a job-training programme is allocated a budget in response to 
the number of students registered. The second type views performance information as 
one of the critical factors which affect budget decisions. This type has been adopted by 
most of the countries which have implemented performance budgeting. The last type 
presents programme performance in a budget proposal for budget deliberators, 
regardless of budget allocations. Shah (2006) distinguished four types of performance 
budgeting: performance-report budgeting, performance-informed budgeting, 
performance-based budgeting, and performance-determined budgeting. These four types 
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are different in the way they link performance presentation to a budget decision. 
 
However, this study examines types of performance budgeting centring on variations in 
budgetary institutions. In this context, the Hoover Commission‟s performance budgeting, 
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), and Zero-Based Budgeting 
(ZBB) are examined below. In the next sub-section, the recent trend in performance 
budgeting, stressing, in a sense, markets and competition
5
, is discussed.  
 
Performance Budgeting as conceived by the Hoover Commission  
 
„Performance budgeting‟ as conceived by the Hoover Commission was first introduced 
by the United States Federal Government in 1949 in reaction to criticisms of the 
incremental line-item budget system. Unlike incremental budgeting systems, such as in 
line-item budgeting, which stresses budgetary control, it places an emphasis on the 
evaluation of the objectives, efficiency and effectiveness of a programme (Jordan and 
Hackbart, 1999). It was invented to shift the focus away from inputs to the functions, 
activities, and achievements of government. It describes the outputs that can be 
expected from a specific function or activity, e.g., the purchasing of weapons or training, 
rather than items of expenditure such as salaries, rent, and supplies (GAO, 1997). 
 
The basic structure of the budget management system is not as complex as it seems. It 
sets up a new budget presentation: „activity obligations‟6 . Budgets are estimated 
centring on the major programmes, projects and activities of government. In order to 
                                                
5
 According to Robinson and Brumby(2005), a type of performance budgeting which stresses market and 
competition is, since 1990,described as „New performance budgeting.‟ 
6
 According to the GAO (1997), the term „activity obligations‟ continues to be used today, although it is 
referred to as „obligations by programme activity‟ or more informally „programme activities‟.   
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complete these, workload and unit cost are presented in budget documents. In this way, 
a tool is created for the public reporting of the outputs of government expenditure.  
 
Nonetheless, the performance budgeting system has been criticized for creating 
difficulties when it comes to implementation. It is not so easy to define functions or 
activities, nor to estimate their unit cost. In these respects, it has been widely argued that 
it has failed to make a fundamental change in budget decision-making. Diamond (2003) 
proposed that the failure of performance budgeting resulted from a lack of adequate 
accounting systems. 
 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) 
 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) was first installed in the US 
Department of Defence in 1961, and then the President Johnson extended it to all other 
federal departments in 1965. It places much more stress on the budgetary function of 
planning, even though it shares the ideas about result orientation of the Hoover 
Commission‟s performance budgeting. 
 
The Planning-Programming-Budgeting System formulates budgets through three phases 
of linking planning to budgeting for programmes: planning, programming, and 
budgeting (Diamond, 2003). The planning phase defines present and future objectives, 
and assesses a variety of possible alternatives for achieving them. The programming 
phase integrates proposals from the phase of planning into programmes. Finally, the 
budgeting phase transforms multi-year programmes into annual actions, and allocates 
the budgets required for implementing them. 
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Despite the simple and clear ideas behind PPBS, difficult and complicated tasks are 
required for its execution. The most difficult problem is that programmes are not easy to 
define. Unlike private companies, governments tend not only to have a wide range of 
operations but also to have multiple objectives. Programmes tend to involve various 
organizations throughout government. What is more, public organizations have many 
regulations, some of which put constraints on the budgeting process. As a result, the 
structure of the budget may well be different from that of programmes. Programmes are 
often not consistent with the workings of relevant departments (Diamond, 2003). This 
results in practical problems in the process of implementation. Secondly, PPBS requires 
sophisticated and elaborate techniques for distributing funds and costs among 
organizations. More specifically, assignments are addressed as follows:  how to 
allocate costs, and how to deal with essential fixed expenditures; off-budget 
expenditures; and transfer payments.  
 
From a political point of view, US federal agencies and the Congress may have been 
reluctant to employ PPBS in the process of budgeting because they are often concerned 
that the system may reduce their influence on budgeting as regards economic efficiency. 
Indeed, for years the US Bureau of the Budget continued to review cost and benefit in a 
traditional way, and the Congress continued to request a traditional budgetary 
presentation (Nah, 2007; Gordon, 1978). 
 
In the end, the PPBS had almost been abandoned by 1971, in spite of acclaim for „a 
revolutionary development in the history of government management (Nah, 2007, pp 
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334)‟ at the beginning. Failure of the PPBS may have resulted largely from lack of 
preparations. Axelrod (1988) argued that most of the problems stemmed from a 
wholesale introduction that forced ill-prepared agencies to implement it (Re-cited 
Diamond, 2003). 
 
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) 
 
Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB), as a term as well as a budget management technique, was 
first introduced by Peter Pyhrr in 1970
7. Pyhrr referred to it as an approach of „rather 
than tinker endlessly with its existing budget, Texas Instruments prefers to start from 
base zero, view all its activities and priorities afresh, and create a new and better set of 
allocations for the upcoming budget year‟ (Re-cited Suver and Brown, 1977). 
 
Zero-Based Budgeting requires three steps: (1) identifying „decision packages,‟ (2) 
evaluating and prioritizing all these packages, and (3) allocating resources between 
packages. The most critical task in ZBB is to design a decision package, because this is 
the basic unit for budget allocations. According to Pyhrr, the decision package is „a 
document that identifies and describes a specific activity in such a manner that 
management can (a) evaluate it and rank it against other activities competing for the 
same or similar limited resources, and (b) decide whether to approve or disapprove it‟. 
 
In practice, identifying and prioritizing decision packages require a great deal of time 
and cost. Most budget directors in US cities reported that the amount of time and 
                                                
7
 Its concept was not completely new. The US Department of Agriculture used a „ground up‟ budgeting 
technique in 1962 which included a re-evaluation of all the department‟s programmes. (Suver and Brown, 
1977) 
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paperwork required had been the biggest problems in the ZBB procedures (Moore, 
1980). 
 
As a result, despite offering the advantages of an enhanced quantity and quality of 
programme information, ZBB failed to reform budget management approaches. Public 
organizations use incremental budgeting and it is within the constraints of this that ZBB 
ideas have had to take their place (Lauth, 1978). 
 
2.3.4 Recent Trends 
 
Since 1990, performance management has become a critical issue in the public sector. 
From the point of view of performance management, performance budgeting tends to be 
seen as „the budget process as a means of increasing the pressure upon agencies to lift 
their performance.‟ For example, it stresses „budget-linked targets, prices and 
performance agreements‟ (Jordan and Brumby, 2005, pp 13). As such, recent 
performance budgeting has placed a growing emphasis on outcomes and accountability 
beyond the workload productivity or efficiency which earlier performance budgeting 
mainly focused on (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999). It tends to strengthen ex post controls 
through performance assessment instead of ex ante controls through budget 
management (Robinson & Brumby, 2005). 
 
Many countries are eager to introduce performance budgeting in order to shift the focus 
of budgeting from inputs to results (Curristine, 2005; Melkers & Willoughby, 1998). 
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The OECD (2005) reported that the majority of OECD members have applied results-
oriented budget management systems as of the year 2005. Recently, budgetary reform 
tends to have integrated performance information into the process of budgeting in a 
systematic and comprehensive manner (Lauth, 1987; Boukaert and Halligan, 2008). In 
particular, performance budgeting has continued to evolve in the direction of 
strengthening links between budget decisions and performance, applying the 
management techniques of the private sector. As a result, different countries have 
implemented various types of performance budgeting in the context of their specific 
approach, objectives, and phase of development. 
 
The UK government introduced a system of „performance agreement‟ in 1995. This is 
intended to introduce flexibility and discretion into the existing budget system and 
budgetary implementation, and also to strengthen direct accountability for results. The 
agreement is referred to as a new type of budget document, a contract in which the 
financial authority and other agencies agree performance targets and financial support 
(Kim, 2003; Jun, 2004). 
 
Compared with other countries, New Zealand has made particular efforts to establish a 
performance management system, and these efforts have led to the setting up of „output-
focused budgeting‟. This is characterized as a system that stresses outputs – goods and 
services – as in the private sector. Based on their intended outputs, each agency 
calculates budgets appropriate for producing them. In addition, a performance 
agreement is made between the minister and deputy minister involved (Kim, 2003; Jun, 
2004). 
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The US Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results Act in 1993. It was 
described as „a continuation of more than 50 years of efforts to link resources with 
results, and …… melds the best features, and avoids the worst, of its predecessors‟ 
(GAO, 2003, pp 2). Furthermore, the US Administration in 2003 launched the „Program 
Assessment Rating Tool (PART)‟ in order to strengthen links between resource 
allocation and performance. PART assesses a fifth of federal budgetary programmes 
regularly every year. It rates programmes as one of four grades: „effective‟, „moderately 
effective‟, „adequate‟, or „ineffective‟. According to Office Management and Budget 
(OMB, 2008), the results of the PART have been one of critical factors that affect 
budget decisions. 
 
As will be described in more detail in the next chapter, the Korean central government 
introduced Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP), which was mainly 
modelled on the basic idea of the US PART, in 2005. This aims to strengthen links 
between budget decisions and performance, compensating for the weakness of the 
Performance Management System of Programmes (PMS) which the Korean 
government launched in 2003. 
 
As discussed above, individual governments have implemented specific types of 
performance budgeting. However, there are still problems with establishing 
performance measurement and links between budget and performance. Lauth (1987) 
proposed that performance budgeting had limited success in associating performance 
information with budgetary decision-making. The OECD (2005) reported that most 
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members had not made an appropriate association between performance information 
and fund allocation. Seventy two per cent of OECD countries have linked budget 
request documents with performance data, whereas only 35% have linked budget 
decisions with performance. In future, individual countries will be likely to continue to 
evolve new types of performance budgeting in order to address these challenges. 
 
2.4 Impacts of Performance Budgeting in the Public Sector 
 
2.4.1 Introduction 
 
Performance budgeting has the main objective of improving government operations. 
However, opinions are mixed as to whether or not it serves that objective. Some critics 
have argued that the mainstream of current public budgeting is still traditional line-item 
budgeting rather than performance budgeting. Whereas, proponents have argued that 
performance budgeting has improved the efficiency or effectiveness of government 
operations. Those supporting this point of view suggest that it has led to improvements 
in budget allocation, managerial practices, and culture. Performance budgeting may 
cause organizations or administrators to modify managerial behaviours, assessing and 
integrating performance into the budget process. More fundamentally, it may cause an 
organizational culture to change from an input- to an outcome-oriented attitude (GAO, 
2005). 
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From an institutional point of view, performance budgeting is a budgetary institution 
which places an emphasis on links between budget decision and performance. It is a 
managerial technique for distributing scarce resources according to performance 
information (Lauth, 1987). From the viewpoint of Giddens‟ theory of structuration 
(2007), according to which an institution interacts continuously with its actors, 
performance budgeting may affect administrators‟ behaviours. In the end, it may 
formulate new patterns as standardized practices within organizations.  
Figure 2-2 illustrates the process of interaction between budget reform and 
administrators. The introduction of performance budgeting may formulate new 
programme-managerial practices in the course of continual interactions. Performance 
budgeting may cause organizations to change a budget decision-making system in 
compliance with its operating norms. In addition, it leads to changes in organizational 
characteristics such as structural arrangements. For example, when the Korean 
government introduced Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme (SABP) in order to 
strengthen performance budgeting, it added one phase of programme assessment to the 
budgeting process and enlarged the divisions in charge of budgeting within spending 
agencies. 
 
Figure 2-2 An adaptive structuration model 
 Organizational characteristics 
(Structural arrangements)  
   
Administrators 
(Administrators) 
 Budgetary reform 
(Performance budgeting) 
       Source: Adapted from Flowers et al. (1999) 
 
Some advocates have argued that performance budgeting changes „the behaviour of 
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budget participants and their decisions‟ (Jordan and Hackbart, 1999, pp 69). 
Furthermore, the GAO (1993) reported that performance measurement for performance 
budgeting, apart from contributing to the budgeting process, encouraged administrative 
managers to (1) establish programme priorities, (2) strengthen management 
improvement efforts, (3) deal with the results of budgetary reduction, and (4) gain more 
flexibility in allocating appropriated funds. Also, administrators‟ capacity to assess 
programmes was being technically improved (GAO, 2005). 
In the 1980s-1990s, economic recessions around the world compelled governments to 
take various reforming initiatives in a wide range of areas in order to improve their 
performance. Amongst these initiatives, budgetary reform – performance budgeting – 
was put in a central position, so that it could drive other reforms. It was expected that it 
would have an impact on the management activities of governments: for example, it 
might affect managerial practices; or a financial authority might strengthen 
accountability for results, increasing the budgetary flexibility of spending agencies.  
 
However, there have not been many studies of how and through what paths performance 
budgeting has had an impact on government performance. Flowers et al. (1999) pointed 
out that „the processes by which this occurs and the factors that contribute to it are not 
well understood.‟ What is more, performance budgeting varies significantly in its 
development phases, objectives, and approaches between countries (Curristine, 2005). 
This diversity in the forms of performance budgeting tends to bring mixed claims about 
its impacts. The scope and depth of the impacts may depend heavily on such differences. 
Accordingly, it may not be right to assess performance budgeting in a single phrase: „it 
works‟ or „it doesn‟t work‟. Therefore, this chapter gives a comprehensive examination 
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to the intended or realized (or tested) impacts with reference to existing literatures. 
 
2.4.2 Impact on the Public Sector 
 
Performance budgeting since 1990 has been strongly underpinned by the presumption 
that public organizations are not more efficient than private organizations such as 
companies. Most OECD members, as noted earlier, adopted performance budgeting as a 
government reform initiative. They tended to expect that it would have direct or indirect 
impacts on budget management, or on the overall management of public agencies. 
Wildavsky (1992) stressed that „any effective changes in budgetary relationships must 
necessarily alter the outcomes of the budgetary process (re-cited Jordan and Hackbart, 
1999).‟ Furthermore, Grizzle (1986b) indicated that changes in budget format could 
affect parts of the budget process, for example, budget deliberations.  
 
Although there have been opposite arguments, it is anticipated that performance 
budgeting will have an impact on government, either positive or negative. According to 
the Korean MPB (2006a), it expected that Korean performance budgeting would change 
budget decisions taken on programmes and would lead to an improvement in public 
finance. Chung (2002) proposed that the impacts to be expected would be as follows: (1) 
improvement of public finance management, (2) changes in administrators‟ budgeting 
behaviour, and (3) enhanced trust and accountability in government. Because 
programme performance is linked to budget allocations, spending ministries and 
agencies have an incentive to achieve the goals of their programmes within budget. 
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Performance budgeting may result in changing a portfolio of programme budgets, and 
in improving the efficiency or effectiveness of programmes. Also, it is expected to 
change budgetary practices within spending agencies. Taking budgeting and goals into 
account, managers may estimate an appropriate budget with scientific evaluation 
techniques, instead of making an incremental budget. Performance budgeting tends to 
report performance targets and achievements in budget documents. Because it facilitates 
public surveillance, it is expected that governments will be more accountable for results. 
Furthermore, Curristine (2005) proposed that such provision of more information on 
performance to the public has, to some extent, improved transparency in the use of 
public finance. 
 
Examining existing empirical studies regarding the efficacy of performance budgeting, 
Robinson and Brumby (2005) reviewed them from three viewpoints: budgetary 
allocation; aggregate expenditure; and productive efficiency and programme 
effectiveness. Firstly, there are mixed arguments about whether or not performance 
budgeting has had an impact on budgetary allocation. Jordan and Hackbart‟s survey 
(1999) found that 33 out of 46 US states had changed the budget allocations since the 
introduction of performance budgeting. In contrast, according to a survey by Melkers 
and Willoughby (2001), most US officials perceived that performance budgeting had 
not changed resource allocations, and even that they did not utilize performance 
measures in budgeting.  
 
As regards the macro-level impact of performance budgeting on aggregate expenditure, 
there are not many empirical studies of this (Robinson and Brumby, 2005). Testing the 
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impact of performance budgeting on levels of US state expenditure, Reddick (2003) 
concluded that budgetary reforms had been successful in reducing aggregate spending. 
Finding that the New Zealand government had reduced central government expenditure 
compared to GDP, Brumby et al. (1996) proposed that financial management reform in 
that country had made it easier to control public expenditure. 
 
Finally, there may be no consistency in the argument that performance budgeting has a 
beneficial effect on programmes. According to Poister and Streib (1999), 46.4% of US 
city managers perceived that performance measures made a contribution to reducing the 
costs of services and improving the efficiency or effectiveness of programmes. On the 
other hand, Willoughby and Melkers (2001) suggested in their survey of US state 
budget makers that performance budgeting did not make any contribution to improving 
programme performance. 
 
So, it is arguable whether performance budgeting has had any impact on government 
operations. These mixed arguments may be the result of the diverse models, structures 
and developments of performance budgeting which individual countries have 
implemented. In this context, it is proposed that researchers should take a case-by-case 
approach in order to identify the impacts of performance budgeting. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined some major issues related to performance budgeting, ranging 
from definition, types, and recent trends to impacts. Before doing this, it discussed the 
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concepts, determinants and measurement of performance which preceded performance 
budgeting. Performance has a multi-dimensional definition: economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. It is affected by various factors such as goals, leadership, personnel 
capacity, budgeting, and external and internal environments. 
 
Following a generally-accepted view, this study defines performance budgeting as the 
process of linking budget decisions to performance. Recommended by the first Hoover 
Commission in 1949, performance budgeting has been constantly evolving since then. 
The US federal government introduced PPBS in the 1960s and ZBB in the 1970s. 
Economic recessions in the 1980s-1990s inspired governments to introduce budgetary 
reform. This led to many countries designing various types of performance budgeting, 
influenced by the private sector. 
 
Many governments tend to expect that performance budgeting will produce 
considerable results throughout public organizations: for example, that measuring 
performance may change organizational behaviours; that performance measures may 
affect the incentive structure for participants. Also, when introducing performance 
budgeting, governments tend to give more budgetary flexibility to agencies and to 
strengthen accountability for results. This may lead to changes in budgeting practices, 
so as to restrain the use of incremental budgeting without assessing performance. 
However, it is not clear what impacts performance budgeting has had on governments. 
That is to say, there are opposite arguments among researchers.  
 
It is a formidable task to identify universal impacts of performance budgeting. Indeed, 
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there are not many literatures that address common factors in all the models. Firstly, 
individual countries have recently applied specific models of performance budgeting. 
Many researchers, inevitably, try to take a case-by-case approach to analysing the 
impacts of these on organizations or programmes. Additionally, it is not easy to obtain 
proper data for testing effects empirically. This results mainly from weaknesses in the 
objective measurement of impacts. How can we measure impacts? More to the point, it 
is difficult to separate the impacts of performance budgeting from those of other reform 
measures, because performance budgeting tends to be introduced as part of a set of 
government management reforms. As a second-best way, many empirical studies utilize 
subjective data obtained by questionnaire surveys. 
 
For now, assessments of the efficacy of performance budgeting may be premature. As 
Jones and Kettl (2003) pointed out, „there is a glaring need to understand the short- and 
long-term outcomes of the reforms… [but] doing so is almost impossible in the short 
term and exceedingly difficult in the long term‟ (Re-cited Robinson and Brumby, 2005). 
In this context, specific empirical tests are likely to be essential for identifying the 
impacts of performance budgeting. These would provide more evidence about the 
impacts of performance budgeting. Korean performance budgeting may provide a useful 
research object because it translates programme performance into scores and grades 
with Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP). The next chapter is devoted 
to undertaking a specific examination of Korean performance budgeting with the SABP. 
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CHAPTER 3 KOREAN PERFORMANCE BUDGETING 
 
 
3.1 History 
 
Since the 1950s, many countries have made efforts to introduce considerations of 
performance into the budgeting process, and this is a trend that is still developing. In the 
1980s, during the economic slow-down, OECD countries began to strengthen 
government performance management. It was in this context that Korea began to 
integrate performance into budget decisions. In 1982, Zero-Based Budgeting (ZBB) was 
introduced as a reform of public finance, but it was abandoned after a few years (Nah, 
2007). In 2000, a performance management system which stressed the linking of fund 
allocation with performance was initiated in central government, but implementation of 
this also soon ceased. 
 
Since the late 1990s Korea has experienced swift changes in its public finance 
environment. Firstly, an aging society has brought a rapid fall in the rate of increase in 
government revenues. By contrast, government spending on areas of social welfare, 
such as provision for the elderly and education, has increased exponentially. Secondly, 
there has been growing concern about trust in the public finance system. Ever since the 
establishment of a Korean budgetary system, this had been operated in an input-oriented 
way without any assessment of programme performance, except for accounting audits. 
This meant there was a lack of performance information that could be linked to 
budgetary programmes. The finance departments of the Administration could plausibly 
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be viewed as allocating public money by rule of thumb and lacking accountability for 
programme results. This view tended to weaken trust in the public finance system itself 
among citizens, the National Assembly, and other groups outside the Administration. It 
is against this background that current financial circumstances have made public finance 
much tighter and tougher.  
 
To address these problems, the Korean central government determined, in 2003, to 
reform its public finance system, and introduce a „top-down‟ budget allocation strategy 
which would allow spending ministries and agencies to allocate funds within 
expenditure limits set by a commission chaired by the President and hosted by the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB)
8
. The Ministry of Planning and Budget, a 
public finance authority, sought to launch a budget management system that would 
allow the linking of budget decisions with performance, in order to implement the new 
budget allocation strategy effectively.  
 
Performance budgeting in Korea since the year 2000 can be divided into three phases 
(Park, 2006). During the first phase, 2000-2002, a pilot project on performance 
budgeting was conducted. Given the title Performance-Oriented Budgeting, this project 
was influenced by the US Government Performance Results Act (GPRA). For this pilot 
project, 39 divisions
9
 were selected in 22 ministries and agencies
10
. These divisions 
                                                
8
 The Ministry of Planning and Budget was reorganized into the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 
merging with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, in 2008.  
9
 The number of participating divisions was extended from 16 in 2000 to 28 in 2001, and finally 39 in 
2002. 
10
 The Ministry of Construction and Transportation; the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; the 
Ministry of the Environment; the Ministry of Science and Technology; the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Energy; the Ministry of Information and Communication; the Ministry of Culture and 
Tourism; the Ministry of Health and Welfare; the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs; the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans 
Affairs; the Government Information Agency; the Rural Development Administration; the Korea Forest 
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were required to develop an annual performance plan and an annual performance report 
every year. However, the project failed to attract senior management‟s attention because 
it was applied only to a few divisions in each of the ministries or agencies (Jun and Park, 
2002; MPB, 2003). Higher management viewed the annual performance plans and 
reports as a supplementary instrument for monitoring their programmes, not as a way of 
linking budget allocation to programme performance. Making comparisons in 
programme performance between divisions that had taken part in the pilot and ones that 
had not, Chung (2003) found that there was little significant difference between the two 
groups in terms of programme performance. The project ended with a change of 
Administration.  
 
Based on the 2000-2002 experiment, the second initiative, known as the Performance 
Management System (PMS), began as one of four major fiscal reforms
11
 initiated by 
the MPB in 2003. At first, 22 ministries and agencies which had ever participated in the 
pilot project introduced the PMS, so that it could cover all their divisions. They were 
asked to submit an annual performance plan and an annual performance report to the 
MPB, along with their annual budget request documentation. After 2006, when the 
Government Performance Assessment Act (GPA) was enacted, they were required to 
establish a strategic performance plan. The PMS was extended to cover 26 ministries 
and agencies in 2005, and then extended to all ministries and agencies in the following 
year. In terms of programmes covered, the PMS covered, initially, only major budgetary 
                                                                                                                                          
Service, the Korea Intellectual Property Office; the Public Procurement Service; the Korea National 
Police; the Korea Coast Guard; the Korea Meteorological Administration; and the Korea National 
Statistical Office. 
11
 The four fiscal reforms consisted of (1) establishing a national mid-term expenditure plan, (2) 
introducing a „top-down‟ budget allocation strategy, (3) introducing performance budgeting, and (4) 
building a „digital budget‟ accounting system.  
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programmes over one billion Won
12
, but, in 2006, was extended to cover all single 
budgetary programmes. 
 
In the third phase of performance budgeting, the MPB tried to improve links between 
performance and budget allocations. In 2005, the MPB introduced Self-Assessment of 
Budgetary Programmes (SABP) to all ministries and agencies. As will be described later, 
this was strongly influenced by the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) of the 
United States. In a procedure similar to that imposed by the PART, programme 
managers have to self-assess their programmes according to checklists of questions 
about the planning, management and results of programmes. The checklists are 
provided for ministries and agencies by the MPB. Under SABP, all budgetary 
programmes must be assessed at least once every three years. This tends to allow the 
MPB to review every budgetary programme over the course of three years. The MPB 
reviewed 555, 577, and 585 programmes (about a third of all the budgetary programmes 
for each year) using SABP in 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively. In 2006, the third phase 
added an In-depth Evaluation System (IES) which allows the MPB to evaluate 
relatively larger and more strategic programmes with the Korea Development Institute 
(KDI).
13
  
 
Performance budgeting had been operated on the basis of guidelines issued by the MPB. 
However, it was defined, with more specifications, by two Acts: the Government 
Performance Assessment Act (GPA) and the National Finance Act (NFA)
14
, in 2006. 
                                                
12
 The Won is the unit of Korean money. One Korean Won is equivalent to about 0.0005 UK pounds, as 
of June 2009. 
13
 The KDI is a major research institute which is financially supported by the Korean central government. 
14
 The Administration required the National Assembly to review the two Bills in 2004 and in 2005, i.e. 
separately. But the two bills were both passed and made effective in 2006. 
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3.2 A Framework for Korean Performance Budgeting 
 
In Chapter 2, the author defined performance budgeting as the process that links 
budgetary allocations to performance of programmes. Seen in this way, the system 
requires two elements: (1) measuring the performance of budgetary programmes, and (2) 
associating performance information with budget allocations. This section now looks at 
the fundamental framework of the current Korean budgeting system, focusing on the 
definition of performance budgeting given above.  
 
3.2.1 Underlying Laws 
 
The Korean central government has a legal system which underpins performance 
management in the public sector. Performance management including performance 
budgeting is constructed according to two laws: the National Finance Act (NFA) and the 
Government Performance Assessment Act (GPA).  
 
The GPA defines government performance assessment and management more 
comprehensively than the NFA. It stipulates the concepts, principles, and objectives of 
government performance management. In addition, it sets out the essential rules of 
government performance assessment. It defines performance management as „the 
activities that develop organizational missions, long and short term objectives, and 
performance indicators, and that manage government performance in the context of 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Art. 2).‟ It proclaims as an essential objective of 
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performance management that it should contribute to enhancing the autonomy of 
ministries and agencies in planning and implementing their policies but should also 
ensure their accountability for results, and that it should improve the performance of 
government, the quality of policy, and the level of public satisfaction (Art. 4).  
 
In order to comply with the GPA, ministries and agencies must develop a strategic 
performance plan and an annual performance plan, and then consult the National 
Assembly on them (Art. 5-6). The strategic performance plan, which covers a five year 
period, should include at the least the missions and strategic objectives of each ministry 
(or agency) for the relevant period, and be revised to take account of changed 
circumstances every three years. It covers a long-/mid-term vision, and focuses on 
establishing future objectives for individual ministries or agencies. However, a strategic 
performance plan tends to be limited to playing only a small role in measuring 
performance, because it does not make use of methods of performance measurement 
such as performance indicators.  
 
An annual performance plan makes concrete the objectives for each year of a strategic 
performance plan. It is required to cover annual performance objectives, performance 
indicators, and the results of implementing the programmes for the previous three years. 
 
The NFA controls Korean performance budgeting more directly and specifically than 
the GPA. It sets out the fundamental objective of the relationship between budget 
decisions and assessments, stating that the MPB should reflect the results of 
assessments of budgeting when assessing programmes (Art. 8).  
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On the basis of the law, the MPB may give spending ministries and agencies a guideline 
which requires them to develop an annual performance plan and an annual performance 
report with performance indicators, and to assess their programmes with SABP. These 
spending ministries and agencies must submit an annual performance plan, an annual 
report, and the results of SABP to the MPB when they request budgets each year (Art. 
8). Furthermore, the MPB can evaluate major budgetary programmes in cooperation 
with the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a government-funded research 
organization (Art. 8). 
 
To sum up, Korean performance budgeting is underpinned by two laws: the GPA and 
the NFA. According to these two laws, individual ministries and agencies must, as a 
first step, draw up a strategic performance plan. On the basis of the strategic plan, they 
must develop an annual performance plan with performance indicators. After 
implementing the annual performance plan, they must draw up an annual performance 
report. In practice, SABP is partly used as a substitute for the financial section of an 
annual performance report. Finally, the MPB may make in-depth evaluations of selected 
programmes with expert teams. In the process of budgeting, the MPB and spending 
ministries and agencies reflect these assessments. 
 
3.2.2 Measuring Programme Performance  
 
In order for performance budgeting to achieve its primary objective of improving the 
efficiency or effectiveness of a government, the underlying assumption is that it has to 
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be allowed to measure performance. A strategic performance plan needs to present a 
well-defined organizational mission and strategic goals, coordinated with a medium-
term budget framework. An annual operating plan needs to make a „direct link between 
the long-term goals of the strategic plan and those identified in budgets‟ which serves as 
„a point of reference for annual progress evaluations‟ (Diamond, 2005).  
 
In this context, Korean performance budgeting measures the performance of budgetary 
programmes with three sub-systems: (1) the Performance Management System of 
Programmes (PMS), (2) Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP), and (3) 
the In-depth Evaluation System (IES). Each of these three sub-systems produces a 
slightly different kind of information. However, they monitor or assess budgetary 
programmes in ways that are closely linked. This is illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
 
Figure 3-1 Relationship between the three sub-systems  
  Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Planning and Budget (2006a) 
 
As described above, in 2003, the PMS was introduced into the major budgetary 
1. PMS 
- Managing Performance Goals and Measures 
- All Programmes (including non-budgetary 
programmes) 
: 
 
Monitor 
- Strategic Performance Plan, and Annual 
Performance Plan and Report with 
Performance Indicators 
↓   
2. SABP 
- All Budgetary Programmes (excluding non-
budgetary programmes) 
: 
 
Review 
- Assessing Programmes by MPB and 
Spending Organizations, using Checklists  
↓   
3. IES 
   - Selected Budgetary Programmes 
: 
 
Evaluation 
  - In-depth Evaluation with Experts 
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programmes of 22 ministries or agencies by the MPB, and it was extended to all the 
budgetary programmes of central government by 2006. The ministries and agencies 
which implemented the PMS in the various years are shown in Table 3-1. Since 2006, 
when the GPA and the NFA defined the underlying basis for performance management, 
the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which comes under the Prime Minister, has 
controlled the PMS, in cooperation with the MPB, in order to avoid a significant 
duplication of paperwork. 
 
The PMS plays a critical role in monitoring programme performance during the 
implementation of programmes, by establishing a strategic performance plan and an 
annual performance plan, and making an annual performance report which mainly use 
performance indicators. An annual performance plan tends to bridge the gap between 
the long-term goals in the strategic performance plan and annually funded goals. So, 
long-term goals tend to be specified in an annual performance plan. It is on the basis of 
the targets in their annual performance plans, that SABP is used to assess the 
performance of budgetary programmes.  
 
An annual performance plan is required to include at a minimum (1) mission, (2) 
strategic objectives, (3) performance goals, (4) performance indicators and ways to 
measure them, and (5) action plans. When implementation of the plan is finished, each 
ministry or agency has to produce an annual performance report (Guidelines for the 
PMS, 2006b). The report checks the extent to which individual programmes have 
achieved performance goals with performance indicators, and provides a brief 
explanation of the causes of any failures in achievement.  
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Table 3-1 Extension of the numbers of PMS participants 
 2003 2004 2006∼  
Ministries 
(or 
Agencies) 
of the 
PMS 
Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation; Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry; Ministry of 
Environment; Ministry of Science 
and Technology; Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy; 
Ministry of Information and 
Communication; Ministry of Culture 
and Tourism; Ministry of Health and 
Welfare; Ministry of Education; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry 
of Government Administration and 
Home Affairs; Ministry of Patriots 
and Veterans Affairs; Government 
Information Agency; Rural 
Development Administration; Korea 
Forest Service; Korea Intellectual 
Property Office; Public Procurement 
Service; Korea National Police; 
Korea Coast Guard; Korea 
Meteorological Administration; and 
Korea National Statistical Office.  
(4 ministries or 
agencies 
added) 
Ministry of 
Labour; 
Ministry of 
Gender 
Equality; 
Small and 
Medium 
Business 
Administration
; and Cultural 
Properties 
Administration 
(22 ministries or agencies 
added)  
Ministry of Finance and 
Economy; Ministry of 
Unification; Ministry of 
Justice; Ministry of Defence; 
Ministry of Planning and 
Budget; Ministry of 
Government Legislation; 
Central Staff Commission; Fair 
Trade Commission; National 
Tax Service; Korea Customs 
Service; Military Manpower 
Administration; Korea Food 
and Drug Administration; 
National Emergency Agency; 
Multifunctional 
Administration; City 
Construction Agency; Defence 
Acquisition Program 
Administration; Prosecutors‟ 
Office; Anti-Corruption 
Commission; Civil Rights 
Commission; Youth Protection 
Commission; Emergency 
Planning Commission; 
Financial Services 
Commission; and Office of 
Policy Coordination 
Programm
es of the 
PMS 
Major budgetary programmes Major 
budgetary 
programmes 
All budgetary programmes 
Source: The Guideline for the PMS (MPB, 2006b) 
 
The PMS does not provide information regarding programme characteristics which may 
be recognized in the process of implementation. As a result, the MPB has explored other 
ways of producing detailed performance information for budgeting (Chin, 2005; MPB, 
2006a). 
 
In addition to performance indicators, SABP, as will be described later, provides more 
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specific information through the checklists. Individual ministries and agencies review a 
third of budgetary programmes every year in accordance with the checklists which the 
OPC (or MPB) controls. Individual programmes are given overall numerical scores 
from 0 to 100, which are translated into one of four grades: „Poor‟, „Modest‟, 
„Somewhat Effective‟, and „Effective‟.  
 
In addition to them, SABP provides individual status information, even though it is only 
in a simple yes/no format. Examples of such information include: purpose or design of 
programme; application of funds; and other considerations which budget makers need to 
have for the process of deliberating on programmes. In its annual workshop
15
 for 
budget makers, the MPB recommends them to deliberate on budget allocations using 
the following fundamental considerations: Is it relevant for a programme to be 
established? (Or: Is the purpose of the programme clear?). If the programme is relevant, 
who funds it: private sector or public sector; local government or central government? 
Because of these checkpoints, SABP tends to provide opportunities for integrating serial 
activities from programme assessment into the activities of budgeting.  
 
The In-Depth Evaluation System (IES) provides comprehensive and in-depth 
information on a selected subset of programmes. In order to implement the IES fairly, 
the MPB set up a committee comprised of non-government experts and budget makers 
from spending ministries and agencies. The committee selects about 20 of the 
programmes which the SABP results, the National Assembly, or non-government 
organizations suggest every year. It also adds several programmes which it judges 
                                                
15
 The MPB holds an annual workshop for budget makers of the MPB and spending ministries and 
agencies before the budget deliberation process starts. There, the MPB gives a session of guidance and 
information on the techniques, direction, and emphasis of programme budget reviews. 
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require in-depth evaluation. The MPB has argued that the IES has contributed to 
restructuring programmes through reduction, elimination, and consolidation. 
 
Korean performance budgeting can be distinguished from other models such as the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) and ZBB in the sense that it has a 
sub-system, SABP, which provides numerical scores for programmes. The yes/no 
format of the checklists allows managers to assess programmes in a less complicated 
way than the PPBS and ZBB. The PPBS and ZBB have a crucial weakness in that they 
need highly skilled and sophisticated assessment techniques which make them difficult 
to implement (GAO, 1997; Nah, 2007). They take up a lot of time and require 
experienced staff.  
 
In addition, Korean performance budgeting produces more diverse information than 
performance indicators alone can. Performance indicators provide such simple 
information that their usefulness for budget decisions tends to be somewhat limited.  
 
3.2.3 Integrating Performance Information into the Budget Process 
 
Korean performance budgeting has the underlying objective of integrating programme 
performance into budget allocation. Under the provisions of the National Finance Act 
(NFA), the MPB may assess budgetary programmes and associate budget decisions with 
the results of those assessments in order to manage government performance (Art. 8). 
According to the resources available, spending ministries and agencies set reasonable 
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performance targets for programmes in an annual performance plan. When conducting 
SABP, the MPB and spending ministries and agencies assess attainment of targets and 
link budgetary allocations with the results.  
 
In the annual Budget Request Guidelines for preparing budget request documentation 
by spending ministries and agencies (NFA Art. 29), the MPB has made two stipulations: 
(1) the budget of any programmes rated as „Poor‟ by SABP shall be reduced by 10% in 
relation to the previous budget; and (2) it is prohibited to increase the budget of any 
programmes that do not demonstrate any improvement in performance (MPB, 2006c, 
2007b, 2008).  
 
In order to enhance the use of SABP results for budget decisions, the MPB has 
developed formal cooperation between budget staff and programme examiners. Budget 
staff in charge of budgeting in the MPB may give their opinions when programme 
examiners in the MPB review or make consistency checks for completing SABP. Also, 
programme examiners who monitor and review programme performance may attend a 
meeting in which budget staff deliberate on programme budgets. However, this 
cooperation may vary in the way it works, or even be temporary, because it is 
underpinned only by an internal „soft‟ memorandum, rather than by a „hard‟ 
memorandum which would be longer-term and more binding. 
 
It is not easy to argue that Korean performance budgeting uses performance information 
to determine budget allocations. Korean performance budgeting may use performance 
measures to inform budget allocations in the budget process (Curristine, 2005a); but it 
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has tended to make a direct link mainly between budget decisions and performance of 
programmes which SABP assesses as „Poor‟. According to the Korean government, it 
has cut the budgets of programmes graded as „Poor‟. In the budget year 2006, it made 
an average reduction of 25%; in 2007, the reduction was 24%; and in 2008, it was 15% 
(Park, 2008). In the current situation, in which some programmes have not identified 
ways of assessing themselves, such as performance indicators, this direct link may 
produce distorted reactions which undermine efficiency (Park, 2006). 
 
3.2.4 Roles Played by Individual Organizations 
 
The Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB), as the control centre of Korean 
performance budgeting, plays a key role in implementing performance budgeting, 
building a legal foundation for the system. According to the National Finance Act (NFA) 
and the Government Performance Assessment Act (GPA), the MPB designs and 
manages Korean performance budgeting. In order for the MPB to perform its role 
systematically, in 2005 it created a unit, the Bureau of Performance Management. 
 
The MPB provides various guidelines for assessing budgetary programmes, and also 
reviews draft performance plans and reports and draft SABP documents which spending 
ministries or agencies have submitted. Based on the reviews, it makes recommendations 
to these bodies. As such, the MPB is heavily involved in developing performance 
indicators and setting targets for programmes. Spending ministries and agencies are 
required to consult the MPB prior to the determination of performance indicators and 
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targets.  
 
The MPB also provides fundamental resources for performance budgeting, such as staff 
training for spending ministries and agencies. It has set up the Learning Centre for 
Performance Budgeting in the Korea Institute of Public Finance, which is financially 
supported by the Korean central government. Many public servants have participated in 
learning programmes in the Centre, and thus broadened or deepened their knowledge of 
performance budgeting (MPB, 2006a). 
 
In reality, formal relationships between a financial authority and spending ministries 
vary from country to country. In some countries, such as Denmark and Iceland, the 
financial authority has no or little involvement. In other countries, such as Chile, the 
financial authority controls performance budgeting (Curristine, 2005a). Curristine 
(2005a) divides performance budgeting into two types, depending on whether or not the 
financial authority is involved in determining indicators and targets. In a survey of 
OECD members, he showed that 48% of responding members operated the centralized 
type. Of these, 16% required spending ministries and agencies to agree performance 
targets with the financial authority, and 32% required them to agree both indicators and 
targets. Korean performance budgeting can be considered a centralized type in which 
the MPB is involved in determining performance indicators and targets for spending 
ministries and agencies. 
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3.2.5 Limitations 
 
Many countries have introduced various types of performance budgeting. They have set 
a wide range of objectives and approaches, reflecting their financial environments 
(Curristine, 2005a). In order to adapt to its own environment, Korean performance 
budgeting has been modified many times since its introduction in 2000. However, it had 
rarely utilized performance information in the process of budgeting before the 
introduction of SABP. The main reason was that performance information was not 
sufficient, in either quantity or quality, for links to be established with resource 
allocation. For instance, performance indicators tended to be oriented towards inputs or 
processes that were easy to measure and attain. In the annual performance plans for the 
fiscal year 2002, only 20.4% of performance indicators presented in the plans were 
found to be result-oriented. Furthermore, there were few audits or meta-evaluations 
against the assessment results (Jun, 2004).  
 
Korean performance budgeting can be seen to have taken a major step forward with the 
establishment of SABP, which aims to strengthen links between budget allocations and 
performance. Under SABP, the MPB has strengthened its review of the appropriateness 
of performance indicators, the level of targets, and the degree of achievements. What is 
more, the MPB puts pressure on budget makers to link budget allocations with SABP 
results. In this context, Korean performance budgeting has become more systematically 
organized since the establishment of SABP. That is, it produces specific performance 
information, assessing budgetary programmes on the basis of performance targets in the 
annual performance plan. The performance information tends to be reflected in the 
making of budget decisions. 
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Nonetheless, Korean performance budgeting has challenges to overcome: some are 
peculiar to the Korean model; others are common to various kinds of performance 
budgeting. Similarly to other models, Korean performance budgeting has inherent 
limitations in measuring performance. It is not easy to measure programme performance, 
because performance tends to be defined in multi-dimensional ways, and because public 
programmes tend to have ambiguous and multiple goals. Technically, a performance 
measure may not represent various facets of performance: outcome, output, process, or 
input. Diamond (2005) pointed out that, even though performance measurement is a key 
tool in the process of implementing performance budgeting, it is necessary to be prudent 
in measuring performance because of possible unintended side effects. For example, 
selecting inappropriate indicators may result in causing goal displacements, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. More seriously, a performance measure does not guarantee causality 
between a programme‟s activities and its outcomes (Diamond, 2005). In the SABP 
assessments for the years 2005-2007, the MPB found that almost 50% of the total of 
1717 programmes reviewed set inappropriate performance indicators. There is also a 
tendency to generate additional workloads in producing documentations such as a 
performance plan and report.  
 
Here, the author will focus on problems peculiar to Korean performance budgeting. 
 
Korean performance budgeting has some limitations in the extent to which it 
encompasses budgetary programmes. In contrast with the PART, performance budgeting 
of the United States, Korean performance budgeting restricts itself largely to capital 
programmes and does not assess programmes related to current costs (including staff 
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cost). It also excludes grants for local authorities and their budget decisions. The Korean 
central government has found that it has been difficult to distribute current costs to 
budgetary programmes without an accrual accounting system. Furthermore, in the light 
of a performance management system for personnel, it might not be fair to distribute 
staff cost to their programmes because programme managers have little authority of 
choosing their staff. The MPB has a plan to implement an accrual accounting system 
from the fiscal year of 2012 after finishing a pilot test during three years (MPB, 2008). 
 
Korean performance budgeting is characterized as the centralized type in which the 
MPB or the Prime Minister are involved when spending ministries and agencies 
develop performance indicators and set targets for programmes. Here, there is some 
redundancy in the underlying legal system. As seen in Table 3-2, both the Government 
Performance Assessment Act (GPA) and the National Finance Act (NFA) stipulate 
performance management including performance budgeting in Korean government. 
While the NFA gives the MPB the authority to ask ministries and agencies to present an 
annual performance plan/report and SABP results, the GPA states that the Prime 
Minister controls a strategic performance plan and an annual performance plan within 
the Korean central government. Also, the NFA leaves out a strategic performance plan, 
whereas the GPA leaves out an annual performance report.  
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Table 3-2  GPA vs. NFA regarding the performance management of Korean government 
 GPA NFA 
Agency in charge Prime Minister Ministry of Planning and Budget 
Scope of performance 
management 
The administrative branch of the 
central government 
The central government which 
spends the public budget, 
including the Legislature, the 
Administration, and the 
Judiciary. 
And, public fund operators 
Objects to be documented 
◇ A strategic performance plan, 
and an annual performance plan 
◇ There is no annual 
performance report 
◇ An annual performance plan 
and an annual performance 
report 
◇ There is no strategic 
performance plan 
Procedure ◇ Developing plans → 
consulting with the relevant 
committee of the National 
Assembly. 
◇ There is no guideline related 
to performance management 
◇ (MPB) Presenting the 
guidelines → (Spending 
ministries and agencies) 
Developing and submitting an 
annual performance plan and 
report to the MPB → (MPB, 
Spending agencies) Submitting 
them to the National Assembly 
along with budget proposals 
Note: modified NABO (2006b) 
 
The two Acts provide two centres of control for the implementation of Korean 
performance budgeting: the MPB, and the Prime Minister. The duplicate legal 
provisions for government performance management may result in (1) the 
disconnection of fiscal performance management from government performance 
management as a whole, (2) the creation of additional workload due to duplication of 
effort, and (3) confusion amongst ministries and agencies (NABO, 2006b). Fortunately, 
because the MPB cooperates closely with the Prime Minister, these problems have not 
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arisen. As a result of discussion with the MPB, the Prime Minister creates and gives 
guidelines regarding performance management, including the use of SABP, to the 
individual ministries and agencies. At the review stage, the MPB is involved in 
reviewing the budget-related part of annual performance plans and reports and the 
SABP results of ministries and agencies. 
 
Korean performance budgeting, as described earlier, tends to make a direct association 
between budget allocation and performance in the case of programmes whose 
performance is poor. When a programme is graded „Poor‟ according to SABP, it is 
forced to reduce its budget by 10% compared with the previous year. This may result in 
the distortion of resource distribution because other considerations – demand, social 
priority, and other aspects of programmes – are neglected in the making of budget 
decisions. The GAO (2004, pp 11) reported that „the more important role of the PART 
was not in making resource decisions but in its support for recommendations to improve 
programme design, assessment, and management.‟ Indeed, 82% of PART 
recommendations were related to programme assessment, programme design, and 
programme management issues (GAO, 2004). 
The next section takes a close look at SABP, which forms a key element of Korean 
performance budgeting (NABO, 2006b). Indeed, it is expected that this will assist 
understanding of the structure and operation processes of other types of performance 
budgeting. 
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3.3 Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme (SABP) 
 
3.3.1 Background 
 
The Korean central government has experienced trials and errors while establishing 
performance budgeting. Beginning in 2000, the pilot project for Performance-Oriented 
Budgeting ended with the change of Administration in 2002. On the basis of lessons 
learnt from the pilot project, the MPB introduced the Performance Management System 
(PMS) for programmes in 2003. However, this had limitations when it came to linking 
budget allocations to performance. Because it concentrated on using performance 
indicators in order to monitor budgetary programmes, it did not provide the diverse 
kinds of information needed by budget decision makers. Rather, it tended to create 
complaints from spending ministries and agencies about the additional workload 
involved in producing a performance plan and report (MPB, 2006a). 
 
This led to growing pressure for the restructuring of the PMS from both inside and 
outside government. After reviewing the system with experts from outside government, 
the MPB found that the PMS needed some modifications: (1) extension of the scope of 
the PMS so that it included all budgetary programmes, and (2) exploring some means of 
strengthening the link between budget allocations and performance. As a result of the 
review, the MPB took two initiatives. One was to extend the PMS to all budgetary 
programmes within spending ministries and agencies; the other was to introduce Self-
Assessment of Budgetary Programme (SABP) in an effort for integrating budget and 
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performance (MPB, 2006a).  
 
In 2005, the Korean central government initiated a „top-down‟ budget allocation 
strategy as one of four fiscal reforms. The top-down strategy was devised to boost each 
ministry‟s and agency‟s autonomy in budgeting, within expenditure limits determined 
by a committee comprised of the President, the Prime Minister, and Ministers. As a 
consequence, the MPB, as the fiscal authority, needed a tool for reviewing and 
screening the individual budgets which each of the ministries and agencies requested for 
their programmes (NABO, 2006b; Lee, 2006; Chin, 2005). This became another issue 
for the introduction of SABP. 
 
3.3.2 Institutional Overview 
 
The design of SABP was strongly influenced by the Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART) initiated by the US President‟s Management Agenda for performance and 
budget integration. As a result, SABP has a variety of things in common with the PART, 
though they are slightly different in some ways, such as the extent to which 
performance information is used in budgeting. Comparisons with the PART help us to 
understand the major characteristics of SABP. 
 
3.3.2.1 Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme (SABP) 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes, as noted earlier, is an effort to strengthen 
the links between budget decisions and performance information. It is a means of 
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assessing performance and diagnosing programmes, using checklists, in the budget 
process. It also allows the MPB to check and screen programmes as it undertakes the 
process of reviewing the budget requests of spending ministries and agencies.  
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes assesses three sections of budgetary 
programmes, responding to checklists which consist of 15 common questions and up to 
three specific questions which depend on seven programme types. Fifteen questions are 
commonly applied to the seven types, and several questions are added to specific 
programmes depending on programme types. In order for SABP to be used to consider 
the characteristics of programmes, it is necessary to divide programmes into seven types, 
depending on their purpose and how they are implemented, as follows: (1) Social 
Overhead Capital (SOC) programmes, (2) Capital Acquisition programmes, (3) Other 
Direct programmes, (4) Investment programmes, (5) Loan programmes, (6) Subsidy to 
Local Government programmes, and (7) Subsidy to Private Sector programmes. A 
programme may be classified as falling into more than one category. 
 
As will be described more specifically later, SABP gives weights of 30%, 20%, and 50% 
to these three sections respectively in order to produce overall numeric scores from 0 to 
100. In the section on planning (30%), the percentage is equally distributed between two 
sub-sections: rationale and design (15%), and performance planning of programmes 
(15%). Using SABP strictly fixes these weights, which are determined by the MPB, in 
order to prevent manipulations of a programme‟s total score, while the PART allows 
spending agencies to adjust weights to emphasize the key factors of a programme. 
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The numeric scores are translated into one of four grades: (1) „Effective‟ (2) „Somewhat 
Effective‟ (3) „Modest‟ and (4) ‟Poor‟. Table 3-3 summarizes the relationships between 
grades and overall numeric scores. The grade of „Effective‟ is 85 points or more; 
„Somewhat Effective‟ goes from 70 to fewer than 85 points; „Modest‟ goes from 50 to 
fewer than 70 points; and, finally, „Poor‟ gives less than 50 points as an overall score.  
 
Table 3-3 Relations between grades and numeric scores 
Grades Score Bands 
Effective 85 – 100 
Somewhat Effective 70 - less than 85 
Modest 50 - less than 70 
Poor Less than 50 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme treats the assessment cycle of programmes 
differently from the PART. In SABP, a third of all the budgetary programmes are 
assessed every year; whereas the PART assesses a fifth of programmes. In other words, 
all the Korean central government‟s programmes are assessed at least once every three 
years, and US federal programmes are assessed at least once every five years. Because 
policy development tends to vary in speed between the two countries, it may be rational 
that the assessment cycle of each is consistent with their rollover period for strategic 
performance plans: five years in the US and three years in Korea. Because SABP and 
PART are not used to assess all programmes every year, they may not provide timely 
performance information on some programmes in budgeting. 
 
In this context, the MPB introduced Programme Reassessment in 2006, considering that 
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the shorter assessment cycle would enable SABP to provide performance information in 
a timely way, even though it might increase workloads and costs. Programme 
Reassessment allows the use of SABP to assess programmes, regardless of the 
assessment cycle, according to which a programme has to be assessed at least once in 
three years. In principle, a programme may be reassessed when it demonstrates evidence 
of significant improvement: for example, performance improvement, the development 
of new measures, or the fixing of new targets. In practice, using SABP, programmes are 
selected for reassessment every year by a review of programmes which spending 
ministries and agencies and the MPB (budget decision makers or programme examiners) 
have recommended. SAPB is used to reassesses about 20 programmes every year, 
whereas the PART is used to reassesses almost all programmes evaluated in the previous 
year. 
 
For a better understanding of SABP, we need to examine the PART used by the US 
federal government, which strongly influenced the design of SABP. The next sub-
section offers a description of the PART. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
 
The Program Assessment rating Tool was introduced by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) of the Bush administration in the fiscal year 2002. It was invented to 
address weaknesses in utilizing the performance information which the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (hereafter GPRA)
16
 produced in the process of 
                                                
16
 The GPRA represented an effort to promote a connection between performance plans and budget. The 
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preparing budgets within the OMB (Johnson, 2003; cited by Dull, 2006). 
 
The PART is a tool for assessing the performance of US federal programmes. The OMB 
(2008) reported that it was „a diagnostic tool used to assess the performance of Federal 
programs and to drive improvements in program performance,‟ by providing „a 
consistent approach to assessing and rating across the Federal programs‟. 
 
The PART assesses performance of programmes, answering more than 25 questions 
written in yes/no format in four sections: (1) programme purpose and design; (2) 
strategic planning; (3) programme management; and (4) programme 
results/accountability. Twenty five questions are commonly applied to all the 
programmes; and a few questions are added for specific programmes depending on their 
type. The PART divides federal programmes into seven types: (1) direct federal 
programmes; (2) competitive grant programme; (3) block/formula grant programmes; (4) 
regulatory-based programmes; (5) capital asset and service acquisition programmes; (6) 
credit programmes; and (7) research and development.  
 
The PART produces overall numeric scores from 0 to 100 for programmes, and it 
interprets the scores into one of four grades: „Effective‟ (85-100), „Moderately Effective‟ 
(70-84), „Adequate‟ (50-69), and „Ineffective‟ (0-49). Regardless of the overall scores, a 
rating of „results not demonstrated (RND)‟ is given when a programme does not have 
                                                                                                                                          
GPRA requires that all US federal agencies undertake strategic planning, develop goals and objectives, 
measure performance with performance indicators, and consult the President and the Congress on the 
degree to which federal programme goals have been achieved annually (GAO, 2003). 
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acceptable performance measures or lacks baselines and performance data.  
 
To produce a numerical score, the sections are weighted differently. For example, in 
2008 weightings were distributed as follows: programme purpose/design, 20%; strategic 
planning, 10%; programme management, 20%; and programme results/accountability, 
50%. Questions within a section, in principle, are weighed equally; but the weights may 
be adjusted to emphasize the key factor of a programme. The adjustment, however, is 
determined prior to the answering of any questions in order to avoid manipulation of the 
total score (OMB, 2008). 
 
The PART assesses one fifth of federal programmes every year. In other words, a 
programme is required to be assessed at least once every five years. A programme, even 
though its assessment cycle has not yet been completed, may be reassessed when it 
provides evidence of significant improvement: for example, the development of new 
measures, or the fixing of new targets or results.  
 
To complete the PART, the OMB provides guidance and training about its workings for 
spending agencies‟ staff. In response to the guidance, each agency makes a PART draft 
and submits it so that the OMB can review it and check consistency. When reviewing 
the draft, the OMB focuses on all the requirements of the guidance. If agencies have any 
disagreements with the revised draft, they can appeal it to a high level appeal board. 
Similarly to SABP in Korea, all these PART processes are completed using an online 
application called PARTWeb. Through the PARTWeb, agencies can enter information, 
and can use the application to collaborate within agencies as well as with the OMB. It is 
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also used to generate summaries for the public at www.ExpectMore.gov (OMB, 2008). 
 
Recent results of the PART are presented in Table 3-4 and Figure 3-2. The ratings make 
an inverted U shape skewed towards the lowest category, without RND. The ratings of 
„Effective‟ and „Adequate‟ increase strongly from 2002 to 2004. The proportion of 
„Effective‟ programmes leapt from 6% in 2002 to 15% in 2004, and „Adequate‟ went 
from 15% to 26%. Showing a gradual decrease, the RND group accounted for a 
particular portion every year: 50% in 2002, 38% in 2003, and 29% in 2003. This 
continuous decline implies that the PART has been achieving significant development in 
establishing performance management: for example, developing performance indicators 
for programmes. 
 
Table 3-4 Ratings by the PART 
 2002 2003 2004 
Ineffective 5% 5% 4% 
Adequate 15% 20% 26% 
Moderately effective 24% 26% 26% 
Effective 6% 11% 15% 
RND 50% 38% 29% 
  Note: modified NABO (2005) 
 
Figure 3-2 Ratings by the PART 
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The key purpose of the PART is to provide performance information for budgeting. The 
PART has contributed to the structuring the OMB‟s use of performance information for 
its internal programme and budget analysis, although the results of the PART are one of 
the key factors for making budget decisions (GAO, 2004). Conducting a regression 
analysis of programme budgets on the PART scores, Gilmour and Lewis (2006) 
proposed that the PART scores had a significant correlation with budget allocations 
within the OMB.  
 
Nonetheless, there are criticisms of the implementation of the PART. As with other 
assessment instruments, the PART is not an automatic or impartial device for translating 
information directly into budget allocations. The GAO (2004) pointed out that the PART 
has the following challenges: (1) inconsistency in awarding grades to programmes, 
particularly programmes with multiple purposes and goals, (2) a lack of harmony 
between the PART and GPRA in defining a unit of analysis, and (3) a lack of 
cooperation with the Congress. More seriously, a PART assessment itself may not be 
neutral because of political considerations. Gilmour and Lewis (2006) hinted that PART 
scores might be politicized, and suggested that political considerations influenced 
budget proposals for federal programmes.  
 
3.3.2.3 Comparisons of SABP with the PART 
 
Modelled on the fundamental strategy of the US PART, SABP plays a role similar in 
many ways to that of the PART in preparing budgets. The contexts in which two 
systems operate make them slightly different in design and implementation, and there 
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are differences in the uses to which the results of the two are put.  
 
The author will now make a detailed comparison between SABP and the PART. Table 3-
5 summarizes differences in structure and information use. In terms of the weightings 
used to produce a numeric score, SABP applies fixed weights, whereas the PART gives 
some slight discretion to spending agencies.  
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes tends to be used in more various ways than 
the PART. The former tries to make a direct link between budget decisions and its own 
results when it assesses programmes as „Poor‟. The MPB has made a strong 
recommendation for ministries and agencies to reduce by 10% the budget of such 
programmes. Furthermore, results produced by SABP are considered in organizational 
or personnel performance evaluation. The PART, however, provides performance 
information as one of the key factors for budgeting. 
 
In terms of the units responsible for the two systems, the SABP unit, the Bureau of 
Performance Management, is independent from the Budget Office, whereas the PART 
unit, the Budget and Performance Integration Unit, has a close association with the 
budget office, the Resource Management Office (RMO). In order to make consistency 
checks, budget makers of the RMO constitute a Programme Evaluation Team in the 
Budget and Performance Integration Unit. As explained earlier, SABP may also involve 
budget makers, but their roles are limited (Bang and Yun, 2007).  
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Table 3-5 Differences between SABP and the PART 
 
SABP PART 
Configur
ation 
Checklist 
 
◇ Three sections: planning, 
management, and results. However, 
Panning is divided into two sub-
sections: rationale and design, and 
performance plan 
◇ Questions: 15 common 
questions and 0-3 specific questions 
depending on programme types. 
◇ Four sections: programme 
purpose/design, strategic planning, 
programme management, and 
programme results/accountability. 
 
◇ Questions: 25 common questions 
and 5-10 specific questions 
depending on programme types.  
 Weight 
 
◇ Planning: 30% (purpose/design: 
15%, and strategic planning: 15%), 
management: 20%, and results: 
50%. 
◇ Weights are not changeable by 
ministries and agencies. 
 
◇ Weights of questions are not 
equal.    
◇ Purpose/design: 15%, strategic 
planning: 15%, management: 20%, 
and results/accountability: 50%. 
 
◇ Weights are slightly flexible up 
to the point where questions are 
answered. 
◇ The weights of questions within 
a section, as a default, are equal. 
 Grade 
 
◇ Translating an overall numeric 
score into one of four grades: 
Effective, Somewhat Effective, 
Modest, and Poor. 
◇ RND (results not demonstrated) 
is not allowed. 
◇ Same as described on the left. 
Additionally, the PART grants RND 
(Results Not Demonstrated), 
regardless of an overall score, when 
a programme does not have 
acceptable performance measures or 
lacks baseline and performance data. 
Specific unit ◇ The central financial authority 
(MPB) is responsible for the 
management of SABP. 
◇ Within the MPB, a specific unit 
has been created to assess 
programmes using SABP. 
◇ The OMB is responsible for the 
management of PART. 
 
◇ The Resource Management 
Office (RMO) within the OMB is 
responsible for both budget 
allocation and assessment. 
Use of 
Informati
on 
Budget 
allocation 
◇ Providing information as one of 
the key factors for budgeting. 
◇ In some programmes which are 
assessed with SABP, „Poor‟ brings a 
direct link between budget 
allocations and the results. 
◇ Providing information as one of 
the key factors for budgeting. 
Others ◇ Reflecting SABP results in 
ministries‟ and agencies‟ 
performance evaluation 
(compulsory by the GPA). 
◇ In some ministries and agencies, 
using SABP results for personnel 
performance assessment 
(voluntary). 
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3.3.3 Programmes assessed with SABP in Korean public finance 
 
Korean central government expenditure consists of one general account, special 
accounts and funds. While the general account serves general purposes, the special 
accounts and funds finance specific purposes such as public corporation management 
and social insurance. The number of special accounts and public funds are changeable 
depending on individual underlying laws by the National Assembly. Indeed, Korean 
central government had 16 special accounts and 60 public funds in the fiscal year 2008. 
However, special accounts reached 18, public funds 63 in the fiscal year 2010. 
 
As for level of expenditures, the Korean government (including local governments) 
spent 30.7% of GDP in the fiscal year 2007. Figure 3-3 illustrates the ratio of 
expenditure to GDP in the fiscal year 2007 (OECD, 2008). Specifically, local 
governments spend a higher proportion of public expenditure than the central 
government (57.0% vs. 43.0%). The central government provides 38.64% of inland tax 
revenues for a grant for local governments by law. 
 
Figure 3-3 Expenditure ratio to GDP among major OECD countries 
(Unit: %) 
 
 Source: OECD Economic Outlook 84(2008), and Public Finance of Korea (Ahn, 2010) 
30.7
37.4 35.8
43.8 44.5
52.4
40.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Korea USA Japan Germany UK France OECD 
average
95 
 
Korean government expenditure can be divided on the basis of expenditure purpose, 
into labour cost, current expenditures, and programmes. Programmes, as a package of 
activities for a policy (MPB, 2004), are a basic unit to which budgets are allotted. 
Programmes can be categorized into two groups, depending on the degree of 
controllability by the central government. For example, because the central government 
is required to give lump-sum grants for local entities on the basis of legal specifications, 
the government has very limited discretion to make decisions  such as whether or not 
to allot grants, and how much to allot. The government is required to give the amount of 
grants automatically in accordance with a guideline specified by the law. 
 
As well as excluding labour cost and current expenditure, the Ministry of Planning and 
Budget (MPB) also excludes some programmes such as grants for local entities from the 
SABP assessment. These excluded elements amounted to 31.0% (65,000 billion Won) 
of total government expenditure of 209,600 billion Won in the fiscal year 2005.  
 
The MPB, similarly to the PART of the United States, assesses about a third of budget 
programmes with SABP every year, excluding some programmes such as lump-sum 
grants, labour cost and other programmes related to current costs. Figure 3-4 presents 
the amount of budget for programmes which MPB assessed with SABP during the years 
2005, 2006, and 2007. MPB assessed programmes accounted for 35,200 billion Won out 
of total government expenditure of 209,600 billion Won in 2005, 35,100 billion Won out 
of 224,100 billion Won in 2006, and 43,300 billion Won out of 237,100 billion Won in 
2007. As described earlier, in order to review the performance of programmes which 
were not assessed in a particular year the MPB has implemented Programme Re-
assessment from the year of 2006 and the MPB has reassessed around 20 programmes 
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every year. 
Figure 3-4 The budget amount of programmes assessed with SABP 
(Unit:Trillion Won) 
 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Budget (2007) 
 
3.3.4 SABP Operating Mechanisms 
 
The National Finance Act (NFA) stipulates that the MPB may assess budgetary 
programmes and then reflect the results in budgeting (Art. 8). On the basis of the law, 
the MPB manages Korean performance budgeting, which includes SABP. When using 
SABP, it plays a core role different from those of the spending ministries and agencies. 
The MPB, as the fiscal authority of Korean government, controls SABP. It establishes 
action plans and guidelines for SABP every year. It provides guidance on SABP
17
 to 
spending ministries and agencies, so that they can use SABP. The guidance presents 
procedures and central directives about the utilization of assessment results. In order to 
                                                
17
 Nominally, the OPC presents the Guidance in order to prevent redundancy. 
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ensure consistency throughout programmes, it explains specifically how to answer the 
checklists which inquire about programme consequences in three sections: Planning, 
Management, and Results. Table 3-6 shows an example of a specific standard for 
answering questions. 
 
Table 3-6 A standard for answering a question (example) 
Common question 2-3  
 Is the program implemented as planned? 
   
Purpose 
 
 
 
To determine whether funds are administered efficiently and apportioned in 
accordance with planned schedules and spent for the intended purposes. 
   
Elements of Yes or No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
□ Elements of Yes: A Yes answer needs to clearly explain and provide 
evidence of each of the following:  
   o Programme funds were spent in accordance with the overall programme 
plan. 
   o Programme funds were distributed to the intended recipients. 
□ Elements of No 
   o Programme funds were not spent in accordance with the overall 
programme plan. 
   o A programme has spent its budget exorbitantly or was in violation of the 
relevant laws. 
   o In indirectly managed programmes, programme funds were not delivered 
to intended recipients. 
 
Source: The Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme (MPB, 2007) 
 
To provide specialized implementation of SABP, the MPB instituted the Bureau of 
Performance Management and the Advisory Corps on Performance Management. The 
Bureau controls SABP, cooperating with the Budget Office of the MPB. It checks the 
consistency of SABP results (draft) which spending ministries and agencies submit. It 
provides SABP results for the Budget Office to utilize in the budget process.  
 
The Advisory Corps on Performance Management is comprised of budget directors and 
experts outside the MPB. The Corps places an emphasis on giving recommendations for 
improving the design and operation procedures of programmes, and for developing 
performance indicators. On the basis of these recommendations, the MPB advises 
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spending ministries and agencies to amend SABP results (draft) or to improve 
programme implementation. They are required to make action plans responding to the 
recommendations, consulting with the MPB; and the MPB checks in the course of 
reviewing the SABP results whether the plans have been completed. 
 
Spending ministries and agencies fulfil a practical role of implementing SABP on the 
spot. They classify programmes into three groups so that SABP can be used to assess a 
group per year. They measure programme performance with indicators, complying with 
the Guidance of the MPB. Furthermore, they conduct SABP and utilize the results in the 
process of preparing their budget requests. 
 
In terms of a process, SABP is largely operated in two phases: (1) preparations, and (2) 
assessments. The first phase considers the question of what is to be assessed and how it 
will be assessed. This phase is closely related to the annual performance plan. Every 
year, spending ministries and agencies develop an annual performance plan which 
contains all their budgetary programmes
18
. Importantly, these programmes tend to be 
grouped so that they are consistent with SABP assessment units. Performance indicators 
are developed for them. The programmes are divided into three groups according to the 
year in which they are to be assessed. In other words, spending ministries or agencies 
select a third of their programmes for the SABP exercise of the following year. 
 
The second phase is to assess programmes in compliance with the Guidance for SABP 
provided by the MPB (or OPC). Firstly, spending ministries or agencies self-assess 
programmes using SABP. Secondly, the MPB checks and reviews the draft SABP 
                                                
18
 In the Korean context, SABP is not used to assess routine and current programmes 
such as personnel management and operation programmes. 
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results which spending ministries and agencies submit. Within spending ministries and 
agencies, the programme managers who implemented programmes start the first stage 
of SABP assessment, making a draft of their own assessment. After reviewing and 
checking the managers‟ assessments, budget divisions submit draft SABP results to the 
MPB with their budget request documents. When spending ministries and agencies 
submit draft SABP results, the MPB reviews them on the basis of the Guidance for 
SABP. 
 
When reviewing draft SABP results, the MPB tends to concentrate strongly on 
performance measurements such as performance indicators, the reasonableness of 
performance targets, and the achievement of targets. It reviews the appropriateness of 
individual performance indicators, mainly with regard to representativeness and the 
measurement instrument used (Questions 1-5 and 1-6), consulting with experts outside 
the government. It analyzes performance achievements which carry the greatest weight 
in the questions (Question 3-2), linking them to reasonableness of the target level 
(Question 1-7). When assessing the achievements of programme targets, spending 
ministries and agencies are required to give their own grades on the basis of their 
documents.  
 
Figure 3-3 gives a comprehensive presentation of the operating mechanism of SABP. 
The figure shows that there are close relationships between the MPB and spending 
ministries and agencies. The MPB manages SABP as a centre of control, and spending 
ministries and agencies select and assess their programmes in response to the control. If 
SABP is to make a contribution to improving programme performance, harmony 
between them is essential.  
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Figure 3-5 The procedures and roles of SABP 
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Source: The Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme for 2007 (MPB, 2007) 
 
3.3.5 Checklists as a Means of Assessing Performance 
 
The MPB presents Guidance for completing SABP, which includes the checklists, every 
year. The checklists have 15-18 questions, depending on which of the seven types a 
programme falls into, and these are to be answered in a yes/no format in three sections: 
Planning, Management, and Results. The section on planning is divided into two sub-
sections: rationale and design; and performance plan.  
 
Each question is weighted so that SABP can produce overall numeric scores. To start 
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with, it has weights of 30%, 20%, and 50% for Planning, Management, and Results 
respectively. In the section on Planning, it allots the 15% to two sub-sections – rationale 
and design; and performance plan – equally. In principle, individual questions within the 
sections (or sub-sections) carry an equal weight. Exceptionally, the section on Results 
assigns 30% to Question 3-2 (achievement of targets), and 10% to Question 3-3 
(consumer satisfaction). In the case where it adds specific questions, SABP re-allots 
weights to each question equally within the overall weight fixed for the section, after it 
has fixed the initial weights for Questions 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, and 3-2: 5, 5, 5, and 30% each. 
 
The way in which SABP allocates weights between questions is critical. Recognizing 
that SABP aims to assess programme performance, a heavy weighting is given to 
questions related to programme performance. Questions 1-5, 1-6 and 1-7, which are 
related to performance measurement, account for half of the Planning section, and their 
weights are fixed regardless of specific questions added. When any one of them receives 
the answer „No‟, a programme becomes liable to receive a lower score due to chain-
linked questions, as will be described later. For example, when a programme sets its 
objectives inappropriately (i.e. Question 1-5 is answered „No‟), it is not easy for that 
programme to receive more than 65 points, which indicates a grade of „Modest‟. As will 
be seen later, the performance plan has been a critical factor in lowering average scores 
under SABP. Question 3-2 which assesses the attainment of targets carries the most 
weight.  
 
As presented in Table 3-7, the individual checklists of programmes consist of the 
common checklist and the specific checklist. Commonly applied to all programmes, the 
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common checklist consists of 15 questions. Of these, seven belong to the section on 
Planning, four to Management, and four to Results. Having various combinations of 
questions, the specific checklist has one to three questions, depending on programme 
types. Let us take as an example a checklist for the Road Building Programme which 
belongs to the Social Overhead Capital (SOC) programme type. In this case, the 
checklist has 18 questions. Out of them, 15 are common questions and three are specific 
questions for SOC programmes. 
 
In terms of the different sections, the Planning section has seven common questions and 
up to two specific questions. Social Overhead Capital programmes and Capital 
Acquisition programmes have the most – nine questions. The section on Management 
ranges from four to six questions, which consist of four common questions and up to 
two specific questions. The Loan and Subsidy types of programme have the most – six – 
questions on Management. And the last section, Results, uses four common questions 
without adding any specific questions. 
Table 3-7 Checklists for SABP 
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  ▣ Common checklist 
(Unit: %) 
Sections Questions Weights 
Planning 1.1 Are the purpose and authority of the programme clear? 3.75 
 
1.2 Is it rational for the programme to spend public funds provided 
by the central government? 
3.75 
 
1.3 Is the programme designed so that it is not redundant and 
doesn‟t duplicate any other programmes?  
3.75 
 
1.4 Is the programme designed to be free of major flaws that would 
limit its effectiveness or efficiency?    
3.75 
 
1.5 Are the performance objectives and the performance indicators 
developed so specifically that they will be suitable for measuring 
the programme‟s performance? 
5.00 
 
1.6 Are the performance objectives and performance indicators 
developed to show a clear causal relationship with the purpose of 
the programme? 
5.00 
 
1.7 Is the target, as set in terms of performance indicators, 
reasonable or ambitious? 
5.00 
 Subtotal 30.00 
Management 
 
 
2.1 Does the programme have procedures to regularly collect timely 
and credible management information, including information from 
key programme partners? 
5.00 
 
2.2 Has the programme taken meaningful steps to address 
management deficiencies or problems revealed in the course of 
execution? 
5.00 
 
2.3 Are funds allotted in a timely manner, and spent for the intended 
purpose? 
5.00 
 
2.4 Does the programme make savings in the budget or improve the 
execution procedure? 
5.00 
 Subtotal 20.00 
Results 3.1 Has the programme received an independent evaluation? 5.00 
 3.2 Does the programme achieve its annual performance targets? 30.00 
 3.3 Are the customers satisfied with the programme‟s service? 10.00 
 3.4 Are the assessment results used to improve the programme? 5.00 
 Subtotal 50.00 
 Total 100.00 
   Note: Every weight except those of questions 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, and 3-2 may be varied, depending on the 
number of specific questions added.   
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  ▣ Specific checklist 
 (Unit: %) 
Sections Questions Weights 
Planning (SOC) Are possible major conflicts considered in planning? 2.50 
 
(SOC) Does the programme have any procedures to analyze 
alternatives or the relevancy of the programme? 
2.50 
 
(CA) Does the programme procure facilities or equipment in a 
timely manner? 
2.50 
 
(CA) Does the programme have any procedures to analyze 
alternatives or the relevancy of the programme? 
2.50 
 
(OthD) Does the programme need to be continuously 
implemented? 
3.00 
 (Inv) Is the amount of investment reasonable? 3.00 
 
(SubL) Does the programme have the procedures to review and 
reflect the conditions of local governments in planning? 
3.00 
 
(SubP) Has the programme reassessed whether the ongoing 
subsidy is necessary?  
3.00 
Management 
(SOC) Does the programme manage its aggregate cost 
appropriately? 
4.00 
 (Loan) Are the loan terms and conditions set reasonable? 3.33 
 (Loan) Is the revolving rate sound? 3.33 
 
(SubL) Have local governments taken meaningful steps for 
making the best possible use of allotted funds?  
3.00 
 (SubP) Is the selection of programme partners reasonable?  3.33 
 
(SubP) Does the programme have oversight practices that 
provide sufficient knowledge of the grantee‟s activities? 
3.33  
Note: The letters in parentheses represent the programme types related to the question. SOC means 
Social Overhead Capital programmes; CA means Capital Acquisition programmes; OthD means 
Other Direct programmes; SubL means Subsidy to Local Government programmes; SubP Subsidy to 
Private Sector programmes; Loan means Loan programmes, and Inv means Investment programmes. 
    Source: Guidance for Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes, 2006 (MPB, 2006) 
 
Each question is designed to be answered with a „Yes‟ or a „No‟, except for two 
questions: Questions 3-2 (achievement of targets) and 3-3 (consumer satisfaction), 
which carry the most weight. Questions 3-2 and 3-3 may receive one of four levels of 
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answer: „Yes‟, „To a large extent‟, „To a small extent‟, and „No‟. The four levels are 
translated into different scores. Table 3-8 presents the relationship between the four 
levels and scores. Answered with a „Yes‟, a question takes a perfect score. Conversely, 
answered „No‟, a question receives a zero.  
 
Table 3-8 Relationship between the four levels of answer and scores in Questions 3-2 and 3-3 
 Yes To a large extent To a small extent No 
Question 3-2 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 
Question 3-3 10.0 6.7 3.3 0.0 
Note: Question 3-3 may be varied when specific questions are added up. 
 
Some questions are strongly linked to each other for the logical consistency of the 
checklist. Answers to Questions 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, and 3-2 are chain-linked. When Question 
1-5 is answered „No‟, Questions 1-6 and 1-7 are automatically answered „No‟. In the 
case where Question 1-6 is answered „No‟, Question 1-7 is necessarily answered „No‟. 
When Question 1-7 is answered „No‟, Question 3-2 may be rated, at best, „To a large 
extent‟. It may be argued that RND (results not demonstrated) needs to be allowed as an 
answer to Question 3-2 when Questions 1-6 or 1-7 are answered „No‟. 
 
3.3.6 Use of SABP Results 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programme has the primary aim of providing various 
kinds of performance information for budget decision makers. When making budget 
decisions, the MPB and spending ministries and agencies consider various pieces of 
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information which SABP provides.  
 
In line with the National Finance Act, the MPB has made several provisions for utilizing 
SABP results in the budgeting process. In the Budget Request Guidelines, the MPB 
announces that any programmes which SABP rates „Poor‟ shall have their budgets 
reduced by 10%, and that any programmes which do not present an evident 
improvement in performance will not have their budgets increased. The MPB made a 
12.7 billion Won reduction from programmes rated „Poor‟ in the budget year 2007, 
compared to the budget year 2006 (Park, 2006). In this sense, Korean performance 
budgeting tends to make a direct link between resource allocation and performance 
information provided by SABP in some programmes. 
 
The National Assembly Budget Office (2006b) reported that 82.5% of central public 
administrators perceived that using SABP results, the current link between budget 
allocations and performance information, was appropriate. 
 
The Office of Policy Coordination under the Prime Minister assesses the performance of 
ministries and agencies every year, based on the Government Performance Assessment 
Act (GPA). It assesses five functions of organizations: (1) Overall performance, (2) 
Finance, (3) Human resources, (4) Organizational structure, and (5) Information system. 
Collaborating with the OPC, five relevant ministries each assess one of the five 
functions. For example, having authority over government finance management, the 
MPB assesses Finance. Without using other assessments for it, the MPB regards SABP 
results as the means of assessing Finance. The five functions have different weights, 
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which are determined each year by the Commission for Government Performance 
Assessment, which the Prime Minister and an expert outside the government co-chair. 
The Prime Minister reports the assessment results to the President and consults the 
National Assembly. 
 
Some spending ministries and agencies reflect SABP results in their personnel 
performance evaluation. This tends to affect performance-related pay for personnel. 
Now, there is a growing trend towards following this practice among other ministries 
and agencies. Additionally, the MPB used to reflect SABP results in assessing the extent 
to which spending ministries and agencies kept good fiscal discipline. The MPB may 
give a slight increase in current expenses, depending on the assessments. 
 
3.3.7 Limitations 
 
Performance measurement is a critical element for successful performance budgeting 
(Robinson and Brumby, 2005). Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes plays a key 
role in producing various kinds of information related to planning, implementation, and 
the results of programmes. It has been shown that SABP has provided various kinds of 
performance information for making budget decisions, compared to the Performance 
Management System (PMS) (Park, 2008). 
 
It is arguable whether Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes has made a 
contribution to integrating performance information into budget allocations; but it does, 
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at least, tend to provide an opportunity for budget decision makers to discuss 
programme performance with programme managers and examiners (MPB staff who 
review the draft SABP assessments). However, SABP reveals some challenges. This 
section focuses on describing limitations specific to SABP rather than general 
performance assessment. 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes has intrinsic limitations in measuring 
programme performance. It is a tool for diagnostic rather than in-depth assessment. It is 
designed to elicit answers in a simple yes/no format that imposes restrictions on 
producing in-depth information about programme performance. The yes/no answer 
format results in an oversimplifying of answers. All the questions except Questions 3-2 
and 3-3 have only to be answered either „Yes‟ or „No‟ in a dichotomous way, depending 
on whether or not a programme meets the requirements, regardless of the fundamental 
causes of achievement or non-achievement. This format may fail to assess the progress 
of programmes in terms of planning, management, or results, because most of them 
cannot be expressed in an on/off mode. In practice, programme managers have asked 
for the yes/no format to be amended. Also, a simple yes/no format has a limited ability 
to express causality between programmes and performance. 
 
Many questions can contain subjective terms which involve assessors in a discrete 
judgement as to whether „Yes‟ or „No‟ is appropriate. They may allow multiple 
interpretations, and this can damage the consistency of SABP. In practice, together with 
consistency checks, the MPB has made efforts to ensure the consistency as follows: (1) 
it has made the Guidance on SABP detailed and specific, (2) it has set up a specialized 
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team which consists of programme examiners and budget decision makers, (3) it holds 
discussions with the Advisory Corps on Performance Management, which is comprised 
of budget makers and experts from outside government, and (4) it has made the terms 
used in checklists more objective. Nonetheless, the checklists still contain subjective 
terms which may damage the consistency of assessments. 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes tends to neglect the long-term view and 
costs when it assesses programmes. The checklist, as shown in Table 3-7, does not 
include questions which take a long-term view. In terms of cost, it includes a single 
question which asks about saving money (Question 2-4). SABP is designed to 
concentrate on assessing whether or not programmes attain goals for the relevant year, 
without considering the unit cost incurred. In contrast, the PART requires spending 
agencies to present each year‟s target levels in the context of a long-term goal (Question 
4.1
19
). It assesses cost-effectiveness in execution (Question 4.3
20
).  
 
From viewpoint of Gilmour and Lewis (2005), Self-Assessment of Budgetary 
Programmes is similar to the PART in that it may lead to goal displacement when 
procedures overwhelm goals. The checklists include two sections which measure 
procedures other than performance: Planning and Management. These sections are 
devoted to assessing mainly the extent to which programmes prepare well-organized 
documents for implementation. When programmes have goals which are hard to 
measure, their goals may be displaced by their operation procedures. For example, 
                                                
19
 Has the programme demonstrated adequate progress in achieving its long-term performance goals? 
(OMB, 2008) 
20
 Does the programme demonstrate improved efficiency or cost effectiveness in achieving programme 
goals each year? (OMB, 2008) 
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SABP does not have a classification „Results Not Demonstrated‟ (or RND), for use 
when it cannot identify programme performance because of inappropriate performance 
indicators. In these programmes, such a goal displacement may be accelerated. This 
may allow Korean performance budgeting to distort budget allocations. Some argue that 
SABP should be modified to produce an RND (Park, 2006). 
 
Many a score may not reflect genuine performance, because SABP does not classify 
programmes as RND. As stated earlier, scores of programmes depend heavily on a 
performance plan, due to the chain-link between questions. When a programme does not 
develop an appropriate performance indicator, it earns, at best, 70 points, the grade 
„Modest‟, regardless of its actual performance. During 2005-2007, SABP assessments 
suggested that almost one in two programmes did not develop an appropriate 
performance indicator.  
 
Spending ministries and agencies appeared to exhibit leniency in assessing programmes. 
Indeed, they make little distinction of SABP scores and grades between programmes. As 
seen in Table 3-9, spending ministries and agencies on average assess performance 26 
points higher than the MPB, and their scores show less variation than the MPB‟s.  
 
Table 3-9 Means and Standard Deviations of SABP scores (2005-2007) 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Spending ministries and agencies 88.23 10.27 
MPB 62.05 13.18 
Notes: 1) Spending ministries and agencies present their scores before the MPB reviews, and the MPB‟s are the 
scores which the MPB reviews. 
      2) Source: MPB (re-cited Park, 2006). 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes needs to reflect the opinions of the National 
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Assembly. In Korea, the National Assembly determines budget allocations for the 
various programmes every year. It depends heavily on the National Assembly whether 
or not SABP results are eventually reflected in budgeting. When conducting SABP, the 
MPB and spending organizations, at present, tend to have no collaboration with the 
National Assembly. They only have to discuss the results of SABP with the relevant 
commissions or sub-commissions of the National Assembly, when they have completed 
SABP. To allow SABP to produce pieces of performance information which the 
National Assembly wants, the National Assembly has to be involved in the process of 
SABP. The executive branch is required to build networks with the National Assembly 
so that it can discuss the considerations for SABP assessments in good time. 
 
Despite of these limitations, SABP may be the process which enables budget makers or 
programme managers to understand the overall status of the planning, management and 
results of programmes. However, it needs to continue improving its checklists and 
operation mechanism, so that it can produce the necessary information for the process of 
budgeting. 
 
3.4 Impacts of Korean Performance Budgeting 
 
In discussing the impacts of performance budgeting in Chapter 2, this research noted 
that they tend to vary depending on the different individual models of the system 
(Curristine, 2005). Since the Korean government conducted its pilot project for 
performance budgeting in 2000, it has evolved a Korean model of performance 
budgeting, taking the political and administrative environment into account. As a 
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consequence, Korean performance budgeting may have aspects that make it distinct 
from other models of performance budgeting. 
 
3.4.1 Overall Impacts on the Korean Central Government 
 
Performance budgeting, as discussed earlier, has the key objective of improving 
organizational performance. With this objective in mind, the Korean central government 
installed the system in order to remove inefficiency in government operations, 
especially in public finance.  
 
It has been widely argued that the pilot project for performance budgeting, known as 
Performance-Oriented Budgeting (2000-2002), did not improve efficiency in public 
spending. It failed to link public funding to performance information. An annual 
performance plan and report did not have the hoped-for result of producing various 
kinds of performance information helpful to budget decision makers. This caused them 
to neglect the system in the process of budgeting. Furthermore, because Performance-
Oriented Budgeting was applied only to „major‟ programmes (budget ≥ one billion 
Won), it was always going to end up as something that affected only certain divisions, 
not the work of entire ministries and agencies. In the end, it did not attract senior 
management‟s attention (Jun, 2003; Jun and Park, 2002). Chung (2003) proposed that it 
had little relationship with performance. 
In 2003, the Performance Management System which replaced Performance-Oriented 
Budgeting was introduced for all the budgetary programmes of the 22 ministries and 
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agencies. However, because it had the same weakness as its predecessor in terms of the 
performance information it provided, it failed to improve the links between performance 
information and budget allocation (Chin, 2005). Few researchers argued that Korean 
performance budgeting – the Performance Management System – had had a positive 
effect on improving public finance. 
 
In response to the criticisms, the MPB added Self-Assessment of Budgetary 
Programmes (SABP) to Korean performance budgeting in 2005. This was aimed at 
strengthening the links between budget allocations and performance information. It 
tended to provide a greater variety of performance information for budget decision 
makers than its predecessors. After the arrival of SABP, some researchers argued that 
Korean performance budgeting had begun to have some impact on the management of 
public finance. In its survey of central government administrators, the NABO (2006b) 
found that 70% of respondents perceived that SABP made some contribution to 
improving the performance of spending ministries and agencies. The MPB (2006a) 
reported to the Presidential Advisory Commission that, when supported by SABP, 
Korean performance budgeting strengthened the links between budget allocations and 
performance information. The links enabled Korean performance budgeting to 
contribute to enhancing efficiency (or effectiveness), transparency, and accountability in 
public expenditure.  
 
In addition, the Korean government expected that Korean performance budgeting would 
improve fiscal transparency (MPB, 2003; Jun, 2003; Jun and Park, 2002). Spending 
ministries and agencies provide performance information on public expenditure on their 
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websites. For example, the SABP results are available on the websites of the MPB, the 
Office of Policy Coordination, and the spending ministries and agencies. The results 
facilitate citizens‟ access to public finance information, and taxpayers are informed of 
where and how the government has spent public funds (Nah, 2005). As a result, the 
system can help enhance the transparency of operations that involve public resources. 
 
The Korean government anticipated that Korean performance budgeting would create 
and extend a performance-focused culture throughout the government, and that it would 
encourage programme managers to manage their programmes in a results-focused way, 
instead of an input-focused way (MPB, 2003; Jun, 2003; Jun and Park, 2002). Indeed, 
the MPB (2006a) has argued that Korean central administrators have now changed to a 
more performance-focused way of managing programmes, and that, furthermore, among 
public servants and throughout the government, there is a growing belief that 
performance measurement is required for achieving the budget. In order for Korean 
performance budgeting to have an effect on government operations, cultural changes are 
required; but these are not easy to achieve. Rather, it should be a long-term challenge 
(Curristine, 2005b). 
 
More practically, Korean performance budgeting, as the GAO (2005) argued for the 
PART, may improve administrators‟ ability to assess budgetary programmes. As the uses 
of SABP results are extended
21
, spending ministries and agencies are making an 
increasing effort to elaborate performance indicators for their programmes. They have 
also strengthened administrator training in performance budgeting. This may result in 
                                                
21
 Some ministries or agencies have extended the use of SABP results into personnel performance 
evaluations. 
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enhancing their capacity to assess programmes (MPB, 2006a). 
 
Nonetheless, arguments have been advanced that Korean performance budgeting has 
had little impact on performance. Some administrators have insisted that it can create 
additional workload without improving the performance of government activities. 
However, there have not yet been many studies – either qualitative or quantitative – of 
its impact over time (Chung, 2003; Koh, 2002). 
 
3.4.2 Impacts on Budget Allocations 
 
Performance budgeting represents an attempt to change resource allocation in public 
finance. On the basis of performance, it seeks to create a new budget portfolio. In order 
to do this, an increasing number of governments have recently associated budget 
decisions with performance information. Nonetheless, many governments use it, at most, 
to display performance information in budget request documents. Korean performance 
budgeting, however, makes clear its intention of linking performance to the budgets of 
programmes which SABP has rated „Poor‟. Indeed, when proposing budgets, the MPB 
has reduced those of programmes which SABP has assessed as „Poor'. The size of the 
reduction for the budget year 2006 was 25%, the reduction in 2007 was 24%, and the 
reduction for 2008 was 15% (Park, 2008). 
 
It has been suggested that Korean performance budgeting tends to link budget decisions 
with performance information. This means that Korean performance budgeting might 
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lead to changes in the amounts of budgets allocated among programmes. Examining the 
relationships between budget growth and SABP grades, Park (2006) proposed that 
performance information has affected budget allocations. In particular, he suggested that 
for programmes graded „Poor‟ there has been a close relationship between fund 
allocation and performance in the three stages of budgeting: request, proposal, and 
budget. However, his suggestions are limited in the extent to which they can be 
generalized, because he analyzed only a third of the programmes which had been 
assessed by SABP. 
 
3.4.3 Impacts on Managerial Practices 
 
At the initial stage, performance budgeting tends to concentrate on producing useful 
information. As it evolves, it places an emphasis on behavioural and cultural changes. 
As discussed in Chpater 2, interacting with administrators inside organizations, 
performance budgeting may have various effects on the management activities of 
governments: e.g. those of finance and personnel (Giddens, 2007). While adjusting to 
performance budgeting, public administrators may change behaviours and culture in 
managing public finance and programmes. 
 
The Korean performance budgeting model uses checklists which consist of 16-18 
questions for assessing the three sections of budgetary programmes: planning, 
management, and results. The checklists cover potential issues which can arise in the 
life-cycle of a programme. In order to achieve high scores according to SABP, 
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programme managers may be willing or reluctant to adjust their management activities 
to match questions on the checklist. More specifically, the checklists are devised to 
assess various programme-managerial practices, such as the setting of a programme‟s 
objective and design; strategic planning; the measurement of performance; and the 
management of programmes.  
 
As a result, the checklists, as evaluation indexes, tend to induce programme managers, 
as the assessed, to adjust their programme-managerial practices to match the questions 
on the checklist. As an example, Question 1-5 of the checklist asks programme 
managers whether or not their programmes have clear performance objectives. In 
answering „Yes‟, they are forced to think through their programme‟s goals. In addition, 
SABP may trigger the formalization of a programme‟s operation procedure, because it 
requires evidence, such as documents, for a „Yes‟. As the area of SABP use expands 
from budgeting to organizational evaluation and personnel evaluation, spending 
ministries and agencies are tending to place an emphasis on changing their practices. 
 
In practice, the MPB has prompted spending ministries and agencies to shift their 
management activities from input-oriented to results-oriented approaches. Park (2008) 
argued that spending ministries and agencies not only used SABP results in budgeting, 
but this also led to changing their management practices. He presented as evidence a 
programme which assists unemployed low-income families. The programme has 
changed from channelling assistance through a single provider to using several 
providers. Although Park has not shown the causal relationship of its strategic changes 
with SABP, this is expected to create a competitive atmosphere between providers 
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which may result in a reduction of costs. 
In the end, this process may result in changing programme-managerial practices. 
However, the changes in processes are too complicated and varied to be expressed in a 
single definition. It is not yet evident that performance budgeting has changed 
managerial practices within Korean government because no research into this has been 
undertaken. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Current performance budgeting in Korea forms a fundamental framework, developing 
what was started in the pilot project on Performance-Oriented Budgeting. Korean 
performance budgeting is underpinned by two laws: the National Finance Act (NFA) 
and the Government Performance Assessment Act (GPA). On the basis of the authority 
which it derives from the two laws, the MPB may evaluate budgetary programmes and 
reflect the assessments in its budgeting activities. It asks spending ministries and 
agencies to assess their programmes according to SABP, and to use the assessments in 
making budgetary decisions. 
 
Korean performance budgeting has three main instruments for assessing programmes: 
the PMS, SABP, and the IES. The Korean Programme Management System (PMS) was 
designed in 2003 on the basis of the country‟s experience of the pilot project. In order to 
strengthen the link between budget decisions and performance, Self-Assessment of 
Budgetary Programmes (SABP) was added in 2005. An In-depth Evaluation System 
(IES) has been used to evaluate major programmes since 2006. 
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Indeed, SABP plays a core role in producing performance information for budgeting. 
Over the course of three years, SABP was used to assess 1717 programmes. It provided 
various kinds of performance information for budget makers, and there is some 
evidence that budget makers have used it for making budget decisions. In particular, by 
introducing a top-down budget allocation strategy, under which the MPB has tended to 
give individual ministries and agencies a higher degree of budgeting autonomy whilst 
strengthening responsibility for results, the MPB uses SABP as an instrument for 
reviewing and screening the budget requests which spending ministries and agencies 
make under the top-down strategy. Furthermore, the results of SABP are directly 
reflected in ministries‟ and agencies‟ performance evaluation22 each year. 
 
As a consequence, Korean performance budgeting has developed a high profile, 
attracting the attention of senior management throughout Korean central government. 
The MPB reduced by more than 10% the budgets of programmes which SABP had 
rated „Poor‟. Additionally, it is argued that Korean performance budgeting has been 
changing programme-managerial practices. The MPB argued that Korean performance 
budgeting has been implemented in a way that is both stable and successful, and that it 
has contributed to improving government operations. 
However, there are opposing views on the impact of Korean performance budgeting. 
Some critics have suggested that Korean performance budgeting has produced a lot of 
extra paperwork without improving government performance. As proponents argue, 
Korean performance budgeting may have caused spending ministries and agencies to 
                                                
22
 According to the GPA, the Prime Minister evaluates ministries and agencies‟ performance every year 
and then reports the results to the President. Individual ministries and agencies consult the results with the 
relevant Committee of the National Assembly. 
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change their managerial and financial practices. However, these adjustments may 
produce quite opposite results. For example, spending ministries and agencies may 
develop inappropriate performance measures. If this is the case, Korean performance 
budgeting may distort management activities and work against productivity.  
 
At present, there is not enough evidence to decide whether or not performance 
budgeting in Korea has had a positive effect on government performance and 
programme performance. Because Korean performance budgeting has a short history, 
there are few studies that identify its impacts. Without evidence, arguments may only be 
anecdotes. Impacts are not easy to identify in a quantitative way, because performance 
measurement is one of the most difficult jobs associated with performance budgeting. 
At the present time, therefore, it may not be reasonable to conclude that the system has 
had particular impacts on public finance in Korea. 
 
Fortunately, however, SABP can provide numeric scores which represent programme 
performance. At least, this technique makes it possible to identify how performance 
information is utilized in the budget process. Furthermore, what is required now is to 
identify whether it has an effect on programme-managerial practices and performance, 
in order to explore the right direction for Korean performance budgeting.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
As described in Chapter 2, a performance budgeting system exists in a variety of forms, 
depending on the circumstances of different countries at different times. A key example 
is the Performance Budget recommended by the Hoover Commission in the United 
States, as well as the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), Zero-Based 
Budgeting (ZBB), and other techniques. 
 
This variety of forms causes some difficulty in discussing the effects of performance 
budgeting. Robinson & Brumby (2005) stated that what researchers should be 
describing is not the efficacy of performance budgeting in general, but that of specific 
forms of performance budgeting. Indeed, there has been a wide range of arguments 
about what impact performance budgeting has had on government operations. Therefore, 
this thesis concentrates on testing the outcomes of the Korean model of performance 
budgeting. There are few empirical studies on the efficacy of Korean performance 
budgeting, because of its short history.  
 
In this context, this thesis aims to identify how Korean performance budgeting changes 
programme performance, simultaneously analyzing both the association of budget 
decisions with performance information and the changes in programme-managerial 
practices within the Korean central government. 
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To achieve the objectives, this research employs a quantitative research approach, using 
budget change rates, SABP assessments, and subjective data collected by a 
questionnaire survey. The research endeavours to make a graphic analysis on the basis 
of the author‟s experience of implementing Korean performance budgeting. The author, 
who was involved in the installation and implementation of performance budgeting as 
an administrator of the MPB, has had many discussions and talks with other 
administrators within spending ministries (and agencies) and with outside experts. SPSS 
version 17.0 is used for statistical analysis. 
 
This chapter aims to provide a description and an explanation of research methodology 
employed in this thesis. The next section, 4.2, develops specific research questions 
based on the preceding discussions. Section 4.3 provides descriptions of instruments for 
solving the research questions developed in Section 4.2. It demonstrates an analysis 
framework, and specifically introduces processes and instruments for collecting and 
analyzing data. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes by summarizing this chapter. 
 
4.2 Developing Research Questions 
 
4.2.1 Earlier Studies 
 
This sub-section summarizes existing studies on performance budgeting in Table 4-1, 
concentrating on Korean and US performance budgeting since the 1990s.  
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Chung (2003) made a comparative study of the programme performance and the 
organizational performance of organizations that implemented performance budgeting 
during the years 2000-2002 and organizations that did not. Conducting an ANOVA 
(analysis of covariance) with 117 questionnaires collected from Korean central 
government administrators, he suggested that Korean performance budgeting did not 
lead to a significant difference in programme and organizational performance between 
the two groups of organizations. However, this survey concerned the pilot project on 
performance budgeting which took place during 2000-2002. The project did not have 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes (SABP) added to strengthen the links 
between budget decisions and performance in 2005. For this reason, Chung‟s findings 
are limited in the extent to which they can be generalized to Korean performance 
budgeting as a whole, as now practised. 
 
In order to identify the effects of SABP, the National Assembly Budget Office (2006b) 
asked Korean central government administrators several questions about its effects. It 
found that more than 70% of respondents perceived that SABP had positive effects on 
government activities. They opined that SABP made a contribution to improving 
performance. In terms of performance measurement, 72.5% perceived that SABP 
constituted an appropriate measurement of programme performance. This research, 
however, has limitations in the extent to which it can yield in-depth insights into the 
system, because it limited itself to simple descriptive statistics in its analysis of 
responses to questions.  
 
Park (2006) reported at the 2006 OECD Senior Budget Officials Meeting that the 
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Korean version of performance budgeting with SABP had had an influence on budget 
allocation. In his report, he regressed the percentage changes of programme budgets on 
the SABP grades in the budget year 2006, controlling several factors such as 
programme size. His study, however, analysed only a third of the programmes which 
SABP was used to assess, so that it had some limitations in the extent to which it could 
be generalized to Korean performance budgeting as a whole. In addition, Park (2008) 
stated that Korean performance budgeting not only produced useful information for 
budgeting but also changed programme management. However, he did not explore in 
detail any possible linkage between the Korean budgeting system and changes in 
managerial practices. 
 
In contrast to the case of Korea, there are many empirical examinations of US 
performance budgeting systems which have a lot in common with the Korean version 
(see Table 4-1). Among researchers, there have been mixed arguments about the 
efficacy of performance budgeting. Jordan and Hackbart (1997) found that 29 out of 45 
states (64.4%) agreed that performance achievement had had an influence on the 
Governor‟s budget recommendations. Melkers and et al. (1999) reported that 7.5% of 
state budget officers perceived that performance measurement had an effect in changing 
budget allocations. These researchers analysed subjective survey data collected from 
civil servants working for state or federal governments, because of the lack of 
availability of performance information.  
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Table 4-1 Summary of existing studies on public performance budgeting 
Date 
(empiric
al work) 
Author Level of 
Govern
ment 
Nature of 
Study 
Findings 
1. U.S studies 
1999-
2000 
Melkers, 
Willoughb
y and et 
al. 
State 
and 
Local 
Survey of state 
budget offices, 
state agency 
officials, and 
budget officers 
and  
department 
heads of city 
and county 
governments  
The percentage of respondents who asserted that 
performance measurements were „very effective‟ 
or „effective‟ in changing budget appropriations 
were 7.5%(state budget officers), 24.2% (state 
agencies) and 16.9%(city/county respondents) 
1997 Jordan & 
Hackbart 
State Survey of 
executive 
budget offices 
29 out of 45 states agreed that „achievement of 
performance standards affects recommendations 
in the Governor‟s Executive Budget.‟ 
1997 Poister 
and Streib 
Local Survey of city 
government 
60% of respondents reported moderate or 
substantial changes in budget allocations as an 
impact of performance measures. 
1999 Flowers, 
G. et al. 
Local Semi-
structured 
interview with 
administrators 
in Florida 
Implementation of performance-based budgeting 
was affected by agent characteristics. A „One-
size-fits-all‟ approach to performance-based 
budgeting caused delays and conflicts in the 
implementation process. 
2. Korean studies 
2003 Chung Central Survey of civil 
servants 
Korean performance budgeting did not make a 
difference to performance of programmes and 
organizations. 
2004 
and 
2005 
Gilmour 
and Lewis 
Federal Regression 
analysis using 
PART scores 
for the FYs 
2004, 2005 
The total PART scores had an impact on budget 
allocations within the OMB, but the „results‟ 
component scores of the PART had a smaller 
impact than that of the other components related 
to programme procedures. 
2006 NABO Central Survey of civil 
servants 
SABP made a contribution to improving 
performance of programmes, and measured 
performance appropriately. 
70% of respondents reported that SABP helped 
make moderate improvements in programme 
performance. 
2006 
and 
2008 
Park Central Regression 
analysis  
and qualitative 
analysis 
Korean performance budgeting had impacts on 
budget allocation between programmes, 
especially small-sized programmes. However, he 
analysed only a third of programmes which were 
assessed by SABP (2006). 
Korean performance budgeting had an effect on 
changing programme management to improve 
the „effectiveness of service delivery‟ within 
spending ministries and agencies (2008). 
Source: Added to and modified from Robinson, M & Brumby, J. (2005, IMF Working Paper). 
Note: The American performance budgeting examined in the table was limited to recent models of 
performance budgeting since the 1990s. 
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On the other hand, using the numeric scores that were produced for individual 
programmes by the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), Gilmour and Lewis 
(2005, 2006) twice investigated the extent to which US performance budgeting affected 
budget allocation. They concluded that „the PART scores have a statistically significant 
impact on budget decisions within the OMB‟, and that „the “results” component of the 
PART has a smaller impact on budget decisions than the “program purpose” 
component‟. Their studies did not describe its contribution to improving programme 
performance, the dynamic process of the changes in budget decisions, and what impacts 
the PART had had on budget decisions within spending agencies and the National 
Assembly. 
 
Studies, as summarized in the table, had a central focus on the performance budgeting 
system itself, and so tended to miss analyzing the effects of the system on specific 
government processes, such as budgetary programme management. In particular, 
although, by using various kinds of information produced by SABP, Korean 
performance budgeting was reported to show small signs of linkage between budget 
decisions and performance, there is a lack of evidence on whether it makes significant 
contributions to improving government operations such as programme-managerial 
practices and programme performance, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
Along with identifying the links between budget decisions and performance, studies 
should not neglect to analyse the relationships of performance budgeting models with 
managerial practices, in order to identify the effects of performance budgeting on 
programme or organizational performance. 
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4.2.2 Research Questions 
 
The key intentions of performance budgeting are, as discussed in the previous chapters, 
to assess programme performance and link it to budget decisions. Even though it is not 
easy, many governments have tried to develop techniques aimed at measuring 
programme achievements quantitatively. Most governments, in particular those of the 
US and Korea, have recently concentrated on strengthening links between budget 
decisions and performance.  
 
Similarly to other models of performance budgeting, Korean performance budgeting 
assesses budgetary programmes and then utilizes the assessment results in the process 
of budgeting. In order to measure programme performance, the Korean government 
developed SABP in 2005. The system enables programme managers to assess major 
issues raised in the process of programme implementation, from programme design to 
results feedback, and to translate the assessment results into numeric scores.  
 
In the process of budgeting, budget makers utilize the performance information 
produced by SABP directly or indirectly, and partly or totally. That is, SABP scores are 
linked with budget allocations between programmes. In practice, the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget (MPB), the Korean finance authority, announced that it would use 
SABP results for restructuring the budgetary programmes of spending ministries and 
agencies in the budget process. Furthermore, the MPB asked spending ministries and 
agencies to make a reduction of more than 10% in the budgets of programmes which 
SABP rated as „Poor‟ (Budget request guidelines, 2006-2008). In addition, the Korean 
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government uses SABP assessments for evaluating ministries‟ and agencies‟ 
performance (compulsory). Several ministries and agencies use SABP for personnel 
performance evaluation (optional). 
 
As a result, it is presumed that performance budgeting will have an impact – negative, 
positive, or even neutral – on government management, although it is hard work to 
integrate budget decisions with performance (Curristine, 2005b). Not only may 
performance budgeting have an impact on key public management functions and 
components, but it may also change the very nature of policy and management in the 
public sector (Bouckaert and Halligan, 2008). More specifically, the integration of 
budget decisions with programme performance is expected to change budget allocations, 
programme-managerial practices, and eventually programme performance within 
spending ministries and agencies. 
 
Based on these discussions so far, Figure 4-1 illustrates the impact paths of performance 
budgeting on programme performance. The links, in particular direct links, are expected 
to facilitate the reallocation of programme budgets according to programme 
performance. From Giddens‟ structuration perspective (2007), administrative actors 
have incessant interactions with a performance budgeting system while they implement 
it. These interactions may cause administrators to adjust their managerial practices 
related to programmes, finance, human resource, and so on. 
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Figure 4-1 Impact process of performance budgeting 
 
 
 Affecting Budget 
Allocations 
  
     
Implementing 
Performance Budgeting  
   
Impacting on Programme 
Performance 
     
  
Affecting Managerial 
Practices 
  
     
 
Source: Adapted from Flowers et al. (1999) 
 
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 4-1, Korean performance budgeting is expected to have an 
influence on management activities in relation to programmes. Firstly, it may change a 
range of programme budgets by associating budget decisions with SABP assessments. It 
may produce a „budget re-allocation effect‟ from lower-performance to higher-
performance programmes. The budget re-allocations between programmes may have an 
influence on performance. For example, programmes may be more efficient, in the 
sense that they may reduce cost per unit of output, if the re-allocations reduce wasteful 
budgets.  
 
The Korean performance budgeting system may trigger modification of existing 
managerial practices, or even create new practices, in terms of the interaction between 
an institution and its actors, as described in Chapters 2 and 3. In particular, by assessing 
the results of individual programme management in an item-by-item manner, the 
introduction of SABP has a greater possibility of producing changes in managerial 
practices. In order to achieve a higher score, programme managers may be forced to 
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adjust their managerial practices in accordance with SABP standards such as checklists. 
In turn, such adjustments may change the performance of programmes or organizations. 
For example, spending ministries may reduce programmes that have proved difficult to 
implement, because SABP assesses the extent to which programmes have spent the 
budgets allocated in the budget process (checklist Question 2-2). In order to answer 
„Yes‟ to Question 2-2, programmes are required to spend their budgets as planned. 
Performance budgeting may, therefore, prevent spending ministries and agencies from 
requesting excessive budgets. In addition, the publication of SABP assessments may put 
pressure on programme managers to adjust managerial practices regarding programme 
management (Park, 2008).  
 
As a consequence, it is expected that adjustments of management activities such as 
budget allocations and managerial practices may affect programme performance. 
However, it is not evident whether such adjustments have contributed to improving 
performance of programmes or government operations. Korean performance budgeting 
may produce unintended reactions as a result of inconsistencies between different 
participants in the way they supply information on their programmes. Spending 
ministries and agencies, having more information about programmes than the MPB, 
may be able to distort their responses in assessing programme performance (Smith, 
1995; Keaney, 2001; Park, 2006). For example, programme managers have a tendency 
to overstate their programme performance in order to receive as large a budget as 
possible. As a result, the assessment may not measure genuine programme performance. 
 
SABP may produce goal displacement due to various performance measurement 
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problems. The goals of public programmes are so ambiguous or intangible that their 
outcomes are not easy to measure (Warner and Havens, 1968). Alternatively, public 
programmes are likely to be evaluated according to their outputs. For example, road 
building programmes tend to be measured by Km of road extension (output), instead of 
by the reduction in the expense of transport per Km achieved by the road extension 
(outcome). The output measurement tends to give programme managers an incentive to 
maximize outputs, regardless of whether the social outcome is desirable (Bohte et. al., 
2000). As Lynn (1998) indicated, performance measurement in the public sector causes 
spending ministries and agencies to give more attention to procedures than to results or 
performance, because it is easier to measure the former than the latter. 
 
In a sense, direct links between fund allocation and programme performance in Korean 
performance budgeting may, on occasion, act to reduce programme performance. For 
instance, if a programme does not achieve goals due to under-spending its budget, its 
subsequent budget reduction may result in accelerating its disadvantages rather than 
advantages. An unpredicted increase in the inflow of residents can mean that the number 
of police becomes inappropriate for securing the safety of a community, and this can 
cause an increase in crime. In this case, budget reduction may bring about decreasing 
inputs of police, and in turn lead to increasing crime in the community.  
 
In the end, it is not reasonable to propose that Korean performance budgeting has 
contributed to improving programme performance without specific evidence. Here, the 
research raises basic questions of what contributions Korean performance budgeting has 
made to improving budgetary programmes. In particular, this research aims to identify 
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the impacts of Korean performance budgeting on programme performance, focusing on 
budget allocation changes among programmes and programme-managerial practice 
changes in the Korean central government which require further studies. To do so, the 
following research questions are examined: 
 
(1) To what extent has Korean performance budgeting influenced budget allocations 
among spending programmes?  
   1.1) Does Korean performance budgeting change budget allocations at the three 
budget stages (request, proposal, and budget)? 
   1.2) At what grades of SABP („Poor‟, „Modest‟, „Somewhat effective‟, or 
„Effective‟) does the budgeting system have the most impact on budget decisions? 
   1.3) In what components of SABP scores does the budgeting system have the 
greatest impact on budget allocations (Planning, Management, and Results)? 
   1.4) Does the budgeting system make a difference in impact on budget allocations 
depending on programme characteristics? 
 
(2) What are the effects of Korean performance budgeting on programme-managerial 
practices and programme performance? 
   2.1) What kind of managerial practices does Korean performance budgeting affect? 
This research is limited to explaining changes in seven practices: goal setting, budgeting, 
operation procedures, and support from higher management, taking SABP checklists 
into account. 
   2.2) What are the significant differences in changes to managerial practices 
depending on differences in organizations, uses of SABP assessment, and programme 
characteristics? 
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   2.3) What are the significant differences in the extent to which changes in individual 
practices affect programme performance. Furthermore, this study identifies differences 
in the kinds of practices which affect programme performance between ministries and 
agencies. 
 
4.3 Methods of Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Analysis Framework 
 
The purpose of this research is to identify the impacts of Korean performance budgeting 
on programmes. Reviewing earlier studies of the impacts of performance budgeting in 
the public sector, the author defines two fundamental research questions focusing on 
budgetary programmes: (1) Did Korean performance budgeting have an impact on the 
programme budgets of the central government? (2) Did Korean performance budgeting 
affect managerial practices within spending ministries and agencies? Figure 4-2 depicts 
the framework of analysis for solving these questions.  
 
Firstly, in order to identify possible changes in programme budgets brought about by 
Korean performance budgeting, the research examines the relationship between budget 
variations and assessment results by means of regression analysis. The assessment 
results are SABP scores or grades of programmes, and the budget variations are 
expressed as percentage changes for programmes in the three stages of budgeting 
(request, proposal, and budget).  
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Figure 4-2 Analysis framework 
   
 1. Examining Korean Performance Budgeting and 
Reviewing Earlier Studies 
 
 ↓  
 2. Developing Research Questions and Defining Research 
Methodology 
 
 ↓  
 3. Collecting Data: Sorting SABP scores, and Conducting 
Survey 
 
 ↓  
 4. Analyzing Data: Factor Analysis, Descriptive Statistics 
Analysis, ANOVA, and Regression Analysis 
 
          
           
  
A. Programme Budget 
  Allocation Changes 
 a. Independent Variable: 
SABP scores or grades 
 b. Dependent Variable: 
Budget changes 
 c. Controlled Variables: 
Current year‟s budget 
changes, and programme 
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B. Programme-Managerial Practice Changes 
 
   SABP-Direct Practices 
a. Goal Setting 
 .Goal Clarity 
 .Goal Difficulty 
b. Budget management 
 .Budget Adequacy 
 .Budget Participation 
 .Budget Flexibility 
 SABP-Indirect Practices 
a. Procedure Formalization 
b. Support from senior 
management 
 
  
      
      
      
        
 
 
The current year‟s budget percentage changes to programmes are added to the models, 
because these are widely believed to affect budget decisions. These models control 
factors other than the assessment results for improving the accuracy of the models. 
Taking into account that, as noted in Chapter 3, programme groups have different 
characteristics in SABP scores and budget changes, controlled variables consist of: 
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method of programme management (direct or indirect), programme budget size (small 
or large), type of organization which the programmes belong to (ministry or agency), 
and type of programme mission (social welfare- or economy-related programmes). 
 
In order to examine changes in programme-managerial practices within spending 
ministries and agencies, the research conducts a survey of the managerial practices of 
Korean central government administrators. As will be defined later, seven managerial 
practices which may affect programme performance are selected. These seven practices 
are closely related to SABP. Depending on the characteristics of SABP impacts, they 
can be divided into two groups: „SABP-direct‟ and „SABP-indirect‟ practices. SABP-
direct practices are: programme goal clarity, programme goal difficulty, programme 
budget adequacy, programme budget participation, and programme budget flexibility. 
SABP-indirect practices are: extent of the formalization of programme operation 
procedures, and support from senior management. SABP-direct practices are affected 
more directly by SABP compared with SABP-indirect practices. For example, 
programme goal clarity and difficulty may be directly influenced by the SABP 
checklists related to goal setting in the section „Planning‟ (Questions 1-5, 1-6, and 1-7). 
Procedure formalization may result from evidence-centric assessment in SABP which 
requires proper evidence, such as formal documents, for an answer „Yes‟.  
 
This analysis measures the extent to which Korean performance budgeting has made a 
contribution to improving programme performance by conducting a survey of central 
government administrators. 
 
In order to analyse the data collected from the survey, the research employs factor 
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analysis, descriptive statistics analysis, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and regression 
analysis. Using factor analysis, this study establishes the reliability of data collected 
from the survey. The descriptive statistics analysis describes the strength of the impact 
of Korean performance budgeting on individual factors and programme performance. 
ANOVA explains whether or not programme or organizational types, and the uses of 
SABP results make significant differences in managerial practice changes. Regression 
analysis of perceived programme performance to managerial practices examines which 
changes to programme-managerial practices affect programme performance, and what 
difference these make to the strength of the impact of individual practices on 
programme performance. 
 
Hereafter, the author provides specific descriptions of the methods of analysis and, for 
convenience, these are divided into two parts: analysis of programme budget allocation 
changes; and analysis of programme-managerial practice and programme performance 
changes. 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of Budget Allocation Changes 
 
4.3.2.1 Constructing a Model 
 
This section provides a method for analysing the extent of any relationship between 
programme budget decisions and performance. It aims to construct regression models 
for analyzing how Korean performance budgeting has associated programme-budget 
decisions with performance. When constructing models, this research considers 
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elements of the budget decision-making procedure and participants‟ behaviour in Korea.  
 
For the budget decision procedure in Korea, the Administration submits budget 
proposals to the National Assembly. In making their proposals, spending ministries and 
agencies present their requests to the MPB, which is the financial authority. The MPB 
reviews the requests and makes final proposals for the spending organizations. Based on 
the proposals which the Administration submits, the National Assembly makes the final 
budget appropriations. 
 
Although there are many items to be considered in the budgetary process, decision-
makers give strong consideration to percentage changes in budgets. Spending 
organizations try to expand their budgets by a certain percentage each year. The Korean 
financial authority and the National Assembly are interested in the budget growth rates 
for certain agencies and programmes (Yoon, 1993; Nah, 1992; Shin, 1991). Wildavsky 
et al. (1966) suggest that the previous budget and the Administration‟s proposals can 
affect the budget decision-making of the Administration and the Congress in the US 
government. Additionally, the Korean government may take into account programme 
performance when budgeting. 
 
The budget decision process described above can be represented as simple equations. 
The budget request or the budget proposal can be stated as a function of the previous 
budget (∆Budgett) and programme performance (Performancet), considering other 
factors (Dr or Dp) which may affect the budget decision. 
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∆Requestt+1 = a + b Performancet + c ∆Budgett + d Dr + e  ........... (1) 
and 
∆Proposalt+1 = f + gPerformancet + h ∆Budgett + i Dp + j  ............. (2) 
 
The final budget appropriation in the National Assembly can be represented as a 
function of the budget proposal, considering other factors (Dn) which may affect the 
budget decision. 
 
∆Budgett+1 = k + l∆Proposalt+1 + m Dn + n  ........... (3) 
 
From the equations (2) and (3), the equation (3) is replaced by the equation (4) below. 
 
∆Budgett+1 = o + p Performancet + q ∆Budgett + rk Dk + s  ............. (4) 
 
The three equations (1), (2), and (4) can be re-labelled, as below. 
 
 
∆Budgetit+1 = α + β1 Performancet + β2 ∆Budgett + β3k Dk + ε  .......... (5) 
 
Where ∆Budgett means programme budget (request, proposal, or budget) percentage 
changes between the budget year t-1 and t. i = 1, 2, or 3, indicating the three stages of 
budgeting. „Performancet‟ means programme scores or grades which are SABP rated 
for programme results of the year t. Dk means six dummy variables, as controlled 
variables (k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6). α and β are a constant and regression coefficients. 
Finally, ε denotes an error term. 
 
In the equation (5), ∆Budgetit+1, a dependent variable, represents budget (request, 
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proposal, or budget) percentage changes (%) in the t+1 budget year (2006, 2007, and 
2008) in the budget stage i (i = 1, 2, or 3); ∆Budget1t+1 symbolizes percentage changes 
in the budget requests of programmes within spending ministries or agencies, 
∆Budget2t+1 means budget proposal percentage changes within the MPB, and 
∆Budget3t+1 means percentage changes of budgets appropriated by the National 
Assembly. Aiming to identify the extent to which Korean performance budgeting has 
had an impact on budget allocations between programmes, this research uses the rate of 
changes (%) instead of the absolute amount of changes. For example, in the budget year 
2006, budget percentage changes are (2006 programme budgets - 2005 programme 
budgets) / 2005 programme budgets * 100. 
 
In terms of independent variables, „Performancet‟ symbolizes scores, grades, or three 
kinds of component scores of programmes which SABP rated for in the year t. Basically, 
these models use SABP scores. Taking into account that the MPB has imposed a budget 
reduction of more than 10% on programmes which are rated „Poor‟ according to SABP 
scores, this model utilizes grades as well. Considering that SABP grades are ordinal data, 
they are dummyized (1, 0). To identify differences in the impact of the three individual 
SABP components on budget allocations, component scores are analysed.  
 
∆Budgett represents budget percentage changes (%) for the budget year t when SABP is 
used to assess programmes in order to produce the budget documents for the t+1 budget 
year. Incrementalists have proposed that budgets are more affected by the current year‟s 
budgets than other factors. If this view is accepted, the current year‟s budgets are one of 
the critical factors which affect budget decisions. In the budget year 2005, ∆Budgett 
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means budget changes from the budget year 2004 to 2005. 
 
Dk (k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6) are dummy variables representing 0 or 1. Taking into account 
that different programme groups have different SABP scores and budget changes, this 
model needs to control these factors so that they do not affect the results of the 
regression analysis. Different programmes construct different stakeholders. They 
formulate diverse political powers to affect fund distributions in the process of 
budgeting. The types of organization which programmes are installed in may have an 
influence on budget decisions. Budget bargaining power can vary, depending on the 
hierarchical level of the ministries and agencies. For example, agencies, even though 
they are independent in many ways, are controlled by the ministries they report to. 
Ministries are expected to be less affected by SABP assessments than agencies. In 
addition, during the years 2005-2007, the period being analysed, the Korean 
administration placed a policy emphasis on strengthening social welfare systems, 
because it needed to build a social safety net after the Asian foreign exchange crisis of 
1997. So, it can be expected that social welfare-related programmes were less affected 
by SABP scores than other programmes. 
 
D1 and D2 indicate „social welfare-related programmes‟ and „economy-related 
programmes‟ respectively. According to their main purposes, programmes can be 
categorized, and these divisions, in general, depend on the UN‟s classification of the 
functions of governments (COFOG) based on government expenditure purpose: general 
public services, defence, public order and safety, economic affairs, environmental 
protection, housing and community amenities, recreation, culture and religion, health, 
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education, and social protection.  
 
Indeed, the ministries and agencies of the Korean central government, although they 
may belong to a small, somewhat mixed zone, do have one primary purpose which can 
be categorized by the UN‟s classification. For example, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry for Gender Equality, and the Commission 
for Youth are primarily concerned with health and social protection. The Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce and Energy, the Ministry of Information and 
Communication, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation, the Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs, and the Small and Medium Business Administration are concerned 
with economic affairs
23
 For the convenience of classification, „welfare-related 
programmes‟ and „economy-related programmes‟ are divided, according to which 
ministry or agency the programmes belong to. „Welfare-related programmes‟ are 
defined as a group of programmes housed in the four ministries or agencies for health 
and social protection; „economy-related programmes‟ is a group of programmes 
belonging to the eight ministries or agencies for economic affairs (Bang, 2008)
24
. 
 
D3 and D4 are programme groups which depend on programme management types. The 
programmes of the Korean central government belong either to a ministry or to an 
agency (D3). Indicating a group of programmes which belong to ministries, 
                                                
23
 The Commission for Youth, the Ministry of Information and Communication, and the Ministry of 
Maritime Affairs, Ministry of Science and Technology were absorbed into the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, the Ministry of Commerce and Energy, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Maritime 
Affairs respectively in 2008. 
24
 Gilmour and Lewis (2006), in an analysis of the PART, grouped programmes in order to measure a 
programme's political content according to „what department houses the programme‟. 
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„programmes belonging to ministries‟ is a dummy variable (1, 0). If a programme 
belongs to an agency, it has the value 0. Also, programmes are implemented either by 
central government or by other organizations (D4). „Programmes managed directly by 
government‟ includes programmes which the Korean central government implements 
directly. They have the value 1. Out of the seven programme types assessed by SABP, 
„SOC programmes‟, „Capital Acquisition programmes‟, and „Other Direct programmes‟ 
are included in „programmes managed directly by government‟, the remaining four 
types („Loan programmes‟, „Investment programmes‟, „Subsidy to Local Government 
programmes‟, and ‟Subsidy to Private Sector programmes‟) are implemented by the 
other organizations (Park, 2006). 
 
D5 and D6 are dummy variables for representing programme size. D5 is a dummy for 
„small programmes‟ and D6 for „large programmes‟. The budget size may make a 
difference to the impact of SABP on budget allocations. In Gilmour‟s & Lewis‟s view 
(2005), large-sized programmes are expected to be less affected by SABP than small-
sized programmes, because large-sized programmes are, in general, well-established 
and have important „constituencies‟ and „long histories‟. Programmes can be grouped 
according to their budget size. Based on the quartiles, „small programmes‟ are 
operationalized as programmes in the first quartile, and „large programmes‟ are 
programmes in the fourth quartile. In this analysis, the four quartiles are divided on the 
basis of programme budgets for the budget year t. Programmes in the first quartile are 
2.5 billion Won or smaller for „small programmes‟, and programmes in the fourth 
quartile are 29.0 billion Won or greater.  
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This analysis model is similar in spirit to recent works by the GAO (2004), Gilmour and 
Lewis (2005, 2006), and Park (2006). The GAO (2004) made a regression analysis of 
budget percentage changes to PART scores. Firstly, putting programmes into three 
groups depending on their budget size (small, medium, large), it made simple regression 
analyses of each. Secondly, it replaced PART scores for four component scores of the 
PART. Adding previous budget changes and controlled variables to the GAO model, 
Gilmour & Lewis (2005, 2006) constructed their models. They controlled the political 
attributes of programmes such as programme age, programme size, and programme 
ideology. Park (2006) modified the models of Gilmour & Lewis (2005, 2006), 
substituting four grades for numeric scores. 
 
Adjusting the recent works cited above to the Korean context, this research makes use 
of regression models as described above. The model used here is distinguished from that 
used by Gilmour & Lewis (2005, 2006) in the sense that it adjusts controlled variables 
to the Korean context. It is also different from Park (2006), who used SABP grades in 
his model. This model introduces SABP scores as a main independent variable, instead 
of SABP grades. Scores have some particular strengths for regression analysis 
compared to grades. Technically, scores are ratio variables, whereas grades are ordinal 
variables. As a result, grades tend to lose various kinds of information, so that they put 
some limitations on regression analysis (Leech et.al, 2008; Bryman, 2004; Hong et.al, 
2000). 
 
There are two alternative types of modified models: (1) the data- or function-
transformed models, and (2) the independent variable-added models. Firstly, instead of 
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budget percentage changes, budget change amounts or budget amounts can be 
considered in the model. For budget amounts, a logarithmic form can be used for 
reducing the excessive data dispersion. Budget amounts and performance take a 
logarithmic form
25
. Secondly, the GDP deflator can be considered as an independent 
variable. However, the estimated results of these alternative models make little 
difference in correlations between budget decisions and programme performance. Table 
4-2 summarizes estimated results for four alternative models using three-year pooled 
data from the budget proposal. The models are statistically significant at the level of 
0.05. In terms of the coefficient of determination (R
2
), they are similar to the original 
model. At best, the coefficient is improved to around 0.9 in the logarithmic form. The 
results indicate that, as with the original model, SABP scores have a positive (+) effect 
on making budget decisions. 
 
Table 4-2 Estimated results for the models in the budget proposal (three-year pooled data) 
Models 
Coefficients of independent variables 
F-value 
Adjusted 
R2 SABP score Budgett GDP deflator 
Original model 0.590*** 0.052** - 13.56 (p<0.001) 0.067 
1. Budget change amounts model 2.589*** 0.233*** - 40.64 (p<0.001) 0.185 
2. Budget amounts model 2.125*** 0.919*** - 4072.60 (p<0.001) 0.959 
3. Log (budget amounts) model 1.019*** 1.058*** - 401.041(p<0.001) 0.696 
4. GDP inflator-added model 0.586*** 0.052** 0.312 12.06 (p<0.001) 0.066 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is budget change amount, budget amount, or Log(budget amount) in the year t+1. 
      2. ***, **, and * denote the significance level of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. 
  
                                                
25
 Log(Budgetit+1)= α + β1 Log(Performance) + β2 Log(Budgett) + β3k Dk + ε 
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4.3.2.2 Collecting Data  
 
This research analysed budget changes and scores (or grades) for 1717 programmes 
which were assessed using SABP in the fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007. In order to 
test differences in the impact of Korean performance budgeting at each budget stage, the 
budget percentage changes relate to three stages: requests, proposals, and budgets.  
 
This research collected, principally, programme budget data and SABP grades (or scores) 
which the MPB and spending ministries and agencies published on their web sites. The 
research collected data related to budget changes by examining, on the relevant web 
sites, budget documents for each budget stage. The MPB and the National Assembly 
both publish budget documents on their home pages. The MPB and spending ministries 
and agencies have published SABP grades for 1717 budgetary programmes which they 
have assessed using SABP since 2005. The MPB‟s and other organizations‟ web sites all 
contributed SABP data used in the research; and SABP scores not published on these 
web sites were provided by the MPB. 
 
4.3.3 Analysis of Managerial Practice Changes 
 
4.3.3.1 Selecting Variables 
 
The analysis, in part, aims to identify changes in programme-managerial practices and 
programme performance. The attributes of programme-managerial practices can be 
146 
 
enumerated in various ways, depending on perspectives as to programme and 
management. For this analysis, the attributes we shall deal with are confined to 
programme-performance-related practices on which Korean performance budgeting, in 
particular SABP, may have a direct or indirect impact. Korean performance budgeting 
may, as described in Chapter 3, affect and change managerial practices related to 
programme performance within spending ministries and agencies. For example, because 
individual questions on the SABP checklists ask programme managers to pre-plan 
programmes, monitor implementation, and assess results, SABP may have a direct 
impact on programme management practices. 
 
Earlier management or organizational studies, as discussed in Chapter 2, discuss various 
factors which affect the programme performance that this research is interested in. From 
these, for this analysis, seven programme performance factors were selected with 
reference to the SABP checklists and the experience acquired from the pilot project on 
performance budgeting: programme goal clarity, programme goal difficulty, programme 
budget adequacy, programme budget participation, programme budget flexibility, 
programme operation procedure formalization, and support from senior management. 
For example, SABP assesses whether programmes have clear and ambitious objectives, 
using the checklists. This assessment affects goal clarity and difficulty of programmes. 
Based on the experience of the pilot project of 2000-2002, the MPB redesigned Korean 
performance budgeting so that it could attract the attention of senior management within 
spending ministries and agencies. It is expected that Korean performance budgeting will 
affect support from senior management. Table 4-3 summarizes seven selected variables 
and their grounds.  
147 
 
Table 4-3 Managerial practice variables and grounds 
Components Variables 
Grounds 
Existing Literatures SABP Checklist and so on 
Goal Setting Goal Clarity 
Hirst (1987), Locke (1968), Likert 
(1967), Stedry and Kay (1966), Hanson 
(1966) 
Q 1-1, Q 1-5,  
Q 1-6, and Q 1-7 
 
 
Goal 
Difficulty 
Hirst (1987), Locke (1968), Likert 
(1967), Stedry and Kay (1966), 
Hofstede (1967), Hanson (1966) 
Q 1-1, Q 1-5,  
Q 1-6, and Q 1-7 
 
Budgeting 
Budget 
Adequacy 
Nouri and Parker (1998), Leonard et al. 
(1995), Miliani (1975), Kenis (1979), 
Argyris (1953) 
Q 1-2, and Q 2-3 
 
 
 
Budget 
Participation 
Nouri and Parker (1998), Merchant 
(1981), Stedry (1960), Miliani (1975), 
Hanson (1966), Leonard et al. (1995), 
Miliani (1975), Kenis (1979), Argyris 
(1953) 
Q 1-2, Q 2-2 and Q 2-4 
 
 
 
 
 
Budget 
Flexibility 
Pitsvada (1983), Hanson (1966), 
Leonard et. al. (1995), Miliani (1975), 
Kenis (1979), Argyris (1953) 
Q 1-2, Q 2-3,  
and Q 2-4 
 
Others  
 
 
Procedure 
Formalization 
Dalton et al. (1980), Rogers and 
Mulnar (1976), Harrison (1974), Rizzo 
et al. (1970), Hackman and Lawler 
(1971) 
Q 2-1, Q 2-2, and 
document-evident rule 
 
 
 
Support from 
senior 
management 
Wart (2003), Sabatier and Mazmanian 
(1979) 
Experience gained from 
the pilot project 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Defining and Measuring Variables 
 
To identify the impact of Korean performance budgeting on programme-managerial 
practices and programme performance, data regarding the seven sets of managerial 
practices and programme performance were collected by an opinion survey of 
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administrators working for the Korean central government. This survey measured these 
eight variables by 35 items in a multiple-item scale way, using a seven-point Likert 
scale from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high). The multiple-item scale has the advantage of (1) 
capturing the totality of a broad concept, (2) drawing finer distinctions between people, 
and (3) reducing misunderstanding about questions, compared to a single question 
(Bryman & Cramer, 2005). The measured data have their usefulness enhanced by 
having their reliability and validity tested using statistical techniques. 
  
Programme performance and these seven managerial practices are measured as follows. 
Table 4-4 presents specific items and their sources depending on these variables. The 
items were designed to modify slightly questions selected from existing studies, taking 
the Korean central government context into account. The questions were re-worded in 
order to help respondents understand them better, after a pilot-test was conducted with 
23 administrators in three ministries (or agencies) of the Korean central government: the 
Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of the Environment, and the Korea Coast Guard, 
between 17 March, 2009 and 11 April, 2009.  
 
(1) Programme Performance 
 
When it comes to programme performance, a dependent variable, this is operationalized 
based on the public sector production process model of Figure 2-1 (Rogers, 1990; 
Chung, 2003). Performance is measured according to six items: (1) The level of 
customer satisfaction with my programme has increased; (2) The efficiency of my 
programme has been enhanced; (3) The effectiveness of my programme has been 
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improved; (4) My programme has used less labour in order to achieve the same goals; 
(5) My programme has spent less money on achieving the same goals; and (6) My 
programme has achieved the objectives that had been set for it. 
 
(2) Programme-Managerial Practices 
 
(2.1) Goal Setting: Clarity and Difficulty 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a goal is defined as the mission and objectives of an 
organization or a programme. Goals play a vital role in planning and managing 
programmes, in that they present guidelines for decision-making (Banner and Gangne, 
1995). Setting goals for programmes is a critical element of performance budgeting 
(Davies, 1999), in the sense that clear and consistent goals underlie performance 
measurement (Wang, 2000).  
 
This research considers two aspects of goal setting – clarity and difficulty – and 
measures them separately. Kenis (1979, pp 709) operationalized goal clarity as follows: 
„the extent to which goals are stated specifically and clearly, and are understood by 
those who are responsible for meeting them‟. This survey follows Kenis (1979). It is 
measured with five items. 
 
This survey operationalized goal difficulty following Hirst (1987), who refers to it as 
„the level of performance required to achieve a goal (Hirst, 1987, pp 774)‟. He assesses 
goals as „easy (or low)‟ or „difficult (or high)‟ on the basis of the average level. Goal 
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difficulty is measured with three items. 
 
(2.2) Budget Adequacy 
 
Budget adequacy is defined as the level of budget which is adequate for a programme to 
be fulfilled. In their survey study of the relationship between budget participation and 
job performance, Nouri and Parker (1998, pp 467) operationalized budget adequacy as 
„the degree to which an individual perceives that budgeted resources are adequate to 
fulfil job requirements‟. This survey follows the concept of budget adequacy 
operationalized by Nouri and Parker (1998), and measures it with three items. 
 
(2.3) Budget Participation 
 
This survey operationalized budget participation as the extent to which subordinates 
have an influence on, and are involved in setting, the budget, following Nouri and 
Parker (1998). In a similar spirit, Miliani (1975) surveyed the degree of budget 
participation in a private company with six questions, as follows: „(1) the portion of the 
budget the foreman was involved in setting; (2) the kind of reasoning provided to the 
foreman by a superior when the budget was revised; (3) the frequency of budget-related 
discussions initiated by the foreman; (4) the amount of influence the foreman felt he had 
on the final budget; (5) the importance of the foreman‟s contribution to the budget; and 
(6) the frequency of budget-related discussions initiated by the foreman‟s superior when 
budgets were being set‟.  
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This survey measures budget participation with the six items used by Miliani (1975) 
adjusted to the context of the Korean central government. 
 
(2.4) Budget Flexibility 
 
Performance budgeting requires more flexibility of spending ministries and agencies in 
executing an allotted budget. Nonetheless, budget flexibility is relatively „neglected‟ by 
both academic and practical studies (Pitsvada, 1983). Pitsvada (1983) refers to budget 
flexibility as the extent to which agencies have flexibility in executing an approved 
budget.  
 
This survey, following Pitsvada (1983), operationalized budget flexibility as the extent 
to which programme managers have flexibility in executing the budget for their 
programmes. It is measured this using three items. 
 
(2.5) Procedure Formalization 
 
As the pressure on programmes to perform grows, operation procedures tend to become 
more formal in underlining clearly who is accountable. Formalization is defined as the 
extent to which the operational procedures of organizations are stipulated in documents. 
Dalton et al. (1980, pp 58) operationalized formalization as „the extent to which 
appropriate behaviour is described in writing‟. 
 
Based on Dalton et al. (1980), this survey operationalized procedure formalization as 
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the extent to which appropriate behaviour in implementing programmes is described in 
writing, and then measured this with three items. 
 
(2.6) Support from Senior Management 
 
Leadership from senior management is a vital factor in making policy implementation 
successful (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979). Senior management can encourage or 
discourage their team to be motivated towards their goals. In Korea, it has been argued 
that lack of high level managerial support has been one of the critical factors which 
have caused performance budgeting not to work successfully (MPB, 2003; Jun & Park, 
2002). 
 
Based on earlier studies, this survey operationalizes support from senior management as 
the extent to which senior management gives advice and/or shows concern about their 
teams‟ programmes in management terms. This survey measures such support with five 
items. 
 
Table 4-4 Items and their sources, depending on variables 
Variables Questions Source 
1. Goal Clarity 
III-1. The strategic objectives and performance targets of my 
programme have been further clarified 
Flowers (1999),  
Chung (2003) 
and Kenis 
(1979) 
 
III-3. The target groups of my programmes have been more 
specific 
 II-5. My programme has clearer objectives 
 
III-6. I have understood the strategic objectives and targets of 
my programme better 
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III-8. My programme goals were more quantitative and 
measurable using performance indicators 
2. Goal Difficulty III-2. My programme targets were made more ambitious 
Flowers (1999), 
Chung (2003) 
and Hirst (1987) 
 
III-4. I had to invest more effort in order to achieve 
programme goals 
 
III-7. My programme targets have become more difficult to 
achieve 
3. Budget 
Adequacy 
IV-8. My programme budget has allowed me to achieve better 
performance 
Nouri and 
Parker (1998), 
and Chung 
(2003) 
IV-10. My programme budget has been sufficient for 
achieving goals 
IV-12. My programme has been allotted a budget more in 
accordance with the target level of programme 
4. Budget 
Participation 
IV-1. My participation in budgetary decision-making has 
increased 
Nouri and 
Parker (1998), 
Chung (2003), 
and Miliani 
(1975) 
IV-3. The frequency of programme budget-related discussions 
initiated by me or my seniors has increased 
IV-4. My opinions have been more important in setting my 
budget targets of programme 
IV-6. My seniors have listened more to my opinions in 
budgeting 
IV-7. My superiors have provided better reasons when my 
programme budget has been revised 
IV-9. My budget-related opinions have been more important in 
making budgetary decisions 
5. Budget 
Flexibility 
IV-2. I have chosen specific projects under my authority 
within the budget 
Chung (2003) 
IV-5. My autonomy of budget implementation has been 
increased 
IV-11. My influence on specific budget implementation has 
increased 
6. Procedure 
Formalization 
V-2. Operation procedures or stipulations have been more 
important for my programme 
Flowers (1999), 
and Chung 
(2003) 
V-3. Operation procedures or stipulations of my programme 
have been more specific formally 
V-5. In the process of my programme management, rules have 
increased 
7. Support from 
senior 
management 
V-1. My seniors have cared about my programme more 
Flowers (1999), 
and Chung 
(2003) 
V-4. My seniors have given advice or opinion on my 
programme more actively 
V-6. My seniors have been more interested in setting the 
objectives and targets of my programme 
V-7. My seniors have presented more concerns about my 
programme performance 
V-8. My seniors made an effort to provide as appropriate 
resources as possible for achieving my goals 
V-9. My seniors have paid more attention to performance 
management such as budget and assessment 
8. Programme 
performance 
VI-1. The level of customer satisfaction with my programme 
has increased 
Rogers (1990), 
and Chung 
(2003) 
VI-2. The efficiency of my programme has been enhanced 
VI-3. The effectiveness of my programme has been improved 
VI-4. My programme has used less labour in order to achieve 
the same goals 
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VI-5. My programme has spent less money on achieving the 
same goals 
VI-6. My programme has achieved the objectives that had 
been set for it 
 
 
4.3.3.3 Collecting Data 
 
This survey was conducted with administrators who were in charge of budgets or 
programmes in the Korean central government between 15 June, 2009 and 7 August, 
2009. The questionnaires were mailed to 33 ministries and agencies. In collaboration 
with the Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF), one of the government-sponsored 
research institutes, for improving the objectivity of data, the survey was specifically 
conducted as follows. 
 
(1) Objects of the Survey 
 
The purpose of this survey is to examine the extent of changes in managerial practices 
and programme performance caused by the performance budgeting which ministries and 
agencies of the Korean central government have implemented. In order to obtain as 
appropriate and unbiased information as possible, this survey took account of all the 
ministries and agencies which implemented the performance budgeting system.  
 
Within the spending ministries and agencies, budget managers, programme managers, 
division managers, and directors were selected to answer the questionnaires, because 
they were directly involved in management activities related to budgets and 
programmes. 
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(2) Configuration of the Questionnaire 
 
The questionnaire is designed to measure administrators‟ perceptions of changes in 
programme performance and programme-managerial practices caused by Korean 
performance budgeting. It is comprised of 53 questions in six sections: demographic 
details, programme details, programme goal setting, programme budgeting, other 
practices, and programme performance. Each item is measured on a seven-point Likert 
scale from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) except some demographic and programme-
related items. Table 4-5 provides summarized descriptions of the questionnaire 
employed in the survey.  
 
Table 4-5 Composition of questionnaire 
Sections Variables 
Questions 
Total The number of question 
I. Demographic details  8 I-1 to 8 
II. Programme details  10 II-1 to 10 
III. Goal setting 
1. Goal clarity 5 III-1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 
2. Goal difficulty 3 III-2, 4, and 7 
IV. Budgeting 
3. Budget adequacy 3 IV-8, 10, and 12 
4. Budget flexibility 3 IV-2, 5, and 11 
5. Budget participation 6 IV-1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 9 
V. Other 
6. Procedure formalization 3 V-2, 3, and 5 
7. Support from senior management 6 V-1, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 
VI. Performance 1. Programme performance  6 VI-1 to 6 
Total 8      53 
 
 
(3) Respondents 
 
This survey mailed 1458 questionnaires to civil servants of the Korean central 
government who were in charge of managing budgets or programmes, in 33 ministries 
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or agencies that had assessed their programmes using SABP during 2005-2007
26
. In 
terms of organizational mission, 462 questionnaires (31.69%) were sent to 10 social 
welfare-related ministries or agencies, 616 questionnaires (42.25%) to 12 economy-
related ministries or agencies, and 380 questionnaires (26.06%) to 11 administrative 
organizations. The recipients and respondents are summarized in Table 4-6 below. 
 
Table 4-6 Response rates of ministries and agencies 
(Unit: person, %) 
Ministries or Agencies Recipient Respondent Response rate 
1.Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 85 46 54.12 
2.Ministry of Health and Welfare 91 38 41.76 
3.Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 80 53 66.25 
4.Ministry of the Environment 39 32 82.05 
5.Ministry of Labour 43 13 30.23 
6.Ministry of Gender Equality 16 15 93.75 
7.Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs 30 28 93.33 
8.Cultural Properties Administration 23 19 82.61 
9.Korea Food and Drug Administration 22 10 45.45 
10.Korea Meteorological Administration 33 32 96.97 
Sub-total (Social Welfare-related Organizations) 462 286 61.90 
1.Ministry of Strategy and Finance 38 - 0.00 
2.Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 
63 58 92.06 
3.Ministry of Knowledge Economy 138 108 78.26 
4.Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs 114 61 53.51 
5.National Tax Service 38 12 31.58 
6.Korea Customs Service 32 13 40.63 
7.Public Procurement Service 40 13 32.50 
8.Korea National Statistical Office 44 20 45.45 
9.Small and Medium Business Administration 37 22 59.46 
10.Korea Intellectual Property Office 23 17 73.91 
11.Rural Development Administration 24 15 62.50 
12.Korea Forest Service 25 18 72.00 
Sub-total (Economy-related Organizations) 616 357 57.95 
1.Ministry of Foreign Affairs 26 5 19.23 
2.Ministry of Unification 23 17 73.91 
3.Ministry of Justice 26 21 80.77 
4.Ministry of Defence 53 7 13.21 
5.Ministry of Public Administration and Security 79 36 45.57 
                                                
5
These are no longer the same as at the time when the SABP assessments were made. 
Some ministries (or agencies) were consolidated, or their names were changed, in the 
2008 administrative reorganization that reduced 22 ministries and 18 agencies to 17 
ministries and 18 agencies. 
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6.Ministry of Government Legislation 29 - 0.00 
7.Military Manpower Administration 24 - 0.00 
8.Korea National Police 41 29 70.73 
9.National Emergency Agency 25 12 48.00 
10.Korea Coast Guard 29 22 75.86 
11.Korea Communications Commission 25 15 60.00 
Sub-total (Administrative Organizations) 380 164 43.16 
Total 1458 807 55.35 
Eight hundred and seven of the 1458 administrators (55.35%) gave responses through a 
self-completion questionnaire
27
. All the social welfare-related ministries and agencies 
gave more than 10 responses, and recorded the highest response rate of 61.90%, 
whereas the administrative organizations showed the lowest response rate with two 
agencies giving no responses (43.16%).  
 
When it comes to distributions of respondents, 44.4% of respondents worked for 
„Economy-related organizations; 34.8% for „Social welfare-related organizations; and 
20.7% for „Administrative organizations. In terms of organizational hierarchy, 68.0% 
belonged to ministries; and 32.0% to agencies. Most respondents, also, worked at 
headquarters (93.6%), and 6.2% at regional agents. 
 
Table 4-7 presents the demographic features of respondents. Eighty two per cent of 
respondents were in a lower grade than 4. As regards age, 75.6% of respondents were in 
their thirties or forties. As regards length of service, 55.3% had worked for their 
ministry or agency for longer than 10 years. 
 
 
                                                
27
 More precisely, 808 questionnaires were received. Of them, one questionnaire from the Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security was almost unfinished, with answers given to a demographic section 
only, and so it had to be excluded from this analysis. 
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Table 4-7 Demographic features of respondents 
Grade 
6 or lower  
(54.4%) 
5  
(27.6%) 
4 
(13.3%) 
3 or 
higher 
(3.2%)  
Other 
(0.9%) 
Age (year) 
29 or 
younger 
(6.8%) 
30 to 39  
(36.2%) 
40 to 49 
(39.4%) 
50 or older 
(16.9%) 
Career 
Years  
Shorter 
than 3 
(9.3%) 
3 to 5 
(15.4%) 
6 to 10 
(19.5%) 
11 to 15 
(20.0%) 
Longer than 15 
(35.3%) 
 
(4) Reliability and Validity of the Measurements  
 
The quality of research work depends heavily on the reliability and validity of the data 
used, particularly as regards opinion surveys (Bell, 1987; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; 
Bush, 2002; re-cited Zhui, 2008). A measurement is „reliable‟ when it is stable over time 
without random errors; it is „valid‟ when the differences between scores reflect „true‟ 
differences in the elements which the researchers are attempting to measure (Churchill; 
1979, Bryman; 2004). Although the reliability and validity of a measurement are 
conceptually distinguishable, they are closely related in that validity presumes reliability. 
Reliability is necessary, but not sufficient, for validity (Bryman; 2004, Churchill; 1979, 
Nunnally; 1967). This means that a reliable measurement will not always produce a 
valid piece of information. For example, when using a multiple-item scale, a „reliable‟ 
set of items (or questions) will not always measure what it is intended it should measure. 
 
This survey seeks to establish both reliability and validity by measuring true changes in 
programme-managerial practices and programme performance within the Korean 
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central government without including random errors. From a practical point of view, as 
with most research measurements, this survey takes some basic steps to ensure internal 
reliability and face validity (Bryman; 2004). Bryman (2004, pp 73) proposes that „face 
validity might be established by asking other people whether the measure seems to be 
getting at the concept‟. In order to establish face validity, this survey, in the first 
instance, drew on items from existing works in this field. Then it consulted with civil 
servants and academic researchers whose experience or expertise enables them to say 
whether these suggested items reflect the concept of each variable in a Korean context. 
In order to establish reliability, this survey performs a series of reliability tests, 
following Chung‟s (2002) and Nunnally‟s (1994) approach. The survey follows three 
phases: (1) item-to-total correlation analysis, (2) factor analysis, and (3) Cornbach α test. 
According to the domain sampling model, which assumes that any specific 
measurement used is intended to estimate a score which could be expected if all the 
items in the domain were used, items which are selected from the domain of a single 
concept should be closely correlated (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Churchill, 1979).  
 
To ascertain whether this can be applied for the survey, this survey first estimates the 
correlation of each specific item with the total of the other items (hereafter item-to-total 
correlation). The correlations may provide criteria for excluding or including an item. It 
is generally accepted that individual items are in a single domain when their correlations 
are above 0.3 (Chung; 2002). This survey deletes items whose item-to-total correlations 
are 0.3 or lower. 
 
Secondly, factor analysis is conducted to determine the number of dimensions, after 
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deleting items with correlations of 0.3 or lower. In other words, factor analysis can 
check whether or not the potential items for each concept are in a single dimension 
(Churchill; 1979). Indicating the correlation of a specific item with a potential variable, 
factor loadings are required to be 5.0 or greater, depending on a generally accepted 
standard in social science works (Chung; 2002).  
 
Thirdly, this survey estimates Cronbach α which is widely used to check whether or not 
a set of items has internal consistency (Churchill; 1979). Although the accepted alpha 
levels vary between researchers, the figure 0.7 is typically used as an acceptable level of 
internal consistency (Nunnally, 1994; Leech et al., 2008). This survey deletes items 
with alpha levels lower than 0.8. 
 
4.3.3.4 Analyzing Data 
 
This survey measured the extent to which Korean performance budgeting contributed to 
changing the seven programme-managerial practices and programme performance using 
a multiple-item scale with 35 items. For this analysis, items for individual variables are 
required to be translated into a single value. An arithmetic mean of the items is used for 
individual variables. For example, take a questionnaire where 3, 4 and 5 were answered 
to three items which measured a specific variable. An arithmetic mean 4 of 3, 4, and 5 
[(3+4+5)/3] would be the respondent‟s level of the variable. With a listwise-deletion 
method, this survey excluded cases without a response in any one of the items. 
 
In order to identify the extent to which Korean performance budgeting contributed to 
changing the seven kinds of programme-managerial practice and programme 
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performance, this research presents descriptive statistics such as their means and 
confidence intervals. These statistics help identify the perceived contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to changing the seven kinds of practice and programme 
performance.  
 
This research compares differences in changes in the seven types of practice and in 
performance between groups: organizations, programmes, and uses of SABP results. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a useful tool which identifies average differences 
between groups.  
 
Finally, this research examines the relationships between the seven types of practice and 
programme performance. To do so, regression analysis is conducted. Regression 
analysis is known to provide useful information about relationships between variables 
(Dielman, 2001). Some recent studies have employed regression models for examining 
the relationships between organization- or individual-level factors and public 
organizational performance (Brewer and Selden, 2000; Kim, 2004; Nahm, 2008).  
 
The regression model for this research is constructed in the box below. 
Merit = α + (β1 Clarity + β2 Difficulty) + (β3 Adequacy + β4 Participation + β5 
Flexibility) + β6 Formalization + β7 Support + ε 
where α and β1, 2, 3..., and 7 denote a constant and regression coefficients, and ε is an 
error term. 
 
In the regression model, „Merit‟ is the dependent variable, representing the extent to 
which Korean performance budgeting has made a contribution to improving programme 
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performance.  
 
In terms of independent variables, the first two terms, „Clarity‟ and „Difficulty‟, mean 
the perceived extent to which Korean performance budgeting has made a contribution to 
improving goal clarity and goal difficulty of programmes. The next three terms, 
„Adequacy‟, „Participation‟, and „Flexibility‟, relate to changes in budget practices such 
as budget formulation and execution. These three terms indicate the extent to which 
Korean performance budgeting has made a contribution to changing programme budget 
adequacy, programme budget participation, and programme budget flexibility. The last 
two terms, „Formalization‟ and „Support‟, represent other managerial practice changes. 
The first of these means the perceived extent to which Korean performance budgeting 
has made a contribution to formalizing programme operational procedures. And the 
second is the extent to which Korean performance budgeting has made a contribution to 
drawing support from senior management. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to describe the development of research questions 
and identify the analysis methods used to address them.  
 
Firstly, based on the examination of existing literatures in Chapter 2 and Korean 
performance budgeting in Chapter 3, this research defines two main research questions. 
One is to describe the relationship between budget allocation and programme 
performance in Korean performance budgeting (Question 1); the other is to identify the 
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extent to which Korean performance budgeting has made a contribution to changing 
programme-managerial practices and improving programme performance (Question 2). 
 
Secondly, this chapter provides specific descriptions of methods suitable for answering 
these research questions. In principle, this research follows analysis methods well-
developed in the academic field of social science. Table 4-8 summarizes statistical 
techniques for analyzing budget allocation changes, managerial practice changes, and 
programme performance changes. In order to describe the relationship of budget 
allocation with programme performance (Question 1), regression analysis is employed. 
Programme budget percentage changes are regressed on SABP scores (or grades). 
 
For the analysis of managerial practice changes and programme performance changes, 
after establishing the reliability of data collected from the survey through factor analysis, 
this research conducts descriptive statistics analysis, ANOVA analysis, and regression 
analysis. These analyses use data obtained from a survey of administrators within the 
Korean central government about managerial practice changes and programme 
performance.  
 
Descriptive statistics present the extent of changes in managerial practices and 
programme performance caused by Korean performance budgeting. ANOVA analysis 
presents specific information on differences in the changes between groups: 
organizations, programmes, and uses of SABP results. Finally, regression analysis 
provides a useful piece of information about the relationship between managerial 
practices and programme performance. It identifies managerial practices which have a 
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significant effect on programme performance. 
 
Table 4-8 Summaries of Analysis Methods 
Research Questions Statistical Techniques 
1. Budget Allocation Changes Regression Analysis 
2. Managerial Practice Changes and 
Programme Performance Changes 
A. Basic Analysis: Factor Analysis, Reliability Test 
B. Descriptive Statistics, ANOVA Analysis 
 C. Correlation and Regression Analysis 
 
In conclusion, this research is heavily centred on a quantitative research approach rather 
than a qualitative approach. However, the author endeavours to present a more vivid 
analysis, on the basis of his own experience and the talks he had with experts and other 
administrators whilst working as an administrator within the MPB during the period 
when he was engaged in installing and implementing Korean performance budgeting. 
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CHAPTER 5 A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SABP 
RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes provides various kinds of performance 
information for Korean performance budgeting, using checklists which ask about 
planning, management, and the results of programmes.  
 
For three consecutive years after SABP was introduced, in 2005, it made one or more 
assessments of individual programmes. In that period, it assessed a total of 1717 
budgetary programmes, and produced overall numeric scores and grades for these. In 
2005, it assessed 555 programmes, in 2006, 577 programmes, and in 2007, 585 
programmes, based on the results of the fiscal years 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively.  
 
As described earlier, the SABP scores may be affected by organizational features, and 
programme types and other programme attributes. Programmes tend to differ in clarity 
or difficulty of their goals. For example, it can generally be easier to set measurable 
objectives for programmes belonging to agencies than to ministries.  
 
These features may contribute to causing differences in the SABP scores between 
programme groups. In this context, this chapter describes the statistical features of 
SABP results in this period. 
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5.2 Statistical Characteristics 
 
5.2.1 Overall Review 
 
In terms of distribution, SABP scores exhibited an inverted U shape skewed a little 
towards the lower end. The average score for the three years was 62.1 points. During the 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007 there was not a vast difference in SABP scores. The average 
score recorded for 2005 was 60.1 points; in 2006 it was 59.9 points; and in 2007 it was 
66.0 points. The 2007 scores showed an increase in the average of 5.9 points, due 
mainly to improvements in the Results section. However, the increase is not so 
encouraging, because it is the result of improvements not in performance-related 
questions (Questions 3-2 and 3-3) but in assessment-related questions (Question 3-1, 3-
4). In these three years, the proportion of „Yes‟ answers to Question 3-4 increased from 
57.3% to 79.0%. This suggested that spending ministries and agencies were more eager 
to evaluate and to feed the results back into their programmes (Question 3-1) than to 
improve performance indicators, targets and performance (Questions 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 3-2, 
and 3-3). 
 
The grades of programmes, like the scores, formed an inverted U shape skewed a little 
towards the lower end. This is the shape presented in Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1. Out of 
the total of these 1717 programmes, 1078 (62.8%) were rated as „Modest‟, 332 (19.3%) 
as „Somewhat effective‟, 183 (10.7%) as „Poor‟, and 124 (7.2%) as „Effective‟. Over 
this period, the higher grades increased gradually. The proportion of „Effective‟ and 
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„Somewhat effective‟ rose from 22.9% in 2005 to 35.1% in 2007. By contrast, the 
number and proportion of „Poor‟ grades significantly decreased from 15.7% (87 
programmes) in 2005 to 5.3% (31 programmes) in 2007. 
 
Table 5-1 Frequency distributions of grades 
(Units: number of programmes, %) 
Year Total Poor Modest Somewhat effective Effective 
2005 
555 
(100.0%) 
87 
(15.7) 
341 
(61.4) 
99 
(17.9) 
28 
(5.0) 
2006 
577 
(100.0%) 
65 
(11.3) 
388 
(67.2) 
94 
(16.3) 
30 
(5.2) 
2007 
585 
(100.0%) 
31 
(5.3) 
349 
(59.6) 
139 
(23.8) 
66 
(11.3) 
Total 
1,717 
(100.0%) 
183 
(10.7) 
1,078 
(62.8) 
332 
(19.3) 
124 
(7.2) 
 
Figure 5-1 Frequency graphs of grades 
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The next sections will describe the statistical features of SABP scores more specifically, 
preparing for an empirical analysis of the links between budgetary allocations and 
programme performance. 
 
5.2.2 Characteristics of Questions 
 
As stated earlier, the checklist consists of 15 common questions and up to 3 specific 
questions, depending on programme types in the three sections. The number of „Yes‟ 
answers varied greatly between the questions. Table 5-2 shows the Yes/No distribution 
of programmes in terms of individual questions. 
 
Table 5-2 Yes/No distribution between the questions 
(Unit: number of programmes, %) 
Sections Questions Yes 
 
% 
No 
 
% 
Small 
Extent 
 
% 
Large 
Extent 
 
% 
Planning 1.1 1,713 99.8 4 0.2     
 1.2 1,685 98.1 32 1.9     
 1.3 1,605 93.5 112 6.5     
 1.4 1,481 86.3 236 13.7     
 Performance  1.5 1,688 98.3 29 1.7     
 Plan 1.6 966 56.3 751 43.7     
  1.7 455 26.5 1,262 
73.5 
    
Management 2.1 1,422 82.8 294 17.1     
 2.2 1,491 86.8 224 13.0     
 2.3 1,183 68.9 534 31.1     
 2.4 889 51.8 827 48.2     
Results 3.1 906 52.8 801 46.7     
 3.2 209 12.2 91 5.3 1,125 65.5 292 17.0 
 3.3 1,067 62.1 641 37.3 6 0.3 - - 
 3.4 1,102 64.2 608 35.4     
Note: Questions 2-1, 2-2, and 2-4 have missing value in a single programme; question 3-3 in three 
programmes; and question 3-4 in seven programmes. 
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In the Planning section, while more than nine out of ten programmes answered „Yes‟ to 
the questions regarding the design and rationale of programmes (Questions 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, 
and 1-4), only five in ten programmes (56.3%) gave a „Yes‟ to Question 1-6. More 
seriously, fewer than three in ten programmes (26.5%) answered „Yes‟ to Question 1-7 
which relates to a performance plan.  
 
This suggests that spending ministries and agencies failed to develop a proper 
performance indicator or to set a reasonable level of performance targets. As seen in 
Table 5-3 and Figure 5-2, there was little difference in the number of „Yes‟ answers to 
Questions 1-5, 1-6, and 1-7, meaning that there was little sign of improving 
performance indicators or target setting over the three years. In order to produce 
performance information useful for budgeting, spending ministries and agencies need to 
devise an improved performance plan. 
 
Table 5-3 Proportion of „Yes‟ answers to questions related to a performance plan 
(Unit: number of programmes, %) 
Question 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 
1.5 541 97.5 568 98.4 579 99.0 
1.6 334 60.2 303 52.5 329 56.2 
1.7 157 28.3 129 22.4 169 28.9 
 
Figure 5-2 Graph showing the proportion of „Yes‟ answers to questions related to a performance plan 
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In the Management section, those responsible for most programmes tended to answer 
„Yes‟. More than 80% gave a „Yes‟ to Questions 2-1 and 2-2, meaning that they had 
created a system which monitored the status of programme implementation. However, 
many a „Yes‟ was not repeated in Questions 2-3 and 2-4. In Question 2-3, the proportion 
of „Yes‟ answers was 68.9%, and in Question 2-4 51.8%. This indicates that many 
programmes did not spend the budgets as planned, nor did they save any money. 
When it comes to the Results section, most programmes tended not to be answered with 
a „Yes‟. One in two programmes answered „No‟ to Question 3-1, indicating that there 
was no regular evaluation. In Question 3-2 in which SABP allows programmes to select 
one of four levels: „No‟, „To a small extent‟, „To a large extent‟, and „Yes‟, a massive 
proportion of 65.5% gave the answer „To a small extent‟, and a „Yes‟ or a „No‟ 
accounted for only 17.5% of answers. This tended to be the result of the automatic link 
between Question 1-7 and Question 3-2. A „Yes‟ to Question 1-7 is necessary if the 
answer to Question 3-2 is to be „Yes‟. When Question 1-7 is answered „No‟, the answer 
to Question 3-2 is almost always „To a small extent‟. As seen in Table 3-12, three 
quarters of programmes responded „No‟ to Question 1-7. 
 
5.2.3 Characteristics of Sections  
 
The checklist for SABP, as described earlier, comprises three sections: Planning, 
Management, and Results. The Planning section is divided into two sub-sections: 
Rationale and Design; and Performance Plan. The Planning section is devised to assess 
the appropriateness of programme design, performance measures, and target setting. 
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The Management section assesses appropriateness of implementation. The Results 
section concentrates on regular evaluation, feedback of assessments, and the actual 
attainment of targets. 
 
Table 5-4 and Figure 5-3 illustrate the distributions of scores among the three sections. 
The Planning section had an average score of slightly more than 20 points out of a total 
of 30 points over the three years. The Management section had an average score of 
around 15 points out of 20 points. The Results section recorded an average score of over 
20 points out of 50 points.  
 
Considering the weights allotted to the sections (Planning : Management : Results = 
30% : 20% : 50%), the three scores were quite different. While the score for Planning 
and Management reached almost 80%, that for Results was less than 50%.
28
 The 
sections on Planning and Management achieved 30% greater scores than the section on 
Results. In the Planning section, two sub-sections – Rationale and Design, and 
Performance Plan – had significantly different scores. While the sub-section for 
Rationale and Design was more than 90%, that for Performance Plan achieved around 
60%, the second lowest in the sections. These differences in scores tended to be the 
result of the poor Performance Plan scores. This led to the lowering of the scores for the 
Results section, due to the automatic linkage of performance-related questions.  
 
  
                                                
28
 80% and 50% were calculated with „(actual score/possible maximum score)*100‟ and they are 
presented in the parentheses of Table 3-13. 
172 
 
Table 5-4 Distribution of scores between sections 
(Unit: points, %) 
 Total Planning   Management Results 
  (30) 
Design 
(15) 
Indicator (15) (20) (50) 
2005 60.1 23.1 13.8 9.3 15.1 21.9 
(%)  (77.0) (92.0) (62.0) (75.5) (43.8) 
2006 59.9 22.9 14.3 8.7 14.7 22.3 
(%)  (76.3) (95.3) (58.0) (73.5) (44.6) 
2007 66.0 23.4 14.2 9.2 15.5 27.1 
(%)  (78.0) (94.7) (61.3) (77.5) (54.2) 
Total 62.1 23.1 14.1 9.1 15.1 23.8 
(%)  (77.1) (93.9) (60.4) (75.6) (47.6) 
  Notes: 1) Numbers in parentheses in the first row represent possible maximum scores.  
       2) (%) means „(actual score/possible maximum score)*100‟ 
       3) Design and Indicator means „Rationale and Design‟ and „Performance Plan‟ for programmes 
in the Planning section 
 
Figure 5-3 Graphs showing the distribution of scores between sections 
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put into one of two groups: Directly Managed programmes, or Indirectly Managed 
programmes. Directly Managed programmes include SOC programmes, Capital 
Acquisition programmes, and Other Direct programmes, and the remaining four types 
are classified as Indirectly Managed programmes: Investment programmes; Subsidy to 
Private Sector programmes; Subsidy to Local Government programmes; and Loan 
programmes (Park, 2006; Guidance for SABP, 2007). 
 
There is a difference between the scores of the various programme types
29
, and this is 
illustrated in Table 5-5 and Figure 5-4. In the period covered, Directly Managed 
programmes had higher average scores than Indirectly Managed programmes. More 
seriously, the gap increased from 2.5 points in 2005 to 5 points in 2007. This appeared 
to be due to the different ways of implementing programmes.  
 
Depending on the manner of implementation, the actions of spending ministries and 
agencies affected programmes in diverse ways. Indirectly Managed programmes tend to 
be implemented through a multi-tier path, so that their management is more complicated 
than that of Directly Managed programmes. Because it is not easy to identify the effects 
of actions, spending ministries and agencies have a tendency to place an emphasis not 
on programme performance but on timely spending of the budgets they have allocated 
(Park, 2006).  
 
In addition, programmes which have been devolved to local governments for 
                                                
29
 This section analyzes 1603 programmes, but leaves out 114 programmes which are of a mixed type. 
Out of the 1603 programmes, 117 are SOC programmes, 148 are Investment programmes, 144 are Loan 
programmes, 384 are Subsidy to the Private Sector programmes, 287 are Subsidy to Local Government 
programmes, 22 are Capital Acquisition programmes, and 501 are Other Direct programmes. 
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implementation tend to experience the constraining influence of central government. As 
a result, Indirectly Managed programmes may pay relatively less attention to 
developing a performance plan and experience less pressure to achieve their goals. This 
may lead to a difference in SABP scores (Bang and Yun, 2007). 
 
Table 5-5 Distributions of scores between programme types 
(Unit: points) 
  Total 2005 2006 2007 
Directly 
Managed 
programmes 
Total 64.1 61.6 62.1 68.5 
SOC 63.5 61.3 65.6 63.8 
Capital Acquisition 63.7 63.1 62.2 66.7 
Other Direct programmes 64.2 61.7 61.1 69.0 
Indirectly 
Managed 
programmes 
Total 60.3 59.1 58.5 63.5 
Invest 62.8 59.8 57.5 70.0 
Loan 59.8 58.9 58.5 62.7 
Subsidy toPrivate Sector 60.9 59.8 60.3 62.7 
Subsidy to Local Government  58.4 58.0 56.2 61.1 
 
Figure 5-4 Graphs of scores distributed between programme types 
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In terms of the purposes of programmes, those dealing with economic matters 
(Economy-related programmes) had higher average scores than those dealing with 
social welfare issues (Welfare-related programmes) (see Chapter 4). Table 5-6 shows the 
average scores of the two groups. In total, Economy-related programmes had an average 
score of 62.66 points, whereas Welfare-related programmes had 58.65 points. More 
notably, the difference between them was becoming larger. In 2005 it was 2.91; in 2007 
it increased to 7.33. The differences appeared to reflect the characteristics of the 
programmes. Including SOC programmes, which produce visible outputs, Economy-
related programmes could achieve higher scores than Welfare-related programmes. 
Economy-related programmes tended to receive higher scores in the Performance Plan 
section, which had a big effect on their total score, because their performance indicators 
are easy to develop compared with those of Welfare-related programmes.  
 
Table 5-6 Differences in average scores between Economy- and Welfare-related programmes 
 Total 2005 2006 2007 
Economy-related programmes (A) 
62.66 
(13.61) 
60.14 
(12.81) 
61.52 
(13.49) 
67.08 
(13.71) 
Welfare-related programmes (B) 
58.65 
(10.20) 
57.23 
(10.54) 
57.90 
(11.11) 
59.75 
(9.34) 
Difference (A-B) 4.01 2.91 3.62 7.33 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. 
 
Programmes can make differences in SABP scores, according to their budget size. Table 
5-7 shows differences in average scores among the four quartiles.  
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Table 5-7 Differences in average scores according to budget size 
 Number of programmes Average scores 
Total 1717 
62.05 
(13.18) 
First quartile  
(budget ≤ 2.5 billion Won) 
425 
60.76 
(13.08) 
Second quartile  
(2.5 < budget < 7.9 billion Won) 
433 
61.97 
(13.12) 
Third quartile  
(7.9 ≤ budget < 29.0 billion Won) 
430 
62.11 
(13.77) 
Fourth quartile 
(budget ≥ 29.0 billion Won) 
429 
63.35 
(12.65) 
Note: Standard deviations are reported in the parentheses. 
 
Programmes in the first quartile (≤ 2.5 billion Won) had the lowest average scores of 
60.76, while those in the fourth quartile (≥ 29.0 billion Won) recorded the highest scores, 
63.35. As suggested in the table, the bigger programmes are, the higher their scores are. 
 
5.2.5 Characteristics of Organizational Groups 
 
Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes was used to assess 1717 budgetary 
programmes which belonged to 18 ministries and 22 agencies during 2005-2007. 
Agencies, which report to ministries, have a different approach to programmes from 
ministries, in the sense that agencies mainly implement policies which are formulated 
by the ministries they report to. One thousand three hundred and thirty seven of the 
1717 programmes (77.9%) were those of ministries, and the remaining 380 programmes 
(22.1%) were those of agencies. Of the 1337 ministry programmes, 434 (32.5%) were 
assessed in 2005, 448 (33.5%) in 2006, and 455 (34.0%) in 2007. 
 
Table 5-8 and Figure 5-5 show the distributions of scores between ministries and 
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agencies. There is an obvious difference in the scores. The ministries‟ programmes did 
not reach the average score every year, and the agencies scored better than the ministries. 
In terms of the different years, ministries scored an average of 59.2 points in 2005, 59.4 
points in 2006, and 65.2 points in 2007, whereas agencies scored an average of 63.3 
points in 2005, 61.8 points in 2006, and 68.7 points in 2007. In the total of 1717 
programmes, there was a gap of more than 3 points between ministries and agencies. 
While ministries scored 61.3 points, agencies scored 64.8 points.  
 
This gap appeared to result from programme characteristics such as degree of goal 
clarity, complexity of planning, and diversity of stakeholders. Implementing policies or 
programmes made by the ministries they report to, agencies can set more concrete 
programme objectives than ministries. As a consequence, it is easier for them to develop 
a performance plan with performance objectives and performance indicators than it is 
for ministries. As seen in Table 3-17 and Figure 3-8, agencies had slightly higher 
average scores than ministries in the sub-section Performance Plan. This resulted in 
increased scores in the Results section, due to the chain-link between questions related 
to performance (Questions 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, and 3-2). 
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Table 5-8 Distributions of scores between organizational groups 
(Unit: points, %) 
  Total Planning   Management Results 
   (30) Design 
(15) 
Performance 
Plan (15) 
(20) (50) 
Total Ministries 61.3 23.1 14.1 9.0 15.0 23.2 
 (%)  (76.9) (94.0) (59.8) (74.9) (46.4) 
 Agencies 64.8 23.3 14.0 9.3 15.6 25.9 
 (%)  (77.7) (93.2) (62.3) (78.0) (51.7) 
2005 Ministries 59.2 23.1 13.8 9.3 15.1 21.1 
 (%)  (76.9) (92.0) (61.8) (75.3) (42.2) 
 Agencies 63.3 23.0 13.6 9.4 15.4 25.0 
 (%)  (76.5) (90.5) (62.5) (77.1) (49.9) 
2006 Ministries 59.4 22.8 14.2 8.6 14.6 22.0 
 (%)  (76.1) (94.9) (57.3) (72.8) (44.0) 
 Agencies 61.8 23.3 14.4 8.9 15.3 23.2 
 (%)  (77.7) (95.9) (59.6) (76.4) (46.3) 
2007 Ministries 65.2 23.3 14.3 9.1 15.3 26.5 
 (%)  (76.1) (94.9) (57.3) (72.8) (44.0) 
 Agencies 68.7 23.6 14.0 9.7 16.0 29.1 
 (%)  (78.8) (93.2) (64.5) (80.1) (58.2) 
Notes: 1) Numbers in parentheses in the first row are possible maximum scores.  
     2) (%) means „(actual score/possible maximum score)*100‟ 
     3) Design means the sub-section Rationale and Design in the Planning section. 
 
Figure 5-5 Graphs showing the distribution of scores between organizational groups 
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5.3 Conclusions 
 
Ministry of Planning and Budget (MPB), for three consecutive years after SABP was 
introduced, assessed a total of 1717 budgetary programmes, and produced overall 
numeric scores and grades for these. In 2005, it assessed 555 programmes, in 2006, 577 
programmes, and in 2007, 585 programmes, based on the results of the fiscal years 2004, 
2005, and 2006 respectively. 
 
This Chapter has provided statistical descriptions of the SABP results of programmes 
which were executed in the fiscal years 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
 
In terms of distribution, SABP scores exhibited an inverted U shape skewed a little 
towards the lower end. The average score for the three years was 62.1 points. However, 
there appeared to be a little difference in SABP scores among programme groups or 
checklists. 
 
As for questions in the checklists, different questions made a vastly different score. 
While almost half of programmes gave a „No‟ to Questions 1-6 and 1-7, only one in ten 
programmes gave a „No‟ to Questions 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 and 1-5. This suggests that spending 
organizations may fail to develop a proper performance indicator or objective. 
 
The three sections „Planning‟, „Management‟, and „Results‟ appeared to make a 
difference in scores. Considering the weights allotted to the sections, the three scores 
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were quite various. While the score for the two sections Planning and Management 
reached almost 80%, that for Results was less than 50%. These differences in scores 
tended to be the results of the automatic linkage of performance-related questions.  
 
There appeared to be differences in scores depending on the way in which programmes 
are implemented. Directly-managed or Economy-related programmes earned higher 
scores than Indirectly-managed or Welfare-related programmes. Due to tendency to 
place an emphasis not on performance but timely spending of the allotted budgets, 
Indirectly-managed programmes may pay relatively less attention to developing a 
performance plan and experience less pressure to achieve their goals (Park, 2006). 
 
As for ministries and agencies, there appeared to be an obvious difference in SABP 
scores. The ministries‟ programmes (61.3) achieved lower mean scores than the 
agencies‟ (64.8). This gap appeared to result from programme characteristics such as 
goal clarity, and diversity of stakeholders. Implementing policies or programmes made 
by ministries, agencies can set more concrete and measurable objectives than ministries. 
This may result in agencies earning higher scores in Questions 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, and 3-2. 
 
As a result, it is possible to conclude that the SABP results may be significantly 
different among programme groups such as programme types, the way in which 
programmes are implemented, organizations. The next two chapters will identify that 
the divergencies in the SABP results make a significant difference in effect of Korean 
performance budgeting. 
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CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUDGET 
ALLOCATION CHANGES 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The primary purpose of performance budgeting, as noted many times, is to improve the 
use of public finances through associating budget decisions with performance. However, 
as Schick (2003) has argued, performance budgeting efforts in many countries have not 
achieved this, because of difficulties in making links between performance and budget, 
or because of difficulties in performance measurement. Similarly, Korean performance 
budgeting, even with SABP, may not quite manage to reflect programme performance, 
or SABP scores, in budgeting. Assessments made using SABP may be only one of a 
range of factors affecting budget decisions, in the sense that the budgeting process has a 
political function of coordinating, and effecting a compromise between, the interests of 
different stakeholders (Wildavsky, 1961). From Dull‟s viewpoint (2006), senior 
administrators may view SABP as a constraint narrowing their intelligence-gathering 
resources to a transparent and neutral instrument which increases the political cost of 
budget decisions. In this sense, SABP may be trivialized or moved further away from its 
goals. 
 
Nonetheless, recent works have argued that the Korean performance budgeting system 
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had influenced budget allocations between programmes. Park (2006, 2008) reported that 
the performance information generated by SABP had significant correlations with 
variations in programme budgets at each stage of budgeting. However, it would be 
premature, as Park (2006) himself recognized, for generalizations to be made from his 
conclusions, given that his investigation was conducted using observations of only a 
third of budgetary programmes for which SABP was used. The random element in 
selecting programmes to be assessed each year could have resulted in relatively better-
performing or more easily linked programmes being evaluated in the first year of SABP. 
 
Since Park (2006) completed his study, the assessment of all programmes using SABP 
has been completed as was planned. Now that SABP has been used to assess all 
programmes, it is worth giving comprehensive consideration to whether or not Korean 
performance budgeting has been using performance information, in the form of SABP 
scores, in the making of budget decisions. We need to decide whether or not budget 
participants at each budget stage have been considering the performance information 
produced by SABP. Furthermore, the extent of the linkage may vary, depending on the 
characteristics of programmes. For example, Korean performance budgeting may make 
a difference between SABP grades in associating budget decisions with programme 
performance, in the sense that the MPB tends to place particular emphasis on reducing 
the budgets of programmes rated „Poor‟. 
 
In order to answer these questions, this research, as noted in Chapter 4, employed 
regression analysis. Section 5.2 provides descriptions of data to be analyzed, focusing 
on the assumptions of regression analysis. Section 5.3 describes analysis results, 
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estimating regression models which represent the relationship between budget changes 
and the SABP results of budgetary programmes within spending ministries and agencies, 
the MPB, and the Legislature (the National Assembly) respectively. Section 5.4 
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of this investigation. 
 
 
6.2 Data Descriptions 
 
The objective of this chapter is to identify whether and how SABP assessments have 
influenced budget allocations between budgetary programmes. For these investigations, 
the author used two kinds of key data related to budgetary programmes: programme 
budget variations; and programme scores or grades produced by SABP.  
 
The research analysed 1717 programmes which were implemented, and then assessed 
using SABP, by the Korean central government in the fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
The 1717 programmes covered all the programmes which it was planned to assess using 
SABP at the time when SABP was introduced. Five hundred and fifty five programmes, 
or 32.3%, were evaluated in 2005, 577 programmes, or 33.6%, in 2006, and 585 
programmes, or 34.1%, in 2007. 
 
The budget variations of these 1717 programmes, one of dependent variables in 
regression models, were individual percentage changes made at the different budget 
stages. An alternative strategy would be to consider the absolute amounts of individual 
budget changes made. Identifying the extent to which SABP scores changed programme 
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budgets, this research used percentage changes as suitable for representing extent. As 
noted in Chapter 4, they made little difference to the results of the analyses. The 555 
programmes assessed in 2005 show percentage variations from 2005 to 2006; the 577 
programmes assessed in 2006 show percentage variations from 2006 to 2007; and the 
585 programmes in assessed in 2007 show percentage variations from 2007 to 2008. 
According to the budgeting stages, each year‟s percentage changes to budgets cover 
three groups: budget requests by spending ministries and agencies, budget proposals by 
the MPB (or the President), and final budgets set by the Legislature. 
 
Some programmes experienced budget reductions, others had budget increases, and the 
rest kept the same level from one year to the next. The budget changes of these 1717 
programmes varied from -100% to +1680% at the three budget stages. The highest 
change observed, 1680%, was a unique and unusual case from the budget year 2008; 
and the most frequent observation, or mode, was 0%. The budget variations at the point 
where spending ministries and agencies made their requests showed more variance than 
those at the proposal and final stage. In terms of standard deviation and variance, the 
request stage saw the highest figures of 79.2% and 6274.2% respectively. At the point of 
request, there was an average budget increase of 15.1%, whereas at the proposal or final 
stage it was almost half that: 7.9% and 8.7% respectively. Table 6-1 summarizes 
observations as to budget variations at each stage of budgeting. 
 
Table 6-1 Descriptive statistics for individual budget stages 
(Unit: %) 
   Minimum Maximum Mean Mode Std. Deviation Variance 
Requested budget -100.0 1680.0 15.1 3.0 79.2 6274.2 
Proposed budget -100.0 1652.0 7.9 0.0 76.5 5853.3 
Final budget -100.0 1648.0 8.7 0.0 76.7 5889.6 
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Budget changes were caused by various factors, such as performance and political 
context. The increase or decrease in the budgets of programmes did not always match 
their performance or SABP results. That is to say, some programmes saw a number of 
changes regardless of their performance or SABP assessments. Firstly, fulfilling its 
purpose might cause a programme to have its budget for the following year reduced by 
up to 100%. Secondly, a particular attribute of a programme might cause its budget to 
be changed, regardless of its performance. There were programmes which were being 
implemented because of the requirements of particular laws. These kinds of 
programmes were made to change their budgets because of legal factors other than 
performance. Additionally, some observations suggested that the results of analyses 
could be biased, because they deviated to such an extent from usual variations. Taking 
into account that observations from these programmes could distort the estimations of 
these regression models, the author excluded 317 programmes. Table 6-2 shows the 
specific number of these excluded programmes.  
 
Table 6-2 Programmes excluded from this analysis 
(Unit: number of programmes) 
 Total 2005 2006 2007 
Terminated programmes 40 13 17 10 
Programmes required by law 16 3 5 8 
Greater than 100% increase in budget 258 88 80 90 
Missing data 3 2 1 - 
Total 317 106 103 108 
 
First of all, when considering those programmes with 100% reduction in budget, the 
author excluded 40 programmes which were terminated because they were completed or 
because they were transferred to other accounts or ministries/agencies. Out of these 40 
programmes, 13 were assessed in 2005, 17 in 2006, and 10 in 2007. For example, the 
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„Seventh Main National Road Building‟ programme, one of the programmes assessed in 
2005, reduced its budget from 293.5 billion Won
30
 in 2005 to 0 Won in 2006 because it 
completed the building of the planned roads. This was regardless of its SABP scores (or 
grades). 
 
Secondly, this analysis excluded 16 programmes in which budget decisions had to be 
made in compliance with the relevant laws. Social insurance programmes such as 
unemployment benefits, national health insurance, and other social welfare programmes 
established by law are often given budgetary allocations regardless of their performance. 
For example, the budget for unemployment allowances, in principle, increases or 
decreases depending not on performance but on economic conditions, at least in the 
short-term. More specifically, an economic recession causes an increase in 
unemployment allowances in accordance with the number of unemployed workers. In 
turn, this results in an increase in the relevant budgets. 
 
Thirdly, the budget variations of these 1717 programmes may include extreme values 
that can lead the analysis to false conclusions. For example, the speeding up of a 
particular process in a road building programme (from the making of a drawing to its 
implementation) can result in an extreme increase in its budget for the next year. Such 
an extreme budget increase, as an outlier, might distort analysis of the results of budget 
variations caused by SABP. However, despite the general arguments that such an outlier 
may reduce the accuracy of the regression outcomes, so far there is no widely accepted 
standard which defines extreme values as an outlier. For this analysis, the author 
                                                
30
) The Won is the unit of Korean money. One Won, Korean money, is an equivalent to about 1 over 2000 
UK Pound, as of June 2009. 
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excluded cases where budget changes were more than 100%. Although this may seem 
like an arbitrary standard, it was still the fact that a large number of cases were 
considered, which lessened the need to rule out variations which would be explainable 
on the basis of SABP. In a similar context, in their analysis of the PART, Gilmour and 
Lewis (2006) defined outliers as greater than 100% variations. According to this 
standard, this study excluded 258 programmes which included 88, 80, and 90 
programmes for the assessment years 2005, 2006, and 2007 respectively. As for timing, 
out of these 258 programmes, 149 had an increase of more than 100 % for the current 
year‟s budget, and the remaining 108 had such an increase in the next year‟s budget 
changes.  
 
Other possible outlier guidelines would have been anything greater than 10 %, 30 %, or 
50 % budget changes. From the incrementalists‟ viewpoint, budget decisions depend 
very much on a baseline which, in general, is the budget for the previous year. Some 
variations from the baseline are normal and common in the process of budgeting (Nah, 
2007): 10 % (Bailey and O‟Corner, 1975; Kemp, 1982), 25 % (Feno, 1966), and 30 % 
(Wildavsky, 1984). Indeed, the aggregated level of Korean public expenditure saw a 
steady increase of 10% every year (Yoon: 1993, Shin: 1991).  
 
When, however, observation data are sorted in accordance with these standards, this 
may cause losses in the number of samples without making significant improvements in 
terms of analysis consequences. Indeed, these outlier standards made little change in the 
regression results of the primary analysis where outliers were greater than 100%, except 
that standard errors became smaller and estimates became more precise. 
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Finally, the author excluded three programmes – two in 2005 and one in 2006 – because  
they were not allocated any budgets in the current year (they were initiated in the budget 
year t+1), so percentage rate changes for the next year‟s budget from the current year‟s 
budget could not be defined.  
 
Having made these changes, the author analysed observations from 1400 programmes, 
excluding the total of 317 programmes. Table 6-3 makes a comparison between the full 
sample of 1717 programmes and the truncated sample of 1400 programmes in terms of 
distribution characteristics at the presidential budget stage. Only observations at the 
presidential budget stage are described here, for the sake of convenience, because the 
other stages had a similar distribution. The degree to which the distribution was skewed 
decreased from 10.1 to -0.5, suggesting that it came close to a normal distribution 
(Leech et. al; 2008). 
 
Table 6-3 Budget change differences at the presidential budget stage 
(Unit: number of programmes, %) 
   
 
Programmes Min. Max. Mode 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Kurtosis Skewness 
Full sample (A) 1717 -100.0 100.0 0.0 76.5 5853.4 182.8 10.1 
Truncated sample(B) 1400 -100.0 100.0 0.0 31.2 975.4 2.7 -0.5 
Difference(A-B) 317 0.0 0.0 0.0 45.3 4878.0 180.1 10.6 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1 illustrates six histograms concerned with budget percentage changes of 
programmes at the presidential budget stage. The three histograms on the left represent 
the full sample of 1717 programmes. The top left histogram is for 555 programmes 
assessed in 2005; the histogram below that is for 577 programmes assessed in 2006; and 
the lowest histogram shows 585 programmes assessed in 2007. The three histograms of 
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the truncated sample of 1400 programmes are on the right side of Figure 5-1. The 
histogram of 449 programmes for 2005 is presented at the top right, below which we 
can see 577 programmes for 2006, and the bottom right histogram shows 477 
programmes for 2007. The distributions look less skewed and more normal compared to 
the full sample on the left hand side. 
 
    Figure 6-1 Histograms of budget changes to assessed programmes 
Full sample Truncated sample 
 
  
  
  
        Note: Histograms on the right are those for the truncated samples at the presidential budget stage. 
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The key independent variable in this analysis is programme performance information 
measured by SABP. As described in Chapter 3, the information comprises two types: the 
grade and the score of individual programmes. The score, a sum of three component 
scores, is translated into one of four grades: „Poor‟, „Modest‟, „Somewhat effective‟, 
and „Effective‟. In order to determine a score and a grade for individual programmes, a 
two-step process is needed. Firstly, spending agencies give a score and a grade to their 
programmes
31
 and then the MPB corrects and determines these by checking their 
consistency against all programmes. It is the corrected scores or grades that are 
considered in the process of budgeting. The MPB has endeavoured to provide them in 
good enough time for spending ministries and agencies to use them in processing 
budget requests, and has considered them in making budget proposals. This analysis 
used the SABP scores (or grades) or component scores of 1400 programmes as 
determined by the MPB. 
                                                
31
 The distribution of grades or scores awarded by spending ministries and agencies showed a different 
shape from that of scores awarded by the MPB. The difference in average scores between them was as 
much as 30 points. Spending ministries and agencies gave an average score of around 90 points, but the 
average score was down by around 30 points in the MPB‟s review. Spending ministries and agencies had 
a strong tendency to rate their programmes „Effective‟ (70.4%). On the other hand, they were mostly 
modified to ‟Modest‟ in the process of the MPB‟s review of the SABP assessments drafted by spending 
ministries and agencies. In the MPB‟s review, the portion of „Effective‟ grades decreased significantly 
from 70.4% to 7.1%. <Table> below summarizes two kinds of grade distribution. Contrary to grade 
distribution weighted to the upper end in spending ministries‟ and agencies‟ awards, the grades fixed by 
the MPB made a bell shape distribution skewed to the lower end and were heavily weighted „Modest‟. 
Eight hundred and eighty nine out of a total of 1400 programmes (63.5%) received the grade „Modest‟. 
„Poor‟ and „Effective‟ grades accounted for 10.1% and 7.1% respectively. „Somewhat effective‟ accounted 
for 19.3%, or 270 programmes. 
 
< Table > Comparison of distribution between spending agencies and the MPB 
(Unit: number of programmes) 
Stage 
Grade 
Spending ministries (and agencies) MPB 
Poor 7 (0.5 %) 141 (10.1 %) 
Modest 67 (4.8 %) 889 (63.5 %) 
Somewhat effective 340 (24.3 %) 270 (19.3 %) 
Effective 986 (70.4 %) 100 (7.1 %) 
Total 1400 (100.0 %) 1400 (100.0 %) 
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Table 6-4 and Figure 6-2 make a comparison of the truncated sample with the full 
sample in terms of scores set by the MPB. The truncated sample appeared to be little 
different in its distribution from the full sample. In total, the two samples had similar 
average scores: (truncated sample vs. full sample) 61.9 vs. 62.1 in three-year pooled 
data, 60.0 vs. 60.1 in 2005, 59.8 vs. 59.9 in 2006, and 65.9 vs. 66.0 in 2007. 
 
Table 6-4 Distribution of scores set by the MPB 
(Units: number of programmes, points) 
Programme groups 
Number of 
programme
s 
Average scores Varianc
e 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Pooled 2005 2006 2007 
1. Full sample 1717 62.1 60.1 59.9 66.0 173.85 13.19 0.334 0.079 
2. Truncated sample 1400 62.0 60.0 59.8 65.9 170.72 13.07 0.324 0.203 
Large programmes  
(≥ 29.0 billion Won)  
363 63.5 63.2 61.1 66.3 158.50 12.59 0.163 0.660 
Small programmes  
(≤ 2.5 billion Won) 
362 60.6 58.0 57.7 65.3 167.21 12.93 0.569 0.215 
Programmes related to 
welfare 
230 58.8 57.7 58.3 59.7 106.16 10.30 -0.072 1.060 
Programmes related to 
the economy 
513 62.8 60.1 61.9 66.9 183.03 13.53 0.506 -0.284 
Programmes managed 
directly by central 
government 
515 64.5 62.6 61.9 68.9 170.18 13.05 0.431 -0.569 
Programmes managed 
by ministries 
1081 61.2 59.2 59.5 65.0 161.41 12.70 0.312 0.351 
Notes: 1. Average scores are SABP scores according to the MPB. 
      2. Average budget changes are for budgets finally allocated by the National Assembly. 
 
 
Figure 6-2 Graphic comparison of the truncated sample with the full sample 
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The scores of the truncated sample highlighted various features among the different 
programme groups, or controlled variables, such as large or small programmes, welfare- 
or economy-related programmes, programmes managed directly or indirectly by the 
central government, or programmes managed by ministries or agencies. Individual 
programme groups were distributed differently from the total truncated sample. 
„Programmes managed directly by the central government‟ had higher average scores 
(64.5) than those for the total truncated sample, and „Programmes related to welfare‟ 
had the lowest average (58.8). „Large programmes‟ and „Programmes managed directly 
by the central government‟ showed a relatively high performance compared to that of 
other groups. 
 
In terms of SABP grades, the truncated sample appeared to retain the full sample‟s 
features. Table 6-5 makes a comparison of the truncated sample with the full sample in 
terms of grade distribution. In total, individual grades accounted for a similar proportion: 
(truncated sample vs. full sample) 10.1% vs. 10.7%  „Poor‟, 63.5% vs. 62.8% 
„Modest‟, 19.3% vs. 19.3% „Somewhat effective‟, and 7.1% vs. 7.2% „Effective‟. In 
addition, the distribution of the truncated sample is similar to that of the full sample in 
terms of years. Another similarity is that the grades for the truncated sample improved 
over the years. The proportion of „Poor‟ grades decreased gradually, in the same way as 
the full sample: (truncated sample vs. full sample) 15.1% vs. 15.7% in 2005, 10.3 % vs. 
11.3% in 2006, and 5.0% vs. 5.3% in 2007. On the other hand, the proportion (or 
number) of „Somewhat effective‟ and „Effective‟ grades increased dramatically from 
22.9% (103 programmes) in 2005 to 35.3% (168 programmes) in 2007. 
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Table 6-5 Distributions of grades set by the MPB for the truncated sample  
(Units: Number of programmes) 
Year Total Poor Modest Somewhat effective Effective 
2005 449 
(100.0%) 
68 
(15.1 %) 
278 
(61.9 %) 
84 
(18.7 %) 
19 
(4.2 %) 
(Full sample)  (15.7 %) (61.4 %) (17.9 %) (5.0 %) 
2006 474 
(100.0%) 
49 
(10.3 %) 
326 
(68.8 %) 
77 
(16.3 %) 
22 
(4.6 %) 
(Full sample)  (11.3 %) (67.2 %) (16.3 %) (5.2 %) 
2007 477 
(100.0%) 
24 
(5.0 %) 
285 
(59.7 %) 
109 
(22.9 %) 
59 
(12.4 %) 
(Full sample)  (5.3 %) (59.6 %) (23.8 %) (11.3 %) 
Total 1400 
(100.0%) 
141 
(10.1 %) 
889 
(63.5 %) 
270 
(19.3 %) 
100 
(7.1 %) 
(Full sample)  (10.7 %) (62.8 %) (19.3 %) (7.2 %) 
 
Figure 6-3 shows scatter diagrams of the relationship between the reviewed SABP 
scores or grades and the budget variations of 1400 programmes at the presidential 
budget stage. They imply that budget changes may have some relationship with SABP 
grades or scores.  
 
However, fit-lines on the scatter diagrams gradually become flatter from 2005 to 2007. 
This suggests that linear relationships between budget changes and SABP assessments 
might be getting weaker over the years. A correlation analysis between them presents 
linear relationships in a quantitatively clearer way. Table 6-6 provides Pearson 
correlation coefficients between proposed budgets and SABP scores set by the MPB. 
 
Table 6-6 Pearson correlation coefficients between proposed budgets and SABP scores set by the MPB 
Assessment year 2005 2006 2007 
Pearson coefficients 0.388
***
 0.195
***
 0.124
***
 
Note: *** denotes statistically significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed test). 
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The Pearson correlation coefficients decreased from 0.388 in 2005 to 0.124 in 2007. 
This confirmed that the linear relationships between budgets and scores might be 
gradually weakening from 2005 to 2007. 
 
Figure 6-3 Scatter diagrams of the relationship between budget changes and SABP assessments at the 
presidential budget stage 
  
  
  
  Note: For the convenience of explanation, only scatter/dot diagrams for the presidential budget stage are shown 
because histograms for the other stages are similar.  
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6.3 The Results of the Analysis 
 
6.3.1 Introduction 
 
A public budget, in general, is defined as a plan of expected revenues and expenditures 
for a public organization within a fiscal year (Nah, 2007). It is widely argued that 
budget decisions are affected by various macro- or micro-factors such as relevant 
policies, value preferences, budgeting participants, the current year‟s budget, and public 
financial resources. Because these factors are changeable, depending on the times when 
budget decisions are made, various countries may formulate different budget documents 
in terms of size or programmes.  
 
In modern societies, participants who prepare and determine budget documents work 
separately, in principle. Budgets are known to be formulated through three stages. The 
budgeting process begins with spending agencies requesting funds from a budgetary 
authority in the Executive branch. The budgetary authority reviews the request 
documents and makes a budget proposal, considering the economic or political reality 
and its resource constraints. Finally, the Legislature deliberates and determines on the 
budget documents proposed by the Executive branch.  
 
Due to the involvement of different participants at each budget stage, fund distributions 
may be made in a different way from one individual budget stage to the next. Table 6-7 
presents the differences for each stage or assessment year in the aggregated budgets of 
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the 1400 programmes which will be analyzed in this chapter. In the budget year 2007, 
although spending ministries and agencies wanted to invest an average 52.1 billion Won 
per programme, the Legislature ended up allocating a smaller average budget of 51.3 
billion per programme. More specifically, for one of the road-building programmes in 
the budget year 2006, the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs, as a 
spending ministry, decided to invest 770.8 billion Won; the MPB, as the budget 
authority, proposed reducing the budget to 658.9 billion Won; and finally the 
Legislature allocated 675.9 billion Won, that is, less than the spending agency requested. 
This indicates that, at different stages, different criteria may be applied when budget 
decisions are being made. Here, it is presumed that participants in each budget stage 
might utilize SABP results in different ways. 
 
Table 6-7 Differences between programme budgets at different budget stages in Korea 
(Unit: billion Won) 
Assessment 
year 
Number of assessed 
programmes 
Spending 
authorities 
MPB National Assembly 
2005 449 28860.4 (64.3) 28208.3 (62.8) 28563.0 (63.6) 
2006 474 19087.2 (40.3) 18591.1 (39.2) 18735.0 (39.5) 
2007 477 24836.3 (52.1) 24317.2 (51.0) 24458.6 (51.3) 
  Note: Average budget per programme is reported in the parentheses. 
 
These three parties (spending agencies, the MPB, and the Legislature) are the principal 
participants in budgeting. They play the role of a budget saver or a budget spender, 
depending on the stage of the budget process. Different role-players may rely on 
different judgements about resource allocations. There may often be disagreement on 
budget decisions between them. However, it is not easy for a spender to ignore a series 
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of standards which a saver uses. For example, the MPB, as a budget saver, may use 
SABP assessments when reviewing spending ministries‟ and agencies‟ budget requests. 
If that is the case, spending ministries and agencies will not find it easy to ignore SABP 
results. Similarly, such a relationship could occur between budget practitioners and 
programme managers within spending organizations. That is to say, the SABP results 
may be a critical factor in budgeting.  
 
Therefore, this section investigates how much SABP results affected budget decisions 
within spending ministries and agencies, the MPB, and the Legislature (or the National 
Assembly) respectively. The section describes the relationship between budget decisions 
and SABP scores (or grades) in order, from the MPB to spending ministries (or agencies) 
and the National Assembly, taking into consideration that the MPB manages Korean 
performance budgeting using SABP. This section uses the regression models presented 
in Chapter 4. 
 
6.3.2 Relationships between SABP Assessments and Budget Allocations by the 
MPB 
 
In Table 6-8, regression estimates are provided. Model 1 is a simple regression analysis 
of the difference between percentage changes to budgets and SABP scores, and Model 2 
is a multiple regression analysis introducing the current year‟s budget changes and six 
controlled variables. These equations are statistically significant at p < 0.001. In Model 
2, the collinearity appears not to be serious in the sense that VIFs (Variance Inflation 
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Factors) were lower than 10.0 (Menard, 1995; Hair et al., 1995; Neter et al., 1989; 
Mason et al., 1989; Marquardt, 1970; Kennedy, 1992; cited O‟Breien, 2007; Basioudis 
and Ellwood, 2005).
32
 The estimates suggest that SABP scores exerted a statistically 
significant influence on programme budget decisions during the processing of budget 
proposals. For the three-year pooled data, the coefficients of the SABP score terms in 
both models were significantly positive (+) at the significance level of 0.01 (two-tailed 
test). Substantively, the coefficients suggest that a 10 point increase in the SABP score 
would result in a 5.9% budget increase being proposed by the MPB. For the individual 
budget years, the SABP scores had a statistically significant relation (+) with budget 
proposal changes in the three budget years 2006, 2007, and 2008. The suggestion is 
similar to Park‟s conclusion (2006) on the relationship between SABP grades and 
budgets for the budget year 2006.  
 
From the incrementalists‟ viewpoint that the budget baseline, like the current year‟s 
budget, matters in making next year‟s budget decisions, it is to be expected that the 
current year‟s budget changes in these equations would have a positive (+) relation with 
the next year‟s budget changes, the dependent variable. The current year‟s budget 
changes had an impact on budget decisions in the three-year pooled data, but not in each 
year. In this sense, it is not easy to determine that the current year‟s budget changes 
were closely correlated with the next year‟s budget decisions at the stage of budget 
proposal. This might illustrate the criticism that aggregated expenditure is significant in 
the incrementalist‟s theorem, but budgets of individual programmes are not. While there 
                                                
32
 In terms of tolerances, the critical variables in these models, SABP scores and the current year‟s 
budget changes, are over 1-R
2
, whereas several dummy variables for controlling in individual equations 
are slightly below 1-R
2
 (the same within the spending ministries and agencies, and the National 
Assembly). 
199 
 
is an incremental regularity in the aggregated expenditure of an organization or a 
country, this does not occur in the individual budgets of programmes (Natchez and 
Bupp; 1973, Kanter; 1972, Nah; 1992, cited Nah; 2007). 
 
The results of the regression analysis suggest that differences between the kinds of 
programmes influenced budget allocations. For „Programmes related to welfare‟ and 
„Programmes related to the economy‟, this study expected that they would be affected 
by changes in policy priorities since the Korean foreign exchange crisis of 1997. 
Because the crisis made unemployment higher than ever, the Korean government made 
it a policy priority to strengthen the social safety net with measures such as a social 
insurance programme, an unemployment allowances programme, and a national health 
insurance programme. As a result, „Programmes related to welfare‟ would receive a 
greater increase in budget than other programme groups. By contrast, „Programmes 
related to the economy‟ would be given lower budget allocations than „Programmes 
related to welfare‟ (Bang, 2008). In the three-year pooled data, the estimates indicate 
that „Programmes related to welfare‟ have a significantly positive (+) correlation with 
budget proposals whereas „Programmes related to the economy‟ have not. This suggests 
that „Programmes related to welfare‟ may request relatively higher increases in their 
budget proposal. This may be the result of continuing expansionary investment in 
building a social safety net for the vulnerable class since the year 1997. In the individual 
years, the results showed that the two programme groups did not have a significant 
correlation with budget proposals. As a result, it is suggested that it was hard to 
determine that resources were not reallocated from „Programmes related to the economy‟ 
to „Programmes related to welfare‟. 
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As described in Chapter 5, a different management process, direct or indirect, may make 
a difference in SABP scores or grades, due to the diversity in complexity of programme 
management techniques. For example, insufficient funds, or funds not available at the 
right time, may cause „Programmes subsidized by local governments‟ to be 
implemented poorly (The Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, 2003). Such poor 
implementation may lower SABP scores, and thus cause the central government to 
reduce their subsidy to local governments. Conversely, a relatively good implementation 
of „Programmes managed directly by the central government‟ may lead to a higher 
average score than that for indirectly managed programmes. In the end, these 
differences may result in differences in the budget allocations between them. The 
estimates indicate that „Programmes managed directly by the central government‟ had a 
significantly positive (+) relationship with budget proposals within the MPB 
(significance level: 0.05). This would imply that they were allotted a higher budget than 
those managed indirectly. 
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Table 6-8 Relationship of SABP scores to changes made to budget proposals by the MPB 
Independent variables 
2006 budget 2007 budget 2008 budget Three-year pooled data 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Score 
1.063*** 
(0.119) 
1.095*** 
(0.124) 
0.453*** 
(0.105) 
0.433*** 
(0.107) 
0.282*** 
(0.103) 
0.259** 
(0.108) 
0.585*** 
(0.062) 
0.590*** 
(0.063) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
- 
 
0.008 
(0.046) 
- 
 
0.037 
(0.043) 
- 
 
0.112*** 
(0.043) 
- 
 
0.052** 
(0.025) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
- 
 
7.276 
(5.379) 
- 
 
7.969** 
(4.053) 
- 
 
0.613 
(3.674) 
- 
 
5.438** 
(2.419) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
- 
 
-4.200 
(3.425) 
- 
 
-1.018 
(3.180) 
- 
 
0.577 
(3.320) 
- 
 
-1.819 
(1.916) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
- 
 
3.967 
(3.930) 
- 
 
3.632 
(3.459) 
- 
 
2.217 
(3.428) 
- 
 
2.659 
(2.083) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
- 
 
-0.648 
(3.275) 
- 
 
5.456 
(2.874) 
- 
 
6.256** 
(2.844) 
- 
 
3.801** 
(1.736) 
Small programmes(0,1) 
- 
 
-1.825 
(4.056) 
- 
 
-4.339 
(3.195) 
- 
 
3.976 
(3.173) 
- 
 
-0.967 
(1.988) 
Large programmes(0,1) 
- 
 
-0.953 
(3.511) 
- 
 
-0.709 
(3.445) 
- 
 
-3.123 
(3.458) 
- 
 
-0.255 
(2.077) 
Constant 
-63.037*** 
(7.325) 
-66.319*** 
(8.497) 
-30.735*** 
(6.414) 
-34.307*** 
(7.313) 
-16.434*** 
(6.932) 
-20.286*** 
(8.153) 
-36.502*** 
(3.925) 
-40.617*** 
(4.509) 
F 79.105*** 10.749*** 18.663*** 3.709*** 7.468*** 2.832*** 89.047*** 13.561*** 
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.148 0.036 0.044 0.013 0.030 0.059 0.067 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes in the budget proposals at the MPB stage. 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
202 
 
For the four levels of grades: „Poor‟, „Modest‟, „Somewhat effective‟, and „Effective‟, it 
is to be expected that they might have a different impact on budget decisions, given that 
the MPB has placed an emphasis on treating programmes differently in the process of 
making budget decisions, depending on SABP grades. The MPB has recommended in 
the Budget Request Guidance that spending ministries and agencies should reduce by 
more than 10% the budgets of „Poor‟ programmes and that „Modest‟ programmes 
should present evidence of having improved their performance in order to augment their 
budgets. 
 
To ascertain how different the impacts are, depending on the levels of grades, the author 
substituted three dummyized grade levels (0, 1) in place of the term „score‟ in Model 2 
of Table 6-8. Representing performance differences between programmes more clearly 
than the grade „Modest‟, the three grades „Poor‟, „Somewhat effective‟, and „Effective‟ 
are selected. The estimates are presented in Table 6-9. This shows that each level of 
grade had a statistically significant correlation with budget decisions made in preparing 
budget documents. The „Poor‟ grade had a negative (-) correlation with budget decisions, 
whereas the „Somewhat effective‟ and „Effective‟ grades had a positive (+) correlation. 
This suggests that programmes which achieved higher performance were allocated a 
higher budget. 
 
In particular, the results indicate that „Poor‟ grades had a stronger impact on budget 
decisions than the other grade levels, in the sense that a „Poor‟ (-0.343, -0.125, -0.134, 
or -0.219) had the highest standardized coefficients of the three grade levels in terms of 
absolute value. The rest of the grades might be becoming weaker in their impact over 
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the years. In the budget year 2008, they did not have a significant correlation with 
budget decisions. This appeared to result from the MPB‟s emphasis on giving „Poor‟ 
programmes a budget reduction of more than 10%. In some respects, this confirms the 
arguments of the SABP‟s opponents that it might be used only as a tool for cutting 
programmes‟ budget requests in the budget year 2008, when the momentum of fiscal 
reform was becoming weak. Budget makers may use SABP not as a tool for giving a 
positive incentive but as a penalty to programme managers.  
 
Table 6-9 Differences in the impact of the different grades on changes made to budget proposals by  MPB 
Independent variables 2006 budget 2007 budget 2008 budget 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Poor 
-32.901***  
(-0.343) 
-12.229***  
(-0.125) 
-17.856***  
(-0.134) 
22.704*** 
(-0.219) 
Somewhat effective 
16.520***  
(0.187) 
7.140*  
(0.089) 
3.013 
 (0.043) 
9.099*** 
(0.115) 
Effective 
13.038*  
(0.076) 
14.449**  
(0.102) 
3.131  
(0.035) 
9.532*** 
(0.079) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
-0.001  
(-0.001) 
0.038  
(0.040) 
0.118***  
(0.125) 
0.051** 
(0.052) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
7.818  
(0.070) 
8.522**  
(0.104) 
0.166  
(0.002) 
5.284** 
(0.063) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-3.493  
(-0.050) 
-0.859  
(-0.014) 
0.671  
(0.011) 
-1.567 
(-0.024) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
2.371  
(0.029) 
3.034 
 (0.042) 
1.161  
(0.017) 
1.349 
(0.018) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
-0.886 
 (-0.012) 
5.109*  
(0.084) 
5.801**  
(0.095) 
3.213* 
(0.050) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-3.067  
(-0.035) 
-4.014  
(-0.061) 
4.013  
(0.062) 
-1.073 
(-0.015) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
-1.742 
 (-0.023) 
-0.841  
(-0.012) 
-3.519  
(-0.051) 
-0.985 
(-0.014) 
Constant 
2.294  
( - ) 
-8.581  
( - ) 
-2.326 
 ( - ) 
-2.848 
( - ) 
F 10.279*** 3.063*** 2.761*** 13.296*** 
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.042 0.036 0.081 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes in the budget proposals at the MPB stage. 
     2. Standardized coefficients are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
In the meantime, SABP is used to assess three components which have different weights 
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in budgetary programmes: planning (30%), management (20%), and results (50%). As 
described in Chapter 3, the results component may represent the performance of a 
programme better than the other two components (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006). It may be 
expected that this component should have a larger impact on budgeting decisions than 
the planning or management components, taking into account the primary goal of 
performance budgeting: linkage of programme performance to budget decisions.  
 
To identify how SABP results for the different components of programmes had critical 
impacts on budgeting decisions, the author substituted three kinds of SABP component 
scores for the term „score‟ in Model 2. Table 6-10 reports the results of the regression 
analysis. The three-year pooled data suggests that the three components had a positive 
(+) relationship with budget changes at the significance level of 0.01. Considering the 
weights for each component (30%, 20%, and 50%), the results component appeared to 
have had a relatively low impact on budgeting decisions. While the results component 
carries 2.5 times the weight of the management component, their standardized 
coefficients, which represent the strength of the correlation, were almost at the same 
level (0.156 vs. 0.142). This inconsistency became clearer over the years. While the 
results component had the largest impact on budget allocations in the budget year 2006, 
the management component had the largest impact in the budget years 2007 and 2008. 
Therefore it is difficult to propose that the results component had the strongest impact 
on the consideration of budget proposals within the MPB. In this sense, the MPB may 
be giving a reward for procedural compliance rather than actual performance or results. 
 
For individual budget years, the regression results were not consistent. In the budget 
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year 2006, all three components were significantly correlated with budget proposals. In 
terms of strength of impact, the results component was the highest, the planning 
component was the second highest, and the management component was the lowest 
(Results > Planning > Management). This may reflect the weights given to components 
in SABP scores. In the budget years 2007 and 2008, the regression results show that 
only the management component had a statistically significant correlation with budget 
decisions. 
 
Table 6-10 Relationship of programme components‟ SABP scores to changes made to budget proposals by MPB 
Independent variables 2006 budget 2007 budget 2008 budget 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Planning 
1.251***  
(0.170) 
0.542 
 (0.085) 
0.149  
(0.026) 
0.574*** 
(0.089) 
Management 
1.040***  
(0.130) 
1.091***  
(0.153) 
0.889**  
(0.116) 
1.081*** 
(0.142) 
Results 
1.050***  
(0.285) 
0.280  
(0.087) 
0.214  
(0.065) 
0.516*** 
(0.156) 
Budget changes of the current year (%) 
0.008  
(0.008) 
0.045  
(0.047) 
0.106**  
(0.112) 
0.052** 
(0.054) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
7.398  
(0.067) 
8.141**  
(0.099) 
0.593  
(0.008) 
5.486** 
(0.065) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-4.234  
(-0.060) 
-0.066 
(-0.001) 
0.983  
(0.016) 
-1.233 
(-0.019) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
3.718 
 (0.046) 
3.596 
 (0.049) 
2.369  
(0.035) 
2.572 
(0.035) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
-1.055  
(-0.015) 
4.662 
 (0.076) 
6.041**  
(0.099) 
3.694** 
(0.057) 
Small programmes(0,1) 
-1.871 
 (-0.022) 
-5.027 
 (-0.077) 
3.734  
(0.058) 
-1.136 
(-0.016) 
Large programmes(0,1) 
-0.864 
 (-0.012) 
-1.072 
 (-0.015) 
-3.044  
(-0.044) 
-0.468 
(-0.007) 
Constant 
-67.772***  
( - ) 
-42.882***  
( - ) 
-26.375***  
( - ) 
-45.974*** 
( - ) 
F 8.583*** 3.469*** 2.632*** 11.573*** 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.050 0.033 0.070 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes in the budget proposals at the MPB stage. 
     2. Standardized coefficients are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
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Different groups of programmes, as described earlier, had a different distribution of 
SABP scores (or grades) and budget changes. For example, as shown in Table 6-4, 
„Programmes managed directly by the central government‟ (64.5) on average achieved 
higher scores than the other groups. „Programmes related to welfare‟ had the lowest 
average scores (58.8) and the highest budget increases (3.55%) on average. Presumably, 
the SABP results of each group of programmes may have a different impact on budget 
decisions. Discerning interaction effects can help describe differences in the impact of 
SABP results on budget changes among programme groups.  
 
To do this, the author introduced six interaction terms of controlled variables with 
SABP scores into Model 2 as independent variables. The estimates are shown in Table 
5-11. In the three-year pooled data, they indicate that „Small programmes (≤ 2.5 billion 
Won)‟ had a statistically significant interaction with SABP scores. The interaction term 
had positive (+) impacts on budget changes. It is indicated that the programmes with a 
positive interaction effect had a larger coefficient of the term „score‟, because the 
coefficient of the interaction term was added. In this case, interacting positively (+) with 
SABP scores, the „Small programmes‟ had a larger coefficient of the term „score‟, 0.969 
(0.701 + 0.268). Figure 6-4 gives a simple illustration of the interaction effect. Line A in 
the figure presents a graph with interaction effect, whereas line B is without interaction 
effect. This suggests that „Small programmes‟ appeared to have made the positive 
interaction effect (+) accelerate the impact of SABP scores on their budget changes. 
That is to say, the „Small programmes‟ group had wider variations in their budget 
changes, depending on the difference in their SABP scores, than other groups. 
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Figure 6-4 Example of interaction effect 
 
 
In the individual budget years, the regression results were not similar to those for the 
three-year pooled data. They were not consistent over the budget years. In the budget 
year 2006, they suggest that „Programmes related to welfare‟ had a significant 
interaction (+) with SABP scores, whereas „Large programmes (≥ 29.0 billion Won)‟ 
and „Programmes belonging to ministries‟ had a negative (-) interaction. Particularly, 
the negative interaction effect of „Large programmes‟ and „Programmes belonging to 
ministries‟ played a role in reducing the coefficients of the term „score‟. This suggests 
that the programmes weakened the marginal impact of the score variations on budget 
proposals. In the budget year 2007, the results of the regression analysis suggest that 
„Small programmes‟ had a positive (+) interaction with SABP scores, whereas 
„Programmes belonging to ministries‟ had a negative (-) interaction. In the budget year 
2008, the results indicate that there were no significant interactions between variables. 
 
As stated in Chapter 5, the author expected that the impact of SABP assessments on 
A: With Interaction 
<0.701 + 0.268> 
B: Without Interaction 
(0.701) 
Budget changes (%) 
SABP 
scores 
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budget allocations would be unequal and would depend on the size of individual 
programmes. The expectation was that SABP assessments would matter more for 
„Small programmes‟ than for large ones. Budgets for small programmes are more 
sensitive to SABP grades or scores than those of large programmes, because large 
programmes are „well established; they have important constituencies and, usually, long 
histories (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006)‟. These regression results suggest that „Large 
programmes‟ might be less subject to change by SABP scores in the process of 
budgeting than „Small programmes‟. 
 
The experience of budget makers gave some support to the findings on the impact of 
„Large programmes‟ on budget allocations. One budget maker who was in charge of 
road-building programmes, relatively large programmes, in the MPB described his 
experience of the process of budgeting as follows: 
 
It was not easy to utilize SABP scores or grades in allocating budgets to 
programmes, because SABP is not good at producing performance information 
for my programmes. Most of my programmes were related to the building of 
roads, and so their primary performance was realized in the long term, after 
they had been completed. As a result, SABP ended up measuring the progress of 
the construction process. That, however, was not useful for budget decisions 
(Personal communication with the author, 2005-2006)
33
. 
 
                                                
33
 This witness provided information during 2005-2006 when the author was in charge of managing 
SABP at the MPB. In reviewing SABP assessments submitted by spending agencies, the author had 
personal communication with a number of programme managers and budget makers. Here the author is 
summarizing the discussions (hereafter same).  
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Table 6-11 Interaction effects between SABP scores and programme groups at the MPB stage 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Score  
1.463*** 
(0.329) 
0.725*** 
(0.294) 
0.168 
(0.257) 
0.701*** 
(0.161) 
Score*Programmes related to welfare 
1.082** 
(0.487) 
-0.276 
(0.351) 
0.389 
(0.357) 
0.179 
(0.221) 
Score*Programmes related to the economy 
0.374 
(0.286) 
-0.017 
(0.253) 
-0.092 
(0.280) 
-0.004 
(0.150) 
Score*Programmes belonging to ministries 
-0.526* 
(0.313) 
-0.524* 
(0.292) 
0.055 
(0.272) 
-0.192 
(0.160) 
Score*Programmes managed by government 
0.063 
(0.267) 
-0.140 
(0.241) 
0.024 
(0.217) 
0.011 
(0.133) 
Score*Small programmes  
0.166 
(0.355) 
0.494* 
(0.256) 
0.270 
(0.245) 
0.268* 
(0.153) 
Score*Large programmes  
-0.856*** 
(0.291) 
0.248 
(0.264) 
-0.242 
(0.282) 
-0.242 
(0.156) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
-0.007 
(0.045) 
0.036 
(0.043) 
0.113*** 
(0.043) 
0.053** 
(0.025) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
-55.166* 
(28.668) 
24.791 
(20.727) 
-22.096 
(22.164) 
-4.821 
(13.214) 
Programme related to the economy (0,1) 
-26.022 
(17.233) 
0.688 
(15.204) 
6.980 
(18.799) 
-1.113 
(9.395) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
35.822* 
(19.568) 
34.647* 
(17.738) 
-1.509 
(18.244) 
14.759 
(10.143) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
-4.550 
(16.442) 
13.426 
(14.738) 
5.018 
(14.691) 
2.979 
(8.523) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-11.170 
(21.039) 
-33.034** 
(15.363) 
-13.628 
(16.391) 
-17.125 
(9.551) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
52.108*** 
(18.351) 
-15.054 
(16.315) 
12.864 
(18.972) 
15.233 
(10.034) 
Constant 
-88.835*** 
(20.466) 
-51.827*** 
(20.442) 
-14.535 
(17.813) 
-48.037*** 
(10.348) 
F 7.554*** 2.742*** 2.022** 8.702*** 
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.049 0.029 0.072 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage change in budget proposal s at the MPB stage. 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
 
These empirical results, statistically significant relationships between changes to budget 
proposal and SABP scores, were significantly consistent with experience within the 
MPB. In the Budget Office of the MPB, the linking of budget choices with programme 
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performance began to attract more attention among budget makers as they prepared 
budget documents. One of the staff in the Budget Office described his experience as 
follows: 
 
When I was discussing my budget decisions with higher-level budget makers in 
the review commission in the MPB, they started by asking me which level of 
SABP scores or grades my programmes showed. In the case of a mismatch of 
these with the budget allocation, they required me to present convincing reasons. 
So I tried to link budgets with SABP scores or grades, particularly ‘Poor’, as 
much as I possibly could, in the course of preparing for the review (Personal 
communication with the author, 2005-2006). 
 
However, the regression coefficients of the term „score‟ suggest that the impact of SABP 
results on budget decisions might be decreasing over the years. The coefficients had 
been decreasing by four or five times, from 1.095 to 0.259 in Model 2, throughout the 
three years. There could be several possible explanations for this phenomenon. Firstly, 
differences in the composition of programmes between the assessment years might 
cause SABP assessments to have different impacts on programme budget allocations. 
For example, programmes might be selected to make the integration of assessment 
results with budget allocations easier in the first year of using SABP than in the second 
or third year. Secondly, this may confirm concerns inside and outside government about 
the implementation of SABP being merely for appearances, due to the decline in 
reforming drive in the later part of the Participatory Administration‟s term. Bang (2008) 
proposed that the driving force towards budgetary reform within the Korean central 
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government became weaker in the later years of the Participatory Administration (2003-
2007). As the driving force declined, efforts towards integrating SABP results with 
budgets might have been little activated, even within the Executive branch. Although 
this phenomenon needs in-depth analysis, this issue is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
6.3.3 Relationships between SABP Assessments and Budget Requests by Spending 
Ministries and Agencies 
 
In the budgeting process, spending ministries and agencies are a starting point which 
may have an effect on the preparation of budget documents within the MPB. In this 
sense, spending ministries and agencies play a critical role in „soft-landing‟ Korean 
performance budgeting, if we take into account their practical impact on budget 
proposals within the MPB. This section investigates whether or how spending ministries 
and agencies used SABP assessments in the process of making budget requests for 
programmes. The basic frame for analysis is the same as in Section 6.3.2. 
 
The regression results are presented in Table 6-12. All equations but Model 1 in the 
budget year 2008 are significant at p < 0.05. In the three-year pooled data, the 
regression results indicate that SABP scores had a statistically significant correlation (+) 
with budget decisions. This implies that performance information produced by SABP 
made a significant contribution to preparing budget requests within spending ministries 
and agencies. The results suggest that, as in the MPB, the current year‟s budget changes 
were a significant factor in making the next year‟s budget decisions. Characteristics of 
212 
 
programmes appeared to affect budget allocations by spending ministries and agencies. 
„Programmes related to welfare‟ and „Programmes belonging to ministries‟ had a 
statistically significant correlation (+) with budget decisions. This suggests that these 
programmes might be allotted larger budgets than other programmes, regardless of 
SABP scores.  
 
For the individual budget years, the regression results indicate that the correlation 
between SABP assessments and budget decisions was not consistent. The correlation 
was statistically significant in the budget years 2006 and 2007, but not in 2008. As was 
the case with the MPB, the coefficients of the term „score‟ were decreasing significantly 
throughout the three budget years (0.815 -> 0.376 -> 0.166). This means, as suggested 
by the correlation analysis, that the impact of SABP on budget requests might have been 
decreasing during the same period.  
 
Within spending ministries and agencies, budget makers seemed to have given more 
emphasis to performance in making their budget requests since the introduction of 
SABP. Many programme managers in spending ministries and agencies experienced 
more difficulty when formulating budget requests for their programmes. One of 
programme managers said: 
 
Unlike in the period before SABP budgeting, there were an increasing number 
of discussions about programme performance with the budget makers in my 
ministry. My budget office asked me to develop performance indicators to 
measure programme performance, and to present these measurements along 
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with my programme budget requests. In addition, after the office checked and 
reviewed my SABP assessments, it modified the budget requests for my 
programmes. (Personal communication with the author, 2005-2006) 
 
This trend appeared to spread throughout the government, regardless of proper 
performance measurement. One budget manager in a spending ministry/agency gave the 
following comments about the linkage effort: 
 
It was not easy for spending ministries and agencies to neglect SABP 
assessments in the process of budgeting. It was more difficult to convince the 
MPB or the National Assembly committee in cases where the SABP score and 
the budget change did not match. For example, when increasing or not 
reducing budget of programmes rated ‘Poor’, we needed to give plausible 
reasons or even to present action plans for improving their performance. 
(Personal communication with the author, 2005-2006) 
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Table 6-12 Relationships between SABP scores and changes to budget requests in spending ministries and agencies 
Independent variables 
2006 2007 2008 Three-year pooled data 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Score  
0.815*** 
(0.116) 
0.866*** 
(0.121) 
0.376*** 
(0.109) 
0.372*** 
(0.112) 
0.166 
(0.109) 
0.185 
(0.114) 
0.463*** 
(0.063) 
0.493*** 
(0.064) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
- 
 
0.073* 
(0.044) 
- 
 
0.048 
(0.045) 
- 
 
0.126*** 
(0.046) 
- 
 
0.080*** 
(0.026) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
- 
 
3.030 
(5.217) 
- 
 
9.797** 
(4.223) 
- 
 
0.121 
(3.876) 
- 
 
5.557** 
(2.456) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
- 
 
-3.482 
(3.322) 
- 
 
-0.903 
(3.313) 
- 
 
-3.762 
(3.503) 
- 
 
-2.668 
(1.945) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
- 
 
4.204 
(3.812) 
- 
 
3.766 
(3.604) 
- 
 
6.292* 
(3.616) 
- 
 
4.160** 
(2.115) 
Programmes managed directly by government 
(0,1) 
- 
 
-2.268 
(3.176) 
- 
 
3.284 
(2.995) 
- 
 
2.896 
(3.000) 
- 
 
1.355 
(1.763) 
Small programme (0,1) 
- 
 
-0.265 
(3.934) 
- 
 
-4.162 
(3.328) 
- 
 
0.576 
(3.348) 
- 
 
-1.679 
(2.018) 
Large programme (0,1) 
- 
 
-4.916 
(3.405) 
- 
 
2.118 
(3.590) 
- 
 
-6.815* 
(3.648) 
- 
 
-3.648 
(2.038) 
Constant 
-44.822*** 
(7.127) 
-48.412*** 
(8.241) 
-21.642*** 
(6.684) 
-25.634*** 
(7.619) 
-3.021 
(7.330) 
-8.210 
(8.601 
-24.367*** 
(4.001) 
-29.234*** 
(4.577) 
F 49.206*** 7.397*** 11.795*** 2.876*** 2.319 2.459** 53.598*** 10.580*** 
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.103 0.022 0.031 0.003 0.024 0.036 0.052 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage change in budget requests at the spending ministries and agencies stage. 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6-13 below presents the regression results for the models which replaced the score 
terms in Model 2 with three levels of grade („Poor‟, „Somewhat effective‟, and 
„Effective‟). The four equations are significant at p < 0.01. 
 
Table 6-13 Differences between grades in their impact on changes to budget requests in spending ministries and 
agencies 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Poor 
-25.524***  
(-0.282) 
-13.209***  
(-0.131) 
-15.223**  
(-0.108) 
-19.748*** 
(-0.189) 
Somewhat effective 
14.898***  
(0.179) 
3.170  
(0.038) 
2.605  
(0.036) 
7.502*** 
(0.094) 
Effective 
11.339  
(0.070) 
11.032  
(0.075) 
1.379  
(0.015) 
7.362** 
(0.060) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
0.064  
(0.066) 
0.047  
(0.048) 
0.131***  
(0.132) 
0.080*** 
(0.081) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
3.488  
(0.033) 
10.456***  
(0.123) 
-0.108  
(-0.001) 
5.402** 
(0.064) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-2.847  
(-0.043) 
-0.601  
(-0.009) 
-3.579  
(-0.055) 
-2.440 
(-0.037) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
3.182  
(0.041) 
2.981  
(0.040) 
5.360 
 (0.074) 
3.012 
(0.040) 
Programmes managed directly by 
government(0,1) 
-2.620  
(-0.039) 
2.884  
(0.046) 
2.516  
(0.039) 
0.840 
(0.013) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-1.226  
(-0.015) 
-3.797  
(-0.056) 
0.641  
(0.009) 
-1.760 
(-0.024) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
-5.647*  
(-0.080) 
-2.183  
(-0.030) 
-7.145**  
(-0.099) 
-4.296** 
(-0.060) 
Constant 
5.267  
( - ) 
-2.566  
( - ) 
4.828  
( - ) 
2.545 
( - ) 
F 7.337*** 2.402*** 2.380*** 10.410*** 
Adjusted R2 0.124 0.029 0.028 0.063 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage change in budget requests at the spending ministries and agencies 
stage 
     2. Standardized coefficients are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
 
In the three-year pooled data, each level of grade had a statistically significant 
relationship with the next year‟s budget requests within the spending ministries and 
agencies. „Poor‟ grades were negatively (-) correlated with budget requests, whereas 
„Somewhat effective‟ and „Effective‟ grades were positively (+) correlated. This 
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suggested that each level of grade appeared to have been used appropriately in the 
budget request process. To paraphrase, „Somewhat effective‟ and „Effective‟ 
programmes were increasing their budget requests, whereas „Poor‟ programmes were 
decreasing their budget requests. Furthermore, „Poor‟ grades appeared to have a 
stronger impact on budget requests than the other grade levels. The absolute values of 
the standardized coefficients gave a suggestion of this (poor: 0.189 > somewhat 
effective: 0.094 > effective: 0.060).  
 
For the individual budget years, results of the regression analysis suggest that „Poor‟ 
grades alone tended to be associated in a statistically significant way with request 
changes. The impact of „Poor‟ grades on budget requests appeared to be getting weaker 
throughout these three years (standardized coefficients: -0.282 vs. -0.131 vs. -0.108). 
This confirms the concerns that SABP assessments might be used as a tool for cutting 
budgets. 
 
Table 6-14 provides the regression results for the model which substituted the three 
component scores for the overall scores in Model 2. The equations have a statistical 
significance at p < 0.01.  
 
In the three-year pooled data, the results indicate that the three components had 
statistically significant impacts on budget requests within spending ministries and 
agencies. Similarly within the MPB, the strength of impact was not consistent with the 
weights given to SABP components. Although the planning component had 1.5 times 
more weight than the management component, its impact was presented as weaker 
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(standardized coefficients: 0.055 vs. 0.116). Given their comparative weights (20% vs. 
50%), the results component appeared to have a relatively weak impact compared to the 
management component. In a sense, it is implied that the use of SABP might result in a 
goal displacement which concentrated on operation procedures rather than results. 
 
Table 6-14 Relationships between programme components‟ SABP scores and changes to budget requests in spending 
ministries and agencies 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Planning 
0.893**  
(0.129) 
0.518  
(0.079) 
-0.029 
(-0.005) 
0.361* 
(0.055) 
Management 
0.623*  
(0.082) 
0.973***  
(0.132) 
0.899**  
(0.112) 
0.889*** 
(0.116) 
Results 
0.900***  
(0.259) 
0.213  
(0.064) 
0.173  
(0.180) 
0.480*** 
(0.144) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
0.073*  
(0.029) 
0.055  
(0.056) 
0.120***  
(0.121) 
0.082*** 
(0.083) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
3.062  
(0.029) 
10.034**  
(0.118) 
0.012  
(0.000) 
5.405** 
(0.064) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-3.943  
(-0.060) 
0.051  
(0.001) 
-3.219  
(-0.049) 
-2.255 
(-0.035) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
4.299  
(0.056) 
3.707  
(0.049) 
6.581*  
(0.091) 
4.240** 
(0.057) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
-2.612  
(-0.039) 
2.532  
(0.040)  
2.791  
(0.044) 
1.431 
(0.022) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-0.355  
(-0.004) 
-4.830  
(-0.071)  
0.387  
(0.006) 
-1.749 
(-0.024) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
-4.775  
(-0.068) 
-2.431 
 (-0.034) 
-6.716*  
(-0.093) 
-3.841* 
(-0.054) 
Constant 
-45.887***  
( - ) 
-34.090***  
( - ) 
-14.297  
( - ) 
-32.037*** 
( - ) 
F 5.960*** 2.697*** 2.413*** 8.949*** 
Adjusted R2 0.100 0.035 0.029 0.054 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage change in budget requests at the spending ministries and agencies 
stage 
     2. Standardized coefficients are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6-15 below shows the estimated results for the equations with the six interaction 
terms. The four equations have a statistical significance at p < 0.01.  
 
Table 6-15 Interaction effects between SABP scores and programme groups in spending ministries and agencies 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Score  
1.102*** 
(0.321) 
0.636** 
(0.307) 
0.290 
(0.271) 
0.648*** 
(0.163) 
Score*Programmes related to welfare 
0.977** 
(0.475) 
-0.183 
(0.366) 
0.426 
(0.377) 
0.171 
(0.224) 
Score*Programmes related to the economy 
0.300 
(0.279) 
-0.043 
(0.264) 
0.046 
(0.296) 
-0.030 
(0.153) 
Score*Programmes belonging to ministries 
-0.517 
(0.306) 
-0.455 
(0.305) 
-0.297 
(0.287) 
0.261 
(0.163) 
Score*Programmes managed by government 
0.138 
(0.260) 
-0.207 
(0.251) 
-0.090 
(0.229) 
-0.049 
(0.136) 
Score*Small programmes  
0.333 
(0.346) 
0.487* 
(0.268) 
0.260 
(0.259) 
0.293* 
(0.155) 
Score*Large programmes  
-0.483* 
(0.284) 
0.245 
(0.275) 
-0.057 
(0.298) 
-0.100 
(0.159) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
0.064 
(0.044) 
0.046 
(0.045) 
0.128*** 
(0.046) 
0.082*** 
(0.026) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
-53.503* 
(27.970) 
21.069 
(21.628) 
-25.213 
(23.403) 
-4.151 
(13.420) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-20.674 
(16.813) 
2.307 
(15.866) 
-6.015 
(19.849) 
-0.276 
(9.541) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
35.592* 
(19.092) 
30.436* 
(18.217) 
25.727 
(19.263) 
20.506** 
(10.301) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
-10.808 
(16.042) 
15.418 
(15.379) 
9.114 
(15.512) 
4.167 
(8.656) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-19.389 
(20.526) 
-32.622** 
(16.031) 
-16.171 
(17.307) 
-19.405** 
(9.699) 
Large programmes(0,1) 
25.108 
(17.904) 
-16.392 
(17.025) 
-2.883 
(20.032) 
2.966 
(10.190) 
Constant 
63.330*** 
(19.968) 
-41.102** 
(18.668) 
-15.629 
(18.808) 
-39.344*** 
(10.509) 
F 5.154*** 2.154*** 1.746*** 6.917*** 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.033 0.021 0.056 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage change in budget requests at the spending ministries and agencies 
stage 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
In the three-year pooled data, the results indicate that no individual programme groups 
but „Small programmes‟ had statistically significant interaction with SABP scores. In 
the three budget years, the results indicate that the interaction effects were inconsistent 
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between the three budget years. In 2006, „Welfare-related programmes (+)‟ and „Large 
programmes (-)‟ had a significant interaction with SABP scores, whereas, in 2007, only 
„Small programmes‟ had a statistically significant association (+) with SABP scores. In 
2008, there were no significant interactions. In the budget year 2006, the results suggest 
that „Welfare-related programmes‟ might be more sensitive to SABP scores. This 
appeared to result from the higher proportion of „Small programmes‟ in „Programmes 
related to welfare‟. „Programmes related to welfare‟ had the highest proportion of 
„Small programmes‟ (31.7%) in the programme groups (average: 25.9%, „Programmes 
directly managed by government‟: 28.5%, „Programmes related to the economy‟: 16.2%, 
„Programmes belonging to ministries‟: 22.6%). 
 
6.3.4 Relationships between SABP Assessments and Budget Appropriations by the 
National Assembly 
 
The National Assembly has the final say in determining public budgets on the basis of 
budget proposals presented by the President. However, budget proposals are not binding 
on the National Assembly, because it has the authority, under the Korean Constitution, 
to modify them regardless of budget proposals or SABP assessments. In this respect, it 
is difficult to achieve the primary objective of the performance budgeting system 
without close cooperation between the National Assembly and the Executive. This 
section, therefore, examines how the nature of the relationship between budget 
decisions and SABP scores was affected by the National Assembly. 
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Table 6-16 provides the regression results of Model 1 and Model 2 for the National 
Assembly. All equations have a statistical significance at p < 0.05. It is indicated that 
SABP scores had a statistically significant correlation (+) with budget allocations within 
the National Assembly for all equations. This implies that, the higher scores the 
programmes had, the bigger budgets they were allocated. However, other variables did 
not have a consistent relationship with budget allocations. In the three-year pooled data, 
„the current year‟s budget changes‟, „Programmes related to welfare‟, and ‟Programmes 
managed by government‟ had a statistically significant correlation (+) with budget 
percentage changes, whereas they were not consistent for the individual budget years. 
 
From the incrementalists‟ viewpoint that budget allocations within the National 
Assembly rely considerably on budget proposals presented by the President (Nah, 2007), 
these regression results may be similar to those made at the MPB stage. According to 
the incrementalists, the National Assembly may closely reflect presidential proposals in 
its final budgets. In practice, only 249 (17.8%) of the 1400 programmes which were 
assessed by SABP were modified in the budget allocation process of the National 
Assembly. Furthermore, 181 (95.1%) of these 249 programmes appeared to have been 
fine-tuned, taking into account that they had received budget changes of the same order 
in the Executive and the National Assembly (just 4.9% had a different sign: +/- → -/+, 
+/- → 0, or 0 → +/-).  
 
Considering carefully, it might be suggested that the National Assembly would rather 
respect presidential budget proposals than make active use of SABP assessments. 
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Table 6-16 Relationship of SABP scores to final budget changes at the National Assembly stage 
 
Independent variables 
2006 2007 2008 Three-year pooled data 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Score  
0.953*** 
(0.116) 
0.992*** 
(0.120) 
0.485*** 
(0.109) 
0.460*** 
(0.112) 
0.262** 
(0.103) 
0.240** 
(0.108) 
0.553*** 
(0.062) 
0.560*** 
(0.063) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
- 
 
0.037 
(0.044) 
- 
 
0.018 
(0.045) 
- 
 
0.107** 
(0.043) 
- 
 
0.053** 
(0.025) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
- 
 
10.171* 
(5.199) 
- 
 
8.535** 
(4.218) 
- 
 
-0.310 
(3.691) 
- 
 
5.767** 
(2.423) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
- 
 
-3.096 
(3.310) 
- 
 
-0.405 
(3.309) 
- 
 
0.020 
(3.336) 
- 
 
-1.280 
(1.919) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
- 
 
2.077 
(3.799) 
- 
 
3.556 
(3.600) 
- 
 
4.038 
(3.444) 
- 
 
2.861 
(2.087) 
Programmes managed directly by government(0,1) 
- 
 
-1.918 
(3.166) 
- 
 
5.801 
(2.991) 
- 
 
5.874** 
(2.857) 
- 
 
3.336* 
(1.739) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
- 
 
-2.557 
(3.920) 
- 
 
-3.968 
(3.325) 
- 
 
0.537 
(3.188) 
- 
 
-2.431 
(1.991) 
Large programmes(0,1) 
- 
 
-2.736 
(3.393) 
- 
 
0.369 
(3.586) 
- 
 
-4.553 
(3.474) 
- 
 
-1.052 
(2.010) 
Constant 
-55.174*** 
(7.108) 
-57.328*** 
(8.213) 
-32.562*** 
(6.671) 
-36.403*** 
(7.611) 
-14.937** 
(6.950) 
-18.348** 
(8.191) 
-34.031*** 
(3.933) 
-37.943*** 
(4.516) 
F 67.525*** 9.806*** 19.717*** 3.757*** 6.428** 2.467** 79.250*** 12.434*** 
Adjusted R2 0.129 0.136 0.038 0.045 0.011 0.024 0.053 0.061 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Note: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes to final budgets at the National Assembly stage. 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests.
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Table 6-17 shows the regression results for the impact of each SABP grade on budget 
allocation within the National Assembly. The equations have a statistical significance at 
p < 0.01.  
 
Table 6-17 Differences between grades in their impact on changes to budget request in the National Assembly 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Poor 
-29.313***  
(-0.319) 
-12.467*** 
 (-0.123) 
-17.412***  
(-0.130) 
-20.856*** 
(-0.201) 
Somewhat effective 
15.014***  
(0.178) 
8.420**  
(0.100) 
3.249 
 (0.047) 
9.249*** 
(0.117) 
Effective 
12.438*  
(0.076) 
15.187**  
(0.103) 
2.948 
 (0.033) 
9.208*** 
(0.076) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
0.029  
(0.029) 
0.019  
(0.020) 
0.113***  
(0.119) 
0.053** 
(0.054) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
10.678**  
(0.100) 
9.061**  
(0.106) 
-0.614  
(-0.009) 
5.651** 
(0.067) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-2.464  
(-0.037) 
-0.264  
(-0.004) 
0.142 
 (0.002) 
-1.027 
(-0.016) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
0.636  
(0.008) 
2.961 
 (0.039) 
3.028  
(0.044) 
1.672 
(0.022) 
Programmes managed directly by government 
(0,1) 
-2.112  
(-0.031) 
5.451*  
(0.086) 
5.394*  
(0.089) 
2.790 
(0.043) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-3.659  
(-0.044) 
-3.646  
(0.053) 
0.588  
(0.009) 
-2.539 
(-0.036) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
-3.411 
 (-0.048) 
0.194  
(0.003) 
-4.934  
(-0.072) 
-1.739 
(-0.024) 
Constant 
4.679 
 ( - ) 
-9.301**  
( - ) 
-1.753  
( - ) 
-2.343 
( - ) 
F 9.112*** 3.129*** 2.513*** 12.000*** 
Adjusted R2 0.153 0.043 0.031 0.073 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes to final budgets at the National Assembly stage. 
     2. Standardized coefficients are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
In the three-year pooled data, the estimates indicate that each level of grades had a 
statistically significant correlation with budget allocations. Programmes rated as ‟Poor‟ 
were negatively (-) correlated with budget allocations, whereas „Somewhat effective‟ 
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and „Effective‟ grades were positively (+) correlated. This suggests that the grade levels 
of programmes might have an effect on budget allocations within the National Assembly. 
In the individual years, the results indicate that while there were significant correlations 
in all grades in 2006 and 2007, this did not happen in 2008. 
 
As at the MPB stage, programmes graded „Poor‟ were the most likely to be subject to 
change in the process of budget allocation. It was even the case that „Poor‟ grades by 
themselves had a statistically significant correlation (-) with budget allocations for the 
budget year 2008, when the impact of SABP assessments on budget decisions appeared 
to be the weakest in the three years.  
 
Table 6-18 provides estimates for the equations which represent correlations between 
the three SABP components and budget allocations within the National Assembly. All 
three equations have a statistical significance at p < 0.05.  
 
In the three-year pooled data, the results indicate that these three components had a 
statistically significant correlation (+) with budget appropriations. Given the weights 
given to SABP assessments (20%, 30%, and 50%), the results component did not appear 
to have stronger impact on budget allocations than the other components.  
 
In the individual budget years, the results indicate that the three components had a 
significant effect on budget decisions in 2006, whereas only the management 
component was significantly correlated in 2008. Even the impact of the management 
component appeared to have been getting weaker over the three years. 
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Table 6-18 Relationship of programme components‟ SABP scores to final budget changes in the National Assembly 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Planning 
0.938***  
(0.133) 
0.492  
(0.074) 
0.158  
(0.027) 
0.468** 
(0.072) 
Management 
0.925***  
(0.121) 
1.03***  
(0.139) 
0.707**  
(0.092) 
0.989*** 
(0.130) 
Results 
1.021***  
(0.289) 
0.353*  
(0.105) 
0.207  
(0.063) 
0.526*** 
(0.159) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
0.037  
(0.038) 
0.025  
(0.025) 
0.103**  
(0.109) 
0.054** 
(0.056) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
10.131*  
(0.095) 
8.577**  
(0.101) 
-0.326  
(-0.005) 
5.684** 
(0.068) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-3.240  
(-0.048) 
0.307  
(0.005) 
0.321 
 (0.005) 
-0.806 
(-0.012) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
2.208 
 (0.028) 
3.560  
(0.047) 
40152  
(0.061) 
2.883 
(0.039) 
Programmes managed directly by 
government(0,1) 
-1.883  
(-0.027) 
5.145*  
(0.081) 
5.716**  
(0.094) 
3.349* 
(0.052) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-2.574  
(-0.031) 
-4.513  
(-0.066) 
0.358  
(0.006) 
-2.536 
(-0.036) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
-2.700  
(-0.038) 
0.030  
(0.000) 
-4.494  
(-0.065) 
-1.251 
(-0.018) 
Constant 
-55.770***  
( - ) 
-43.017***  
( - ) 
-22.848**  
( - ) 
-41.619*** 
( - ) 
F 7.814*** 3.336*** 2.168** 10.503*** 
Adjusted R2 0.132 0.047 0.024 0.064 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes to final budgets at the National Assembly stage. 
     2. Standardized coefficients are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Table 6-19 provides estimates for the equations with the six interaction terms within the 
National Assembly. In the three-year pooled data, the estimates indicate that „Small 
programmes‟ had a statistically significant interaction (+) with SABP scores. This 
means that „Small programmes‟ had a larger coefficient of the term „score‟ in the 
equation. It is suggested that „Small programmes‟ might have budgets that were more 
sensitive to increases or decreases in SABP scores than other programmes.  
 
These results, however, were not consistent in the individual budget years. In the budget 
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year 2006, only „Large programmes‟ had a statistically significant interaction (-) with 
SABP scores; in 2007 this was only the case for „Small programmes‟ (+); and in 2008 
there were no significant interactions. 
 
Table 6-19 Interaction effects between SABP scores and programme groups in the National Assembly 
Independent variables 2006 2007 2008 
Three-year 
pooled data 
Score 
1.298*** 
(0.320) 
0.661** 
(0.307) 
0.192 
(0.258) 
0.654*** 
(0.161) 
Score*Programmes related to welfare 
0.717 
(0.473) 
-0.185 
(0.365) 
0.266 
(0.359) 
0.086 
(0.221) 
Score*Programmes related to the economy 
0.208 
(0.278) 
0.015 
(0.263) 
-0.150 
(0.281) 
-0.061 
(0.151) 
Score*Programmes belonging to ministries 
-0.407 
(0.304) 
-0.490 
(0.304) 
0.034 
(0.273) 
-0.175 
(0.161) 
Score*Programmes managed by 
government 
0.143 
(0.259) 
-0.061 
(0.251) 
-0.014 
(0.217) 
0.044 
(0.134) 
Score*Small programmes  
0.247 
(0.345) 
0.510* 
(0.267) 
0.344 
(0.246) 
0.304** 
(0.153) 
Score*Large programmes  
-0.671** 
(0.283) 
0.286 
(0.275) 
-0.214 
(0.283) 
-0.175 
(0.157) 
Budget changes for the current year (%) 
0.026 
(0.044) 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.109** 
(0.044) 
0.055** 
(0.025) 
Programmes related to welfare (0,1) 
-31.250 
(27.850) 
20.000 
(21.602) 
-15.349 
(22.250) 
1.000 
(13.238) 
Programmes related to the economy (0,1) 
-14.950 
(16.741) 
-0.579 
(15.847) 
10.386 
(18.871) 
2.915 
(9.412) 
Programmes belonging to ministries (0, 1) 
29.391 
(19.010) 
32.546* 
(18.196) 
1.877 
(18.314) 
14.063 
(10.162) 
Programmes managed directly by government 
(0,1) 
-10.903 
(15.973) 
9.115 
(15.360) 
7.059 
(14.748) 
0.388 
(8.538) 
Small programmes (0,1) 
-16.625 
(20.439) 
-33.632** 
(16.012) 
-21.889 
(16.454) 
-20.819** 
(9.568) 
Large programmes (0,1) 
38.945** 
(17.827) 
-16.340 
(17.004) 
9.529 
(19.045) 
10.205 
(10.052) 
Constant 
-76.352*** 
(19.882) 
-48.588*** 
(18.646) 
-15.609 
(17.881) 
-44.371*** 
(10.367) 
F 6.617*** 2.667*** 1.862** 8.035*** 
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.047 0.025 0.066 
N 449 474 477 1400 
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the percentage changes to final budgets at the National Assembly stage. 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, the author aimed to identify how Korean performance budgeting has had 
an effect on the budget decision of programmes, employing analysis techniques of 
regressing budget changes on SABP assessments (scores or grades)
34
 at the three 
budget stages respectively.  
 
As a result of the regression estimations, Korean performance budgeting, with its use of 
SABP, has been empirically proven to have had an impact on budget decisions, at each 
budget stage, in the three budget years 2006, 2007, and 2008. Table 6-20 summarizes 
results estimating the regression model 2, focusing on the relationship of the next year‟s 
budget changes with SABP scores and the current year‟s budget changes (%).  
 
Table 6-20 Variations of the „score‟ and „current year‟s budget changes‟ coefficients between budgeting stages in 
Model 2 
Independent 
variables 
Budget stage 
Three-year 
pooled data 
2006 budget 2007 budget 2008 budget 
SABP scores 
Spending organizations 
(Request) 
0.493***  
(0.064) 
0.866*** 
 (0.121) 
0.372***  
(0.112) 
0.185  
(0.114) 
 
MPB 
(Proposal) 
0.590***  
(0.063) 
1.095***  
(0.124) 
0.433***  
(0.107) 
0.259**  
(0.108) 
 
National Assembly 
(Budget) 
0.560***  
(0.063) 
0.992***  
(0.120) 
0.460***  
(0.112) 
0.240**  
(0.108) 
Current 
budget change 
(%) 
 
 
 
 
Spending organizations 
(Request)  
0.080*** 
(0.026) 
0.073* 
(0.044) 
0.048 
(0.045) 
0.126*** 
(0.046) 
MPB 
(Proposal) 
0.052** 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.046) 
0.037 
(0.043) 
0.112*** 
(0.043) 
 National Assembly 
(Budget) 
0.053** 
(0.025) 
0.037 
(0.044) 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.107** 
(0.043) 
Notes: 1. These results are from Model 2. Dependent variable is the percentage changes to budgets. More specifically, 
it is the percentage changes to budgets at the spending agencies stage, to budget proposals at the MPB stage, and to 
final budgets at the National Assembly stage. 
     2. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
     3. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests. 
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 In total, all regression models are statistically significant. And collinearity appears not to be serious. 
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The results of regression indicated that SABP scores had a significant correlation with 
the budget percentage changes at the three budget stages in the three years. In terms of 
the current year‟s budget changes, the results suggested that they still had affected 
budget decisions of programmes. In particular, the current year‟s budget changes appear 
to have had the strongest impacts on budget requests within spending ministries and 
agencies. 
 
On the other hand, there appeared to be differences in the strength of the correlations 
between SABP scores and the next year‟s budget changes, depending on the budget 
stages. As suggested in Table 6-20, out of the three budget stages, the one where SABP 
scores exerted the most effect on budget decisions appeared to be the MPB (or 
President‟s) stage (MPB > Legislature > spending ministries and agencies). This may 
have resulted from the MPB, both as a financial authority and as a performance 
budgeting system manager, encouraging budget makers to reflect SABP assessments in 
the process of budgeting. More specifically, the MPB demonstrated every year that it 
had induced budget makers to allocate different budgets to programmes depending on 
the levels of programme performance assessed by SABP (Budget Request Guidelines, 
2006-2008). 
 
The coefficients, as shown in the table, had been decreasing throughout the three years 
at each stage of budgeting. This suggests that Korean performance budgeting, with its 
use of SABP, may have had a decreasing impact on budget decisions. This phenomenon 
can, as described earlier, result from differences in the composition of programmes 
between the assessment years: how easily individual programmes can integrate budget 
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decisions with performance. Another possible explanation is the decline in budget-
reforming drive (Bang, 2007). The decline in driving force might cause the Executive 
branch to make little effort to integrate SABP results with budgets. Although this 
phenomenon needs in-depth analysis, this issue is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Conclusively speaking, Korean performance budgeting is likely to be characterized as 
an approach based on performance budgeting models, in that SABP scores, representing 
performance, have had a significant effect on budget allocations among programmes. 
Nonetheless, Korean performance budgeting may appear to show, partly, an attribute of 
incremental budgeting, given that the current year‟s budget has critically affected 
budget decisions. 
 
The present empirical analysis is expected to contribute to work in this academic area, 
in that, by giving a more comprehensive analysis of Korean performance budgeting, 
with its use of SABP, it provides generalized and various empirical evidence of its 
impact on budget allocations. This analysis, however, has been subject to some 
constraints in making interpretations, in the sense that Korean performance budgeting 
may have idiosyncratic features. Given these constraints, which are listed below, the 
author does not intend to give specific solutions here, because these would be beyond 
the scope of this research. 
 
Firstly, this empirical analysis suggests that some controlled variables had a significant 
interaction with SABP scores. However, this research does not describe the evident 
reasons for, and processes of, the interaction effect because these go beyond its scope. 
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Secondly, the regression models used here did not have very high coefficients of 
determination (R
2
), although these were similar to those of existing works.
35
 For Model 
2, the determination coefficients ranged from 0.040 to 0.190 (Adjusted R
2
: 0.022 – 
0.170). The determination coefficients were at their highest at the MPB stage, and 
decreased between the budget years of 2006 and 2008. This might result from the 
decreasing impact of SABP on budget decisions over the three budget years. Although 
there may be room for improving determination coefficients, this is not easy, because 
budget decisions are affected not only by SABP assessments but also by many other 
factors that would be difficult to include in the models. 
 
Thirdly, the regression results suggest that the National Assembly made significant use 
of SABP assessments in deliberating on the budget documents proposed by the 
Executive branch. From Dull‟s viewpoint (2006), the Legislature may not want to use 
SABP assessments in budgeting, because its political decisions can be restricted by 
linking budget deliberations to SABP assessments introduced by the Executive branch. 
  
In addition, budget changes in the MPB and the National Assembly have shown an 
increase (+) or decrease (-) of a similar, though not quite the same, order. Indeed, the 
National Assembly may have made only a few modifications to the President‟s budget 
proposals because by law it is not allowed to increase individual programme budgets, or 
to add new budget expenditure items to the Presidential budget proposals, without the 
Executive‟s agreement (Article 57 of the Korean Constitution). If this is the case, we 
cannot exclude the possibility of there being a spurious correlation which is not related 
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) GAO (2004) showed 0.039 – 0.149 and Gilmour and Lewis (2005) ranged from 0.10 -0.41. 
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to the intended link of budgets to SABP assessments. Further work is required to 
investigate budgeting behaviours within the National Assembly.  
231 
 
CHAPTER 7 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF VARIATIONS IN 
MANAGERIAL PRACTICE 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This author investigated, in Chapter 6, whether and how performance budgeting in 
Korea affected budget decisions on programmes by regressing programme budget 
changes in relation to scores produced by the process known as Self-Assessment of 
Budgetary Programmes. The regression results suggested that Korean performance 
budgeting had significantly positive impacts on budget allocations between programmes. 
That is to say, programmes with higher SABP scores were allocated higher budgets. 
These results were to a large extent consistent with the experience of administrators 
within the Korean central government. Judging by these results, it could be presumed 
that the performance budgeting system has made a contribution to budget makers 
linking programme performance with budget decisions in the fiscal years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
 
As a separate issue from the association of budget decisions with performance, the 
performance budgeting system may affect programme-managerial practices and, beyond 
that, performance of programmes. Linking programme performance to budget decisions 
or personnel performance evaluation may stimulate programme or budget managers to 
adjust their behaviours. For example, the use of SABP in Korea may cause 
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administrators to change managerial practices in order that their programmes can be 
given satisfactory scores or grades, because the Korean central government reflects 
SABP results in making budget decisions and in evaluating personnel performance.  
 
For this research, in order to ascertain the impact of Korean performance budgeting on 
programme-managerial practices and programme performance, an opinion survey of 
administrators within the Korean central government was undertaken. The survey 
collected useful pieces of information which could indicate changes in programme-
managerial practices and programme performance which the Korean performance 
budgeting system, with its use of SABP, had generated. By analyzing the data, this 
study identifies whether or not Korean performance budgeting has improved 
programme performance, how programme-managerial practices have changed within 
spending organizations, and how changes in practice have made a contribution to 
improving performance of programmes.  
 
In this chapter, Section 7.2 establishes the quality of data: its reliability and validity. It 
presents the results of reliability tests of its measurements, and gives a brief description 
of the collected data. Section 7.3 illustrates changes in programme management 
activities within spending ministries and agencies. Similarly to the links between 
performance and budget decisions, the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to 
changing managerial practices might be made in different ways, depending on 
programmes, organizations, and the uses to which they put SABP assessments. This 
section places an emphasis on identifying how Korean performance budgeting has 
changed the managerial practices of programmes, and what differences it has made to 
the practices depending on programmes, organizations, and the uses of SABP 
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assessments. Section 7.4 describes the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to 
improving programme performance. It deals with the extent to which Korean 
performance budgeting has made a contribution to improvements in programme 
performance and the relationship of programme performance to changes in managerial 
practice. Furthermore, it describes differences in the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to the improvement of programme performance in different 
organizations and programmes, and differences in the use of SABP assessments. Section 
7.5 concludes with a summary and discussion of the limitations of work described in 
this chapter.  
 
The analytical software SPSS (version 17.0), which is widely used in the field of social 
science, was employed for these analyses. 
 
7.2 Data Descriptions 
 
7.2.1 Quality of the Data  
 
The survey questionnaires, as described in Chapter 4, were designed to perceive the 
extent of changes in programme-managerial practices and programme performance 
which the Korean performance budgeting system, with its use of SABP, had made 
within the Korean central government. The survey collected two kinds of information 
related to budgetary programmes: the extent of changes in performance of programmes; 
and the extent of changes in programme-managerial practices. Along with performance 
of programmes as the dependent variable, this study selected, as independent variables, 
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seven managerial practices that Korean performance budgeting might affect: (1) 
programme goal clarity, (2) programme goal difficulty, (3) programme budget adequacy, 
(4) programme budget participation, (5) programme budget flexibility, (6) programme 
operation procedure formalization, and (7) support from senior management. These 
eight variables were measured with multiple items ranging from 3 to 6.  
 
To improve the quality of these measures, this analysis requires tests of its reliability 
and validity. Firstly, in order to establish validity, this survey selected items for 
measuring the variables from existing literatures. Then, it asked 23 public 
administrators and three academic researchers who had experience or expertise in the 
area whether or not these suggested items reflected the concept of each variable. 
 
As a tool for testing reliability, this research conducted an exploratory factor analysis 
(Chung, 2002; Kim and Lee, 2006). Factor analyses were made separately for the eight 
potential variables, because the 35 items (or questions) for measuring them were 
established by leading researchers in this field. The factor analysis presented 1) item-
total correlations between each item and the total of the other items within a factor 
(hereafter item-to-total correlation: r), to test whether each item was consistent with the 
others for measurement of the specific factor, 2) eigenvalues and factor loadings, to 
determine which factors remain in a survey, and 3) Cronbach‟s alpha, to check the 
internal consistency of a measurement.  
 
For item-to-total correlations (r), each item is required to be above 0.3 so that it is in the 
same dimension (Leech, Barret and Morgan, 2008; Chung, 2002). Table 7-1 shows the 
item-total correlations. The correlation coefficients ranged from 0.644 to 0.869, 
indicating that each item had close correlations with the total of the other items for the 
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specific factor. It is suggested that all the items used for this survey probably fitted 
together in each relevant potential variable. 
 
Table 7-1 Corrected item-to-total correlations 
Potential Variables (or factors) Item No. Corrected item-total correlation (r) 
Independent 
variables 
1. Goal clarity 
III-1 
0.808 
III-3 0.838 
III-5 0.867 
III-6 0.853 
III-8 0.761 
2. Goal difficulty III-2 0.758 
III-4 0.734 
III-7 0.794 
3. Budget adequacy IV-8 0.750 
IV-10 0.787 
IV-12 0.786 
4. Budget participation IV-1 0.715 
IV-3 0.645 
IV-4 0.783 
IV-6 0.788 
IV-7 0.800 
IV-9 0.770 
5. Budget flexibility IV-2 0.731 
IV-5 0.747 
IV-11 0.742 
6. Procedure formalization V-2 0.754 
V-3 0.758 
V-5 0.685 
7. Support from senior 
management 
V-1 0.794 
V-4 0.807 
V-6 0.860 
V-7 0.864 
V-8 0.814 
V-9 0.849 
Dependent 
variable 
1. Programme performance VI-1 0.842 
VI-2 0.876 
VI-3 0.869 
VI-4 0.862 
VI-5 0.836 
VI-6 0.775 
 
Secondly, principal axis factor analysis without rotation was performed, in order to 
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assess the underlying construct for these eight factors. This factor analysis produces 
eigenvalues representing the amount of variance which a factor accounts for. 
Eigenvalues are used to determine which factors remain in an analysis. Following 
Kaiser‟s criterion (Eigenvalue ≥ 1, 1958, 1973), factors with an eigenvalue of more than 
1 are included.  
 
Table 7-2 shows the number of factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, their 
eigenvalues, and their proportions of variance which the factors accounted for in each of 
the eight potential variables. In these eight potential variables, the number of factors 
with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 was one each. The factor accounted for 63-76% of 
the relevant variance. As a result, it is suggested that individual items were selected 
from the population of the same concept, and that they were respectively conceptualized 
as these eight potential variables. 
 
Table 7-2 Factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 in eight potential variables. 
Potential Variables  
(or factors) 
Number 
of items 
No. of factors with Initial 
Eigenvalue of 1 or more 
Extraction sums 
of squared loadings 
Eigenvalue % of Variance 
1. Goal clarity 5 1 3.713 74.264 
2. Goal difficulty 3 1 2.113 70.438 
3. Budget adequacy 3 1 2.155 71.820 
4. Budget participation 6 1 3.798 63.303 
5. Budget flexibility 3 1 2.032 67.740 
6. Procedure formalization 3 1 2.016 67.190 
7. Support from senior 
management 
6 1 4.444 74.072 
8. Programme performance 6 1 4.552 75.863 
 
The meaning of a factor, in general, is determined by the items which load most highly 
on it. A generally accepted criterion of high loading, which represents a correlation 
between each item and a factor, is over 0.4 (Bryman and Cramer, 2005; Leech et al., 
2008). Cronbach‟s coefficient alpha is a reliability coefficient most commonly used to 
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assess whether or not items in a factor form a reliable scale. This coefficient indicates 
the extent to which individual items are consistent with one another in measuring the 
specific factor (Leech et al., 2008). Cronbach‟s alpha requires a common standard of 0.7 
or greater (Nunnally, 1994; Leech et al., 2008).  
 
Table 7-3 Unrotated factor loadings and Cronbach‟s alpha in eight potential variables 
Potential Variables Item No. Unrotated Factor Loading Cronbach‟s Alpha 
Independent 
variables 
1. Goal clarity III-5 0.908 
α = 0.935 (n=5) 
III-6 0.892 
III-3 0.875 
III-1 0.841 
III-8 0.788 
2. Goal difficulty III-7 0.889 
α = 0.876 (n=3) 
III-2 0.832 
III-4 0.795 
3. Budget adequacy IV-10 0.866 
α = 0.884 (n=3) 
IV-12 0.865 
IV-8 0.811 
4. Budget participation IV-7 0.852 
α = 0.910 (n=6) 
IV-6 0.838 
IV-4 0.831 
IV-9 0.821 
IV-1 0.745 
IV-3 0.673 
5. Budget flexibility IV-5 0.833 
α = 0.863 (n=3) 
IV-11 0.826 
IV-2 0.810 
6. Procedure formalization V-3 0.856 
α = 0.858 (n=3) 
V-2 0.852 
V-5 0.747 
7. Support of higher 
management 
V-7 0.897 
α = 0.945 (n=6) 
V-6 0.892 
V-9 0.879 
V-8 0.841 
V-4 0.832 
V-1 0.820 
Dependent 
variables 
1. Programme performance VI-2 0.907 
α = 0.949 (n=6) 
VI-3 0.900 
VI-4 0.889 
VI-1 0.870 
VI-5 0.859 
VI-6 0.796 
Extraction method: Principal axis factoring. 
 
Table 7-3 above presents unrotated loadings and Cronbach‟s alpha from each potential 
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variable. The table shows that the loading values of each item are spread between 0.673 
and 0.908, indicating that they were in the rule of 0.4. Also, Cronbach‟s alphas for the 
eight potential variables ranged from 0.876 to 0.949, suggesting that they were high 
enough for their items to form a consistent and reliable scale for the different potential 
variables. 
 
In conclusion, the items of the eight potential variables were highly correlated with one 
another, in the sense that item-total correlations (r) and factor loadings were sufficiently 
high over a generally accepted criterion. It is suggested that each potential variable was 
in the same dimension. Results of the reliability test suggest that each item formed a 
consistent and reliable scale for measuring relevant potential variables. The results of 
factor analysis suggest that this survey measured these eight variables with an 
appropriate scale. 
 
7.2.2 General Characteristics of the Data 
 
In the previous section, the eight variables for this study were determined through 
conducting a factor analysis and a reliability test. Because, as was noted earlier, this 
survey measured the eight variables with multiple items recorded along a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very low) to 7 (very high), this study processed the raw 
data collected from administrators. Excluding the cases without response in any one of 
the items (listwise-deletion method), this survey used an arithmetic mean of values for 
multiple items as a single value which represents a variable. 
 
Table 7-4 shows summaries of cases processed by the listwise-deletion method. Out of 
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these eight variables, budget flexibility presented the lowest exclusion rate of 0.9%, 
whereas goal clarity had the highest rate of 5.6%. Goal clarity included the item III-3 
(making programme target groups more specific), with the lowest response rate (no 
respondents: 34). However, this study included the item III-3 because when it was 
excluded
36
 it made little difference in the results of the analyses. 
 
When it comes to the distributions of these eight variables, they were likely to form a 
similar shape. These variables, although they were a little left-skewed, were distributed 
in an approximately normal shape, considering that that the degree to which the eight 
variables were skewed was less than plus or minus one (Leech et al., 2008). The mass of 
these distributions was concentrated on figures above the middle (or median) score 4.0 
on this scale. This suggested that the administrators of the central government assessed 
Korean performance budgeting somewhat positively.  
 
Table 7-4 Case processing summaries 
Variables  
Cases Distribution 
Valid Excluded Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Variance 
Skew-
ness 
Kurtos
is 
Indepen
dent 
1. Goal clarity 
762  
(94.4%) 
45 
 (5.6%) 
4.39 1.00 1.01 -0.51 1.92 
2. Goal difficulty 
785 
(97.3%) 
22 
 (2.7%) 
4.48 1.03 1.06 -0.24 1.26 
3. Budget adequacy 
800 
(99.1%) 
7  
(0.9%) 
3.95 1.10 1.21 -0.58 0.64 
4. Budget participation 
795  
(98.5%) 
12  
(1.5%) 
4.22 0.95 0.91 -0.47 1.74 
5. Budget flexibility 
800 
(99.1%) 
7  
(0.9%) 
3.98 1.02 1.04 -0.51 1.09 
6. Procedure formalization 
799 
(99.0%) 
8 
(1.0%) 
4.35 0.95 0.89 -0.46 1.62 
7. Support from senior 
management 
780 
(96.7%) 
27 
(3.3%) 
4.41 1.01 1.02 -0.41 1.33 
Depend
ent 
1. Programme 
performance 
798 
(98.9%) 
9  
(1.1%) 
4.38 1.04 1.08 -0.39 1.41 
Note: The total number of cases is 807. 
 
                                                
36: „Goal clarity‟ without Question III-3 indicated that the number of excluded cases was reduced to 3.3 %. 
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It is meaningful to examine relationships between the eight variables. Table 7-5 presents 
the results of the Pearson correlation analysis. It indicates that eight variables were 
significantly correlated with one another at the level of 0.01. The dependent variable of 
programme performance had a significantly positive relationship with all the 
independent variables. In particular, support from senior management was the most 
closely related with performance of programmes in the eight independent variables (r = 
0.804). The high correlation coefficient confirmed previous studies which found that 
senior management might play a critical role in improving the performance of budgetary 
programmes when performance budgeting was in operation(Jun and Park, 2002). 
 
Table 7-5 Correlations between eight variables (Pearson) 
 
Goal 
clarity 
Goal 
difficulty 
Budget 
adequacy 
Budget 
participation 
Budget 
flexibility 
Procedure 
formalizatio
n 
Support 
from senior 
management 
Programme 
performance 
Goal 
clarity 
1 - - - - - - - 
Goal  
difficulty 
0.754*** 1 - - - - - - 
Budget adequacy 0.490*** 0.315*** 1 - - - - - 
Budget 
participation 
0.716*** 0.589*** 0.751*** 1 - - - - 
Budget flexibility 0.532*** 0.359*** 0.842*** 0.818*** 1 - - - 
Procedure 
formalization 
0.651*** 0.611*** 0.582*** 0.771*** 0.613*** 1 - - 
Support from 
senior 
management 
0.695*** 0.614*** 0.579*** 0.792*** 0.613*** 0.856*** 1 - 
Programme 
performance 
0.724*** 0.611*** 0.602*** 0.773*** 0.626*** 0.758*** 0.804*** 1 
Note: *** denotes that correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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7.3 Impacts on Managerial Practices 
 
7.3.1 Introduction 
 
This section focuses on identifying evidence of whether Korean performance budgeting 
has had an impact on programme-managerial practices or not. The budgeting system 
may have had no influence on managerial practices. Conversely, managerial practices 
may have been changed, and these changes may have been different for different 
administrators and in different ministries (and agencies). 
 
Table 7-4 above presented descriptive statistics for the sample survey of eight practices 
which this research is interested in. Judging by this sample survey, even though it was 
not large, performance budgeting has had a positive effect on programme management 
activities within the Korean central government. As for target setting of programmes, 
respondents rated this at more than 4.00, suggesting that Korean performance budgeting 
has made a contribution to setting programme targets that are slightly clearer and more 
ambitious. When it comes to budgeting, this was a little different from the other sections. 
Public administrators perceived that, although they had participated in budgeting more 
frequently, the amount of their budgets had not been more adequate than expected, and 
the operation of their budgets had not been more flexible than expected. Encouragingly, 
respondents observed that the performance budgeting system caused their senior 
administrators to assist them more eagerly to improve the performance of their 
programmes. Finally, they were likely to consider that Korean performance budgeting 
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had made a slight contribution to improving performance of programmes, its primary 
objective. This result is consistent with NABO (2006b). 
 
Results for the sample survey present several hints that public administrators in the 
Korean central government had slightly changed their programme-managerial practices 
since the government introduced the performance budgeting system in order to associate 
budget decisions with performance of programmes. In particular, the sample survey 
demonstrates that SABP results have been used in managing programmes or/and 
evaluating personnel performance. Although SABP was introduced to strengthen links 
between fund allocation and performance, it has developed to the point where it is 
considered even for evaluating personnel performance. Out of 578 respondents who 
managed budgets or/and who managed programmes using SABP, 480 confirmed that 
they had used SABP assessments in making budget decisions for their programmes 
or/and in evaluating their own performance (83.04%).  
 
However, it was possible that, by chance, this survey might have sampled respondents 
who were not typical of the population. If this was the case, any observed changes in 
programme-managerial practices might be a product of chance and so might not be a 
real reflection of managerial practices. To ascertain whether the budget system had 
made a contribution to a real change in managerial practices and, furthermore, in 
performance of programmes, this section (1) examines and tests descriptive statistics for 
these seven practices, and (2) compares differences in these seven practices between 
administrators, programmes, and organizations (ministries and agencies), and their use 
of SABP results, employing an analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique.  
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This study estimated the confidence intervals of the seven practices at the 95% level. 
Table 7-6 provides arithmetic means and their confidence intervals for changes in the 
seven managerial practices. Of the seven practices, five, including goal clarity, goal 
difficulty, budget participation, procedure formalization, and support from senior 
management, form a confidence interval of over 4.00. The other two, budget adequacy 
and budget flexibility, range between 3.80 and 4.10. This suggests that Korean 
performance budgeting has made a greater contribution to changing the five practices 
than expected, whereas it cannot be determined that it has done so for the remaining two. 
 
Table 7-6 Means and confidence intervals for the seven managerial practices 
 
 Valid cases Mean 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
1. Goal clarity 762 4.39 4.31 4.46 
2. Goal difficulty 785 4.48 4.41 4.56 
3. Budget adequacy 800 3.95 3.87 4.02 
4. Budget participation 795 4.22 4.16 4.29 
5. Budget flexibility 800 3.98 3.91 4.05 
6. Procedure formalization 799 4.35 4.28 4.42 
7. Support from senior 
management 
780 4.41 4.34 4.48 
 
The following sub-sections give specific descriptions of how Korean performance 
budgeting has made a contribution to adjusting programme-managerial practices related 
to programme goal setting, programme budget management, programme operational 
procedures, and support from senior management in the course of managing 
programmes.   
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7.3.2 Impacts on Programme Goal Setting 
 
Budgetary programmes, in general, are required to present their goals in the process of 
budgeting. Goals have attracted more attention generally since budget systems have 
begun to concentrate on performance or results. This is also true in the case of Korean 
performance budgeting. Specifically, when introducing performance budgeting with 
SABP, the Korean central government asked programme managers to make their 
programmes‟ goals sufficiently clear and ambitious for them to provide good motivation 
(MPB; 2006a; 2006b, NABO; 2006b; 2007). The government anticipated that the goals 
set for programmes would become more specific, that it would be more difficult to 
achieve them, and that eventually such a change would improve performance of 
programmes. 
 
The following sub-sections describe how Korean performance budgeting has made a 
contribution to changing specific practices related to goal setting. 
 
7.3.2.1 Impacts on the Clarity of Programme Goals 
 
Table 7-6 displays arithmetic means and their confidence intervals for the levels at 
which 762 respondents assessed their goal clarity. The results of the sample survey give 
some hints as to how Korean performance budgeting has changed managerial practices 
in terms of setting programmes‟ goals.  
 
Public administrators in the Korean central government perceived a slight improvement 
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in recognizing and understanding their programmes‟ goals because these goals had been 
stated more specifically and clearly. Respondents gave the mean score of 4.39 out of 
7.00 to the level of clarity of programme goals, suggesting that the performance 
budgeting system had made slightly more contribution to setting goals clearly than had 
been expected.  
 
As seen in Table 7-7, the survey, however, reflected statistically significant differences 
between various cohorts such as managers, organizations, programmes, and their use of 
SABP results.  
 
Firstly, managers are categorized as belonging to one of two groups: budget managers 
and programme managers. The budget managers are in charge of making programme 
budgets, and the programme managers are involved in designing, planning, and 
implementing programmes. However, not all programme managers manage their 
programmes using SABP
37
. In Table 7-7, „No. of programmes in charge‟ denotes the 
number of programmes which a manager manages using SABP.  
 
Table 7-7 shows the ANOVA results for differences in the perceived contribution of 
performance budgeting to changing goal clarity among managers. The survey results 
suggest that budget managers perceived a higher contribution by performance budgeting 
to changing levels of goal clarity than programme managers did (4.53 vs. 4.33, p < 
0.01). On the other hand, no significant difference was found between programme 
managers who managed programmes using SABP and those who did not.  
                                                
37
 Programmes are put into two categories. One group is assessed using SABP; the other isn‟t.  
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As for the organizations which respondents worked for, these were of two types, 
according to the organizational hierarchy of the Korean central government: ministry 
and agency. Ministries are controlled by ministers, the secretaries of the President, and 
may have agencies under their control. Agencies, in general, enforce the policies which 
the ministries they report to make. Further, ministries and agencies are divided into 
three groups according to their main mission: economy-related, social welfare-related, 
or other administrative organization
38
. Also, respondents were categorized according to 
where they worked: headquarters or regional agents.  
 
Depending on the organization to which they belonged, respondents had slightly 
different perceptions of the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to changing 
goal clarity. Table 7-7 presents the results of the ANOVA analysis for goal clarity among 
organizations. Administrators in agencies saw the budget system as making a greater 
contribution to increasing goal clarity than did administrators in ministries (4.25 vs. 
4.70, p < 0.01). The other groups in the table do not make a statistically significant 
difference to the findings on goal clarity. The result is a suggestion that Korean 
performance budgeting made slightly more of a contribution to setting clear programme 
goals in agencies than it did in ministries. 
 
It is meaningful to take the characteristics of programmes into account when describing 
changes in goal clarity, because different programmes have different goals. In Table 7-7, 
the results of the ANOVA for goal clarity among programmes are presented.  
 
                                                
38
 The criterion for this categorization followed the MPB. For convenience‟s sake, in budgeting, the MPB 
puts all ministries and agencies into one of three groups. 
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Firstly, as described in Chapter 3, programmes assessed by SABP were divided into 
seven types. There was no statistically significant difference between them in the 
contribution that Korean performance budgeting made to increasing goal clarity, as far 
as their administrators perceived. Programme ages, however, were likely to make a 
slightly significant difference (p < 0.1). The second oldest programmes (11-15 years) 
had the highest mean scores (4.61) and the youngest programmes had the lowest mean 
scores (4.28). It is suggested that performance budgeting had the strongest effect on the 
goal clarity of mid-age programmes (6 to 15 years). In another activity, programmes 
were divided into four groups on the basis of the quartiles of the budgets of the 1717 
programmes which SABP was used to assess between 2005 and 2007
39
. As seen in 
Table 7-7, the budget amounts and SABP grades of programmes were not likely to make 
a difference to the perceived contribution of Korean performance budgeting to changing 
the degree of goal clarity. It is suggested that the SABP grades and budget amounts of 
programmes did not have significant relationships with changes to the degree of goal 
clarity. 
 
The uses to which SABP assessments are put may be one of the critical factors which 
have an impact on various managerial practices within public organizations, because 
they could reform the structure of incentives. It may be presumed that different uses of 
SABP assessments have a different effect on managerial practices. As described earlier, 
ministries and agencies have reported that they use SABP results for managing 
programmes (including budget decisions) and/or personnel performance. This survey 
includes four groups which are categorized according to the uses to which they put 
                                                
39
 Budgets of programmes are for the year assessed by SABP. 
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SABP results. One is a group which uses the results for programme management 
(including budget decisions); the second uses them for personnel performance 
management; the third uses them for both programme and personnel performance 
management; and the fourth group is for „others‟40.  
 
Table 7-7 presents the results of the ANOVA test for perceived contribution to changing 
the degree of goal clarity among these four groups. The results show that these four 
groups‟ use of SABP assessments made a significant difference in the degree to which 
Korean performance budgeting changed their goal clarity (p < 0.01). The third group, 
with their multi-purpose use of SABP results (for both programme and performance 
management), saw the highest mean scores (4.74). It is suggested that multi-purpose use 
had a greater effect on goal clarity than single-purpose use (for programme or 
performance management). Among the groups with single-purpose use of SABP 
assessments, the group that used these in programme management had higher mean 
scores than the group which used them in personnel performance management (4.35 vs. 
4.10). However, this can be generalized only on a very limited basis, because there were 
not many cases of using SABP assessments for personnel performance management 
(valid cases = 14, 3%). It is suggested that, because the Korean central government is 
only just starting to use SABP assessments for personnel performance management, 
                                                
40
 Programme management activities include budgeting for programmes. For this analysis, Question 2-9 
in the questionnaire re-coded „① Budgeting‟, „③ Programme management‟ and „⑤ Budgeting and 
programme management‟ into „① Programme management‟; „② Personnel performance evaluation‟ 
into „② Personnel performance evaluation‟; „④ Budgeting and personnel performance evaluation‟, „⑥ 
Programme management and personnel performance evaluation‟ and „⑦ Budgeting, personal 
performance evaluation, and programme management‟ into „③ programme and personnel performance 
management’; and ‘⑧ Others‟ into „④ Others‟ (Hereafter the same). 
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administrators might not yet perceive the impacts of these on goal clarity. 
To sum up, budget managers perceived a greater contribution by Korean performance 
budgeting to changing goal clarity than programme managers. Managers perceived that 
programme goals might be set more clearly when SABP assessments were used for 
making budget decisions than when they were used for personnel performance 
management. As a result, it is suggested that Korean performance budgeting has made a 
slight contribution to making programme goals clearer and more specific. 
 
Table 7-7 ANOVA results for perceived changes in goal clarity among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job** 
1. Budget 220 4.53 1.03 4.39 4.67 
2. Programme 535 4.33 0.99 4.24 4.41 
No. of 
programmes 
in charge 
1. No programme 255 4.30 0.93 4.18 4.41 
2. One or more programmes 329 4.36 1.04 4.25 4.47 
Organizatio
n size*** 
1. Ministry 520 4.25 0.99 4.16 4.33 
2. Agency 237 4.70 0.97 4.57 4.82 
Organizatio
n mission 
1. Economy Org. 334 4.47 0.94 4.37 4.57 
2. Social welfare Org. 264 4.32 1.10 4.18 4.45 
3. Administration Org. 158 4.33 0.97 4.18 4.48 
Department 
1. Headquarters 708 4.39 1.02 4.31 4.46 
2. Regional agent 48 4.35 0.76 4.13 4.57 
Programme 
types 
1. SOC 12 4.57 1.14 3.84 5.29 
2. Capital acquisition 29 4.34 0.75 4.05 4.62 
3. Other direct programme 124 4.51 0.94 4.34 4.67 
4. Investment 13 4.66 0.80 4.18 5.14 
5. Loan 6 4.17 0.51 3.63 4.70 
6. Subsidy to private sector 61 4.24 1.12 3.95 4.53 
7. Subsidy to local government 50 4.07 1.33 3.69 4.45 
Programme 
ages* 
1. 5 years or less 133 4.28 0.98 4.11 4.45 
2. 6 to 10 years 96 4.52 1.06 4.31 4.74 
3. 11 to 15 years 28 4.61 1.06 4.20 5.02 
4. 16 years or more 40 4.15 1.06 3.81 4.49 
Budget size 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 103 4.39 0.84 4.23 4.56 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 84 4.32 1.02 4.10 4.54 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 67 4.14 1.28 3.83 4.46 
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 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 35 4.65 1.07 4.28 5.02 
Programme 
grades by 
SABP 
1. Effective 32 4.33 1.09 3.94 4.72 
2. Somewhat effective 67 4.48 1.06 4.23 4.74 
3. Modest 155 4.39 0.91 4.25 4.53 
4. Poor 33 3.99 1.47 3.47 4.51 
Use of 
SABP 
results*** 
1. Programme management 326 4.35 1.07 4.23 4.46 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
14 4.10 1.23 3.89 4.81 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2) 
102 4.74 0.73 4.60 4.89 
4. Others 7 4.26 1.97 2.44 6.07 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in
 a one-way ANOVA. 
 
7.3.2.2 Impacts on the Difficulty of Programme Goals 
 
Public administrators perceived that Korean performance budgeting caused them to set 
the goals for their programmes at a more ambitious level than had been expected. In this 
survey, goal difficulty saw an average of 4.48 – slightly higher than 4.00 (modest), as 
shown in Table 7-6.  
 
As with goal clarity, there is a slight difference between groups. Table 7-8 presents the 
ANOVA test results for differences in the perceived contribution of Korean performance 
budgeting to changing goal difficulty among respondent groups. The ANOVA results 
indicate that budget managers perceived a greater contribution by Korean performance 
budgeting to changing goal difficulty than programme managers (4.58 vs. 4.44, p < 0.1). 
This suggests that budget managers were slightly more in favour of this role of 
performance budgeting than programme managers. There were no statistically 
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significant differences between programme managers who managed their programmes 
with SABP and those who did not. 
 
Table 7-8 presents the ANOVA test results for differences between organizations in their 
perception of the extent to which Korean performance budgeting contributed to 
changing goal difficulty. The mean scores of individual groups ranged from 4.31 to 4.86, 
indicating that performance budgeting made a slightly greater contribution to setting 
ambitious goals for programmes than had been expected. More specifically, 
administrators who worked for agencies saw higher mean scores than those who worked 
for ministries (4.31 vs. 4.86, p < 0.01). However, there was no significant difference in 
the degree of perceived goal difficulty between organizations dealing with the economy, 
organizations dealing with social welfare, and administrative organizations, nor between 
administrators working at headquarters and regional agents.  
 
The results of the ANOVA test between programme groups are presented in Table 7-8. 
The results suggest that differences in the budget amount of programmes made a 
difference to the impact of Korean performance budgeting on the goal difficulty of 
programmes. Large programmes (≥ 30.9 billion Won or more) had the highest mean 
scores; small programmes (2.3 billion Won or less) had the second highest; and mid-size 
programmes (2.4-30.7 billion Won) had the lowest (4.62 vs. 4.86 vs. 4.19, p < 0.01). 
Also, the results suggest that SABP grades made a slightly significant difference in the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to changing goal difficulty. As the SABP 
grades of programmes rose, the mean scores increased (4.20 vs. 4.50 vs. 4.55 vs. 4.86, p 
= 0.089). This meant that the contribution of performance budgeting to changing goal 
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difficulty was greater in high grade programmes than in low grade programmes. On the 
other hand, no statistically significant difference was found between the seven 
programme types, or between programmes of different ages. 
 
Table 7-8 presents the results of the ANOVA test for differences between the four types 
of user of SABP assessments in their perceptions of the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to changing goal difficulty. According to the results, 
administrators perceived that its use for programme management made a higher 
contribution to changing goal difficulty than its use for personnel performance 
management (4.51 vs. 4.00). As with goal clarity, multi-purpose use of SABP (for both 
programme and performance management) saw the highest mean scores (4.71, p < 0.1). 
This suggested that the performance budgeting system made a significantly different 
contribution to the setting of ambitious programme goals depending on what SABP 
assessments were used for. 
 
As a result, the findings suggest that the performance budgeting system in Korea has 
made a slight contribution to setting programme goals that are clearer and more difficult 
to achieve. The results of the ANOVA test indicate that multi-purpose use of SABP 
results (for both programme and performance management) caused programmes to set 
clearer and more ambitious goals than single-purpose use. Among groups making 
single-purpose use of SABP results (for programme management or personnel 
performance management), those using them for programme management experienced 
more of a contribution to setting ambitious goals than those using them for personnel 
performance management. This suggests that what SABP assessments are used for is 
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critical for changing managerial practices. It implies that proper uses of SABP 
assessments may be one of the critical success factors for the Korean performance 
budgeting system.  
 
Table 7-8 ANOVA results for changes perceived in goal difficulty among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job* 
1. Budget 231 4.58 1.07 4.45 4.72 
2. Programme 547 4.44 1.01 4.35 4.52 
No. of 
programmes 
in charge 
1. No programme 261 4.40 0.95 4.29 4.52 
2. One or more programmes 339 4.50 1.06 4.39 4.62 
Organization 
size*** 
1. Ministry 534 4.31 0.98 4.22 4.39 
2. Agency 246 4.86 1.04 4.41 4.99 
Organization 
mission 
1. Economy Org. 344 4.52 0.98 4.41 4.62 
2. Social welfare Org. 274 4.48 1.09 4.35 4.61 
3. Administration Org. 161 4.41 1.04 4.25 4.57 
Department 
1. Headquarter 730 4.48 1.04 4.40 4.55 
2. Regional agent 49 4.55 0.85 4.31 4.79 
Programme 
types 
1. SOC 12 4.69 1.38 3.82 5.57 
2. Capital acquisition 33 4.41 0.91 4.09 4.74 
3. Other direct programme 124 4.66 0.98 4.48 4.83 
4. Investment 13 4.82 0.90 4.28 5.36 
5. Loan 6 4.22 0.58 3.61 4.83 
6. Subsidy to private sector 61 4.41 0.96 4.17 4.65 
7. Subsidy to local government 53 4.26 1.36 3.88 4.63 
Programme 
ages 
1. 5 years or less 134 4.41 0.99 4.24 4.58 
2. 6 to 10 years 100 4.63 1.05 4.43 4.84 
3. 11 to 15 years 29 4.79 1.06 4.39 5.20 
4. 16 years or more 43 4.34 1.16 3.98 4.70 
Budget size*** 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 105 4.62 0.92 4.44 4.79 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 85 4.43 0.95 4.22 4.63 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 70 4.19 1.28 3.88 4.49 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 39 4.86 1.13 4.50 5.23 
Programme 
grades by 
SABP * 
1. Effective 32 4.86 1.18 4.44 5.29 
2. Somewhat effective 69 4.55 1.02 4.31 4.80 
3. Modest 160 4.50 0.95 4.35 4.64 
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 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
4. Poor 35 4.20 1.52 3.68 4.72 
Use of SABP 
results* 
1. Programme management 338 4.51 1.11 4.39 4.63 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
15 4.00 1.27 3.30 4.70 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2) 
101 4.71 0.76 4.56 4.86 
4. Other 8 4.34 2.04 2.67 4.98 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in 
a one-way ANOVA. 
 
7.3.3 Impacts on Budget-Managerial Practices 
 
For performance budgeting to achieve its objectives, public administrators need to 
adjust their programme-managerial strategies. The use of SABP as an assessment tool 
for Korean performance budgeting was expected to lead to the changing of managerial 
practices related to budgeting. For example, because SABP was designed to check 
whether programmes were allocated budgets that were adequate for the achievement of 
their goals, programme or budget mangers may change their practices of making 
decision about the budget amount of programmes. Indeed, it was argued that spending 
ministries and agencies in Korea made decreasing budget requests due to a top-down 
budget strategy
41
 and Korean performance budgeting (Lee, 2006). 
 
As indicated in Table 7-6, public administrators gave mean scores of 3.95 to budget 
adequacy and 3.98 to budget flexibility, indicating that the performance budgeting 
system made less of a contribution to improving them than expected. Budget 
                                                
41
 The financial authority announced the budget ceiling for spending ministries and agencies. Individual 
spending agents made their budget requests with more discretion under the ceiling. 
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participation, however, had mean scores of 4.22. This suggested that performance 
budgeting did not contribute with satisfaction enough to make budget allocations to 
programmes more adequate, even though there were increasing discussions about the 
budgets of programmes. 
 
Below, the contributions of Korean performance budgeting to changing specific 
practices related to budget management are described, focusing on the differences 
between organizations, programmes, and the uses to which SABP assessments are put.  
 
7.3.3.1 Impact on the Adequacy of Programme Budgets 
 
To achieve performance of programmes, it is essential to employ proper and adequate 
resources such as money and labour. For example, the economy (input/input), one of the 
programme performance definitions used in the public sector, rests heavily on the 
provision of an adequate amount of money and labour, neither too much nor too little of 
either. Therefore, public administrators were presumed to seek budgets that were 
adequate to achieve the goals for their programmes. Table 7-9 shows the results of the 
ANOVA test for differences in respondent groups‟ perceptions‟ perceptions of the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to improving the adequacy of 
programme budgets.  
 
As indicated in Table 7-9, all kinds of managers marked mean scores of slightly less 
than 4.00, although this made little statistically significant difference. Managers 
perceived that performance budgeting did not necessarily result in making budgets more 
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adequate. 
For organizations, the table summarizes the results of the ANOVA test for differences in 
the contributions of Korean performance budgeting to improving budget adequacy 
among organizations. Budget adequacy was a slightly different item from the 
managerial practices related to goal setting. 
 
As for the three groups categorized by organizational mission, they showed a significant 
difference in their mean scores for budget adequacy (p < 0.01). Organizations related to 
the economy, such as the Ministry of Land, Transportation, and Maritime Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, had the highest mean scores of 4.17. 
Administrative organizations such as the Ministry of Public Administration and Security 
saw the lowest score of 3.69. This implies that performance budgeting had more of an 
effect on organizations related to the economy. Because these organizations had 
relatively more programmes with tangible outputs, such as roads and houses built, it 
might be easier to estimate their programme budgets than those of other organizations.  
 
Between ministries and agencies, and between workers at headquarters and regional 
agents, there was no statistically significant difference in the extent of their perceptions 
of contribution to improving budget adequacy. 
 
The characteristics of programmes might affect the adequacy of the programme budgets 
they receive. Table 7-9 summarizes the ANOVA results for differences perceived in the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to improving budget adequacy among 
programmes.  
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The results, in the table below, show that the type, age, and SABP grades of 
programmes made significant differences in the contribution of the budgeting system to 
improving the adequacy of their programme budgets. As far as the seven programme 
types are concerned, investment-type programmes had the highest mean scores; loan-
type programmes had the lowest mean scores (4.82 vs. 4.22); SOC-related programmes 
saw relatively high mean scores (4.69). In terms of the age of programmes, mid-age 
programmes (6 to 15 years) had higher levels of improvement in budget adequacy than 
other age groups (4.19). As for the SABP grades of programmes, administrators 
perceived that performance budgeting affected the adequacy of the budgets of 
programmes achieving the middle grades („Modest‟ or „Somewhat effective‟) more than 
that of the budgets of programmes achieving the other two grades (4.23 or 4.01 vs. 3.66 
or 3.26, p < 0.01).  
 
On the other hand, the ANOVA results indicate that the budget amount of programmes 
did not make a significant difference in the contribution of Korean performance 
budgeting to improving their adequacy.  
 
Table 7-9 below shows the ANOVA results for differences in the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to improving budget adequacy among the four users of SABP 
assessments. There was a significant difference in the contribution to improving budget 
adequacy, depending on what SABP results were used for (p < 0.01). Administrators 
observed that the contribution of performance budgeting to the adequacy of programme 
budgets was slightly improved for organizations using SABP results for personnel 
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performance management rather than for programme management activities (3.82 vs. 
3.90). In other ways, these two single-purpose users experienced less of an 
improvement in budget adequacy than the multi-purpose users who used SABP results 
for both programme and personnel performance management (4.27). 
 
As a result, public administrators perceived that the contribution of performance 
budgeting to the budget adequacy of programmes might be smaller than expected, 
although they differed slightly according to organizational mission, characteristics of 
programmes, and uses of SABP assessments. For the different types, ages, and SABP 
grades of programmes, Korean performance budgeting had significantly different 
effects on the adequacy of programme budgets. Still, it is implied that programmes 
experience different levels of budget adequacy according to what their SABP results are 
used for. 
 
Table 7-9 ANOVA results for changes perceived in budget adequacy among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s Job 
1. Budget 235 3.87 1.12 3.72 4.01 
2. Programme 558 3.98 1.09 3.89 4.07 
No. of 
programmes 
in charge 
1. No programme 264 3.97 1.02 3.85 4.10 
2. One or more programmes 347 3.98 1.12 3.86 4.10 
Organization 
size 
1. Ministry 538 3.91 1.10 3.82 4.00 
2. Agency 257 4.04 1.10 3.90 4.17 
Organization 
mission*** 
1. Economy Org. 355 4.17 1.05 4.06 4.28 
2. Social welfare Org. 278 3.82 1.10 3.70 3.95 
3. Administration Org. 161 3.69 1.13 3.51 3.86 
Department 
1. Headquarter 746 3.96 1.10 3.89 4.04 
2. Regional agent 48 3.76 1.09 3.44 4.07 
Programme 
types* 
1. SOC 12 4.69 1.38 3.82 5.57 
2. Capital acquisition 33 4.41 0.91 4.09 4.74 
3. Other direct programme 124 4.66 0.98 4.48 4.83 
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 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
4. Investment 13 4.82 0.90 4.28 5.36 
5. Loan 6 4.22 0.58 3.61 4.83 
6. Subsidy to private sector 61 4.41 0.96 4.17 4.65 
7. Subsidy to local government 53 4.26 1.36 3.88 4.63 
Programme 
ages*** 
1. 5 years or less 140 3.93 1.04 3.76 4.10 
2. 6 to 10 years 100 4.19 1.16 3.96 1.16 
3. 11 to 15 years 32 4.19 0.99 3.83 4.54 
4. 16 years or more 44 3.39 1.27 3.00 3.77 
Budget size 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 110 3.96 1.04 3.76 4.16 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 89 4.00 1.16 3.76 4.24 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 70 3.72 1.20 3.43 4.00 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 40 4.11 1.26 3.71 4.51 
Programme 
grades by 
SABP*** 
1. Effective 35 3.66 1.31 3.21 4.11 
2. Somewhat Effective 75 4.23 1.25 3.94 4.52 
3. Modest 161 4.01 0.94 3.86 4.15 
4. Poor 35 3.26 1.31 2.81 3.71 
Use of SABP 
results*** 
1. Programme management 347 3.82 1.15 3.69 3.94 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
14 3.90 1.28 3.17 4.64 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2) 
107 4.27 0.87 4.11 4.44 
 4. Others 8 3.42 1.88 1.85 4.98 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in
 a one-way ANOVA. 
 
7.3.3.2 Impacts on Budget Participation 
 
It was expected that there might be increasing discussions within spending ministries 
and agencies, and decreasing deliberations within the financial authority, after the 
introduction of „top-down‟ budget allocation strategy into the Korean central 
government gave more budgetary discretion to spending ministries and agencies. It was 
anticipated that this might lead managers to participation in budget discussions. Table 7-
10 presents the ANOVA results for differences in the perceived contribution of Koran 
performance budgeting to changing the extent of budget participation among respondent 
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groups. 
This survey, as described earlier, suggests that there was growing participation in the 
process of budgeting, in the context of budget participation marking a mean score of 
4.22. As indicated in Table 7-10, managers showed a slight difference in their 
perceptions of the extent of budget participation. Budget managers had higher mean 
scores than programme managers (4.31 vs. 4.18, p < 0.1). Amongst programme 
managers, managers who used SABP had higher mean scores than those who did not 
(4.12 vs. 4.25, p < 0.1).  
 
The Korean performance budgeting system might make a different contribution to 
changing the degree of managers‟ budget participation depending on their organization. 
Table 7-10 compares the mean scores of budget participation among groups of 
organizations. It is indicated that there was a significant difference in the contribution of 
the budget system to changing budget participation according to the organizations‟ 
characteristics. Agencies had higher mean scores than ministries (4.45 vs. 4.12, p < 
0.01). In terms of organizational mission, organizations related to the economy recorded 
higher mean scores than the other organizations (4.40 vs.4.10 or. 4.06, p < 0.01). 
However, no statistically significant difference was found between managers operating 
at headquarters and regional agents. 
 
There might be a significant difference in budget participation between groups of 
programmes. Table 7-10 presents the ANOVA results for perceived differences in the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to changing the extent of budget 
participation between groups.  
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These seven programme types had significantly different mean scores ranging from 4.12 
to 4.50. Of them, SOC-type programmes had the highest mean scores, whereas 
programmes which subsidized local governments had the lowest mean scores. 
Programme age might vary the effect of Korean performance budgeting on budget 
participation. Mid-age programmes (6-15 years) had a higher level of budget 
participation than the other age groups (4.48 or 4.55 vs. 4.12 or 3.90, p < 0.01). There 
was also likely to be a significant difference in the contribution of performance 
budgeting to changing budget participation (p < 0.05) according to the budget amounts 
of the programmes. Programmes in the fourth quartile had the highest mean scores 
(4.57), whereas those in the third quartile had the lowest (3.99).  
 
On the other hand, the ANOVA results indicate that SABP grades might not make 
statistically significant differences in the contribution of Korean performance budgeting 
to changing budget participation.  
 
As in the case of previous managerial practices, the different uses to which SABP 
results were put seemed to be significant for the different effects that Korean 
performance budgeting had on budget participation. Table 7-10 presents the ANOVA 
results for differences in the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to changing 
the degree of budget participation between the four types of SABP user. It is suggested 
that there were statistically significant differences between the four types. The mean 
scores were slightly higher for those using the assessments for programme management 
rather than for personnel performance management (4.23 vs. 3.99, p < 0.05). These two 
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single-purpose users had lower mean scores than multi-purpose users who used the 
assessments for both programme and personnel performance management (4.48). 
 
Table 7-10 ANOVA results for changes perceived in budget participation among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job* 
1. Budget 235 4.31 0.95 4.19 4.43 
2. Programme 554 4.18 0.96 4.10 4.26 
No. of 
programmes 
in charge* 
1. No programme 264 4.12 0.83 4.02 4.22 
2. One or more programmes 344 4.25 1.00 4.15 4.36 
Organization 
size*** 
1. Ministry 537 4.12 0.96 4.04 4.20 
2. Agency 254 4.45 0.91 4.34 4.56 
Organization 
mission*** 
1. Economy Org. 352 4.40 0.86 4.31 4.49 
2. Social welfare Org. 276 4.10 1.03 3.97 4.22 
3. Administration Org. 162 4.06 0.97 3.91 4.21 
Department 
1. Headquarters 743 4.23 0.95 4.17 4.30 
2. Regional agent 47 4.05 0.99 3.76 4.34 
Programme 
types* 
1. SOC 12 4.50 1.12 3.79 5.21 
2. Capital acquisition 33 4.47 0.71 4.22 4.72 
3. Other direct programme 128 4.26 1.00 4.09 4.44 
4. Investment 16 4.39 0.48 4.13 4.64 
5. Loan 6 4.14 0.69 3.42 4.86 
6. Subsidy to private sector 63 4.13 1.03 3.87 4.39 
7. Subsidy to local government 51 4.12 1.20 3.78 4.46 
Programme 
ages*** 
1. 5 years or less 138 4.12 0.89 3.97 4.27 
2. 6 to 10 years 100 4.48 0.99 4.28 4.68 
3. 11 to 15 years 31 4.55 1.00 4.19 4.92 
4. 16 years or more 43 3.90 1.08 3.56 4.23 
Budget size** 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 108 4.23 0.83 4.07 4.39 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 89 4.25 0.96 4.05 4.45 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 68 3.99 1.23 3.69 4.28 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 41 4.57 0.96 4.27 4.87 
Programme 
grades by 
SABP 
1. Effective 35 4.18 0.99 3.84 4.52 
2. Somewhat effective 75 4.42 1.13 4.16 4.68 
3. Modest 159 4.22 0.81 4.10 4.35 
4. Poor 34 3.93 1.39 3.45 4.42 
Use of SABP 1. Programme management 345 4.23 1.00 4.11 4.32 
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 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
results* 2. Personnel performance 
management 
15 3.99 1.06 3.40 4.57 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2) 
106 4.48 0.77 4.33 4.63 
4. Others 8 4.04 1.69 2.63 5.45 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in
 a one-way ANOVA. 
 
7.3.3.3 Impacts on Flexibility in Budget Execution 
 
Performance budgeting requires programme managers to exercise appropriate discretion 
in implementing their budgets in changeable circumstances (Diamond; 2001). 
Nonetheless, according to Table 7-6, administrators perceived that Korean performance 
budgeting had less of an effect on flexibility in operating budgets than they would have 
expected (3.98). That is to say, they did not perceive much of a contribution by the 
Korean performance budgeting system to increasing such flexibility. Table 7-11 below 
summarizes the ANOVA results for differences in the perceived contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to changing the degree of flexibility in operating budgets among 
respondent groups.  
 
Managers of budgets and programmes had, as indicated in the table, mean scores of 
slightly lower than 4.00, indicating that the contribution of performance budgeting to 
increasing flexibility was not greater than expected. Between these managers, 
significant differences were not found. 
As seen in Table 7-11 below, there was a significant difference in budget flexibility 
depending on what kinds of mission organizations had.  
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Organizations related to the economy saw higher mean scores of 4.18, suggesting that 
the performance budgeting system made a slightly greater contribution to increasing 
budget flexibility than expected (4.18 vs. 3.85 or 3.77, p < 0.01). Between ministries 
and agencies, or between those working at headquarters and regional agents, there was 
no significant difference in the contribution of the budget system to changing budget 
flexibility for them. 
 
Table 7-11 makes comparisons between the mean scores of groups of programmes. The 
table shows that the age of programmes made a slight but significant difference in the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to the flexibility of their budget 
operations. Mid-age programmes (6-15 years), as with previous practices, saw the 
highest mean scores, whereas the other age groups had mean scores of lower than 4.00 
(4.17 or 4.22 vs. 3.90 or 3.64, p < 0.05). It is suggested that the performance budgeting 
system might make more of a contribution than expected to increasing flexibility in 
implementing programmes in the mid-age group alone.  
 
On the other hand, there were no statistically significant differences in the contribution 
of Korean performance budgeting to changing budget flexibility in relation to 
programme type, budget amount, or SABP grades. 
 
The table, also, summarizes the ANOVA results for differences in the contribution of 
Korean performance budgeting to improving budget flexibility among the four types of 
SABP user.  
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The results show that, among these four users of the SABP assessments, there were 
statistically significant differences in the flexibility they had for executing budgets. The 
two single-purpose users (for programme management; and for personnel performance 
management) had mean scores of lower than 4.00, indicating that for them there might 
be no critical effect of the budgeting system on the flexibility they had for operating 
budgets. The multi-purpose users (for both programme and personnel performance 
management) had mean scores of 4.30. It is implied that, when SABP assessments were 
used for managing programmes as well as personnel performance, then performance 
budgeting could make a greater contribution to increasing the flexibility of budget 
operation. 
 
Table 7-11 ANOVA results for perceived changes in budget flexibility among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job 
1. Budget 234 3.95 1.03 3.81 4.08 
2. Programme 559 3.99 1.02 3.90 4.07 
No. of 
programm
es in 
charge 
1. No programme 265 3.96 0.94 3.85 4.08 
2. One or more programmes 347 3.99 1.07 3.87 4.10 
Organizati
on size 
1. Ministry 538 3.95 1.01 3.86 4.04 
2. Agency 257 4.04 1.03 3.91 4.17 
Organizati
on 
mission*** 
1. Economy Org. 355 4.18 0.97 4.08 4.28 
2. Social welfare Org. 277 3.85 1.03 3.72 3.97 
3. Administration Org. 162 3.77 1.05 3.60 3.93 
Departme
nt 
1. Headquarter 746 3.99 1.02 3.92 4.06 
2. Regional agent 48 3.81 1.01 3.53 4.11 
Programm
e types 
1. SOC 12 4.31 1.22 3.53 5.08 
2. Capital acquisition 33 4.31 0.85 4.01 4.62 
3. Other direct programme 131 3.96 1.05 3.78 4.15 
4. Investment 16 3.98 0.94 3.48 4.48 
5. Loan 6 4.06 0.49 3.54 4.57 
6. Subsidy to private sector 64 4.01 1.13 3.73 4.29 
7. Subsidy to local government 51 3.70 1.14 3.38 4.02 
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 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Programm
e ages** 
1. 5 years or less 140 3.90 0.95 3.74 4.05 
2. 6 to 10 years 100 4.17 1.13 3.95 4.40 
3. 11 to 15 years 32 4.22 0.99 3.86 4.57 
4. 16 years or more 44 3.64 1.10 3.30 3.97 
Budget 
size 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 110 4.03 0.88 3.86 4.19 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 89 4.01 1.13 3.77 4.25 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 69 3.70 1.20 3.41 3.99 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 41 4.07 1.04 3.75 4.40 
Programm
e grades 
by SABP 
1. Effective 35 3.69 1.20 3.27 4.10 
2. Somewhat effective 75 4.19 1.17 3.92 4.45 
3. Modest 161 4.00 0.91 3.85 4.14 
4. Poor 35 3.54 1.16 3.15 3.94 
Use of 
SABP 
results*** 
1. Programme management 346 3.90 1.06 3.79 4.01 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
15 3.80 1.15 3.17 4.43 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2)  
106 4.30 0.87 4.13 4.47 
4. Others 8 3.54 1.87 1.98 5.10 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in
 a one-way ANOVA. 
 
7.3.4 Impacts on Other Programme-Managerial Practices 
 
Under Korean performance budgeting, as described in Chapter 3, SABP is used to 
assess budgetary programmes on the basis of reports which programme managers make 
about the results of programme implementation. During the assessment, programme 
managers are urged to present written documents as evidences for the SABP score (or 
grades) awarded to their programmes. This could lead to greater documentation or 
formalization of operational procedures.  
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Apart from the question of procedure formalization, the MPB and some researchers 
used to put the failure of the PMS attempt of 2000 down to a lack of support from 
senior management. It was argued that the introduction of the PMS into only part of 
central government did not attract senior management‟s support. When the MPB 
introduced performance budgeting with SABP in 2005, it did so widely across the 
central government, to all ministries and agencies.  
 
Taking this into account, this section aims to identify how performance budgeting with 
SABP affected these two factors: procedure formalization and support from senior 
management. 
 
7.3.4.1 Impacts on Formalization of Programmes‟ Operational Procedures 
 
As demonstrated in Table 7-6 above, public administrators perceived that Korean 
performance budgeting made a slightly greater contribution to formalizing the 
procedures of programme management activities than expected (4.35). This is consistent 
with the above expectation. More specifically, Table 7-12 below shows differences in 
respondent groups‟ perceptions of the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to 
procedure formalization. As for managers‟ job, although a slight gap between the mean 
scores is shown, it was not statistically significant. The findings suggest that it was not 
critical for procedure formalization which jobs or what kinds of programmes 
administrators were in charge of.  
 
The characteristics of organizations might make a difference in the formalization of 
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programme operational procedures. Table 7-12 presents variations of the extent of the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to formalizing operational procedures 
among the three categories of organization. All types of organizations had mean scores 
of greater than 4.00, indicating that performance budgeting had a greater effect on 
formalization of operational procedures than expected.  
 
Among the different types of organization, there were statistically significant 
differences in the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to procedure 
formalization. Agencies had higher mean scores than ministries (4.64 vs. 4.21, p < 0.01). 
This suggested that agencies, whose jobs are more standardized, had higher levels of 
procedure formalization than ministries. Organizations whose work was related to the 
economy showed higher mean scores than the other organizations (4.49 vs. 4.28 or 4.17, 
p < 0.01). The findings suggest that differences between the missions of organizations 
lead to Korean performance budgeting having a different impact on the extent of 
procedure formalization. 
 
On the other hand, there were no significant differences between the mean scores of 
administrators working at headquarters and regional agents.  
 
The extent to which programme operational procedures are formalized may depend on 
the attributes of programmes such as type, budget, and age. Table 7-12 summarizes the 
ANOVA results for differences in the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to 
formalizing operation procedures among groups of programmes. It shows that the extent 
of the formalization might not be equal, depending on the age, budget size and SABP 
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grades of programmes.  
 
The mid-age group (6-15 years) might have more formal procedures, given that this 
group received a greater contribution from performance budgeting to formalization of 
the procedures of its programmes than the other groups (4.54 or 4.57 vs. 4.23 or 4.01, p 
< 0.01). Large-sized or highly graded programmes had higher mean scores. It is 
suggested that large programmes and highly graded programmes might have more 
formal and better-organized operation procedures. 
 
As suggested in the findings so far, what their SABP assessments were used for was 
critical for the extent to which programmes had their procedure formalization affected 
by performance budgeting. Table 7-12 makes comparisons between the four types of 
user of SABP results. All the four groups had mean scores of greater than 4.00, 
indicating that performance budgeting made a greater contribution to formalizing 
operation procedures than expected.  
 
However, statistically significant differences were found among the four types of user of 
SABP assessments. Out of the two single-purpose users, those who used SABP 
assessments for programme management had higher mean scores than those who used 
them for personnel performance management (4.31 vs. 4.07, p < 0.1). The multi-
purpose users had higher mean scores than the single-purpose users (4.56). This 
suggests that the performance budgeting system might make greater contributions to 
formalizing the procedures of programme operations when SABP assessments are 
considered for programme management as well as personnel performance management.  
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Table 7-12 ANOVA results for changes perceived in procedure formalization among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job 
1. Budget 236 4.23 0.99 4.30 4.55 
2. Programme 556 4.32 0.93 4.24 4.39 
No. of 
programm
es in 
charge 
1. No programme 265 4.27 0.87 4.17 4.38 
2. One or more programmes 345 4.37 0.96 4.27 4.47 
Organizati
on size*** 
1. Ministry 539 4.21 0.93 4.13 4.29 
2. Agency 255 4.64 0.91 4.53 4.76 
Organizati
on 
mission*** 
1. Economy Org. 353 4.49 0.89 4.40 4.58 
2. Social welfare Org. 275 4.28 0.99 4.16 4.40 
3. Administration Org. 165 4.17 0.96 4.02 4.32 
Departme
nt 
1. Headquarters 743 4.37 0.94 4.30 4.43 
2. Regional agent 50 4.15 1.02 3.86 4.44 
Programm
e types 
1. SOC 10 4.73 1.11 3.94 5.53 
2. Capital acquisition 33 4.52 0.83 4.22 4.81 
3. Other direct programme 130 4.42 0.94 4.25 4.58 
4. Investment 16 4.42 0.48 4.16 4.67 
5. Loan 6 4.11 0.98 3.08 5.14 
6. Subsidy to private sector 64 4.18 0.96 3.94 4.42 
7. Subsidy to local government 52 4.15 1.21 3.82 4.49 
Programm
e ages*** 
1. 5 years or less 141 4.23 0.90 4.08 4.38 
2. 6 to 10 years 100 4.54 0.98 4.35 4.74 
3. 11 to 15 years 30 4.57 0.98 4.20 4.93 
4. 16 years or more 44 4.01 1.03 3.70 4.32 
Budget 
size* 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 110 4.40 0.80 4.25 4.55 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 89 4.27 0.91 4.07 4.46 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 68 4.13 1.24 3.83 4.43 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 40 4.58 1.03 4.24 4.91 
Programm
e grades 
by SABP* 
1. Effective 34 4.68 0.85 4.38 4.97 
2. Somewhat effective 75 4.37 1.00 4.14 4.60 
3. Modest 161 4.30 0.86 4.17 4.43 
4. Poor 35 4.08 1.43 3.59 4.57 
Use of 
SABP 
results* 
1. Programme management 345 4.31 1.00 4.20 4.42 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
15 4.07 1.11 3.45 4.68 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2) 
107 4.56 0.76 4.41 4.70 
4. Others 8 4.25 1.16 3.28 5.22 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in a one-way ANOVA. 
 
271 
 
7.3.4.2 Impacts on Support from Senior Management 
 
Different leadership may result in differences in performance of programmes and even 
of organizations. Similarly, failure or success of an institution such as a budget system 
may depend heavily on the type of leadership given. SABP in Korea, in a sense, aimed 
to attract senior management‟s support for their staff, so that the latter would manage 
programmes efficiently under the performance budgeting system. According to Table 7-
6, regardless of which jobs administrators had, or what kinds of programmes they 
managed, they perceived that the contribution of performance budgeting to attracting 
support from senior management was greater than expected (4.41). Table 7-13 shows 
the ANOVA results for differences in the perceived contribution of Korean performance 
budgeting to attracting senior management‟s support for managers.  
 
As indicated in the table,  there was no significant difference between budget managers 
and programme managers, or between programme managers who managed programmes 
using SABP and those who managed without using SABP.  
 
The contributions of performance budgeting to inducing senior management to pay 
attention to programme management were significantly different between organizations. 
Table 7-13 presents the ANOVA results for differences in the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to increasing support from senior management according to the 
type of organization.  
 
The results indicate that agencies had significantly higher mean scores than ministries 
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(4.72 vs. 4.27, p < 0.01). Out of three groups classified by organizational mission, those 
whose work related to the economy had, by a small margin, the highest mean scores 
(4.56 vs. 4.35 or 4.21, p < 0.01). This suggests that performance budgeting needs to be 
designed to reflect the characteristics of organizations in order for senior management to 
give support to their staff and programme management 
 
On the other hand, administrators working at headquarters and regional agents did not 
show any significant difference in the extent to which they attracted senior 
management‟s support. 
 
Programmes might attract different levels of support from senior management 
depending on their characteristics, such as type, age, and size. Table 7-13 presents the 
ANOVA results for differences in the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to 
attracting the support of senior management among various groups of programmes.  
 
The results, in the table below, indicate that there were significant differences in senior 
management‟s support among the four programme age groups. Mid-age programmes (6 
to 15 years) had higher mean scores than the two other groups (4.70 or 4.66 vs. 4.18 or 
4.16, p < 0.01). Of the four programme size groups, large sized programmes (30.9 
billion Won or more), had significantly higher mean scores than the other three groups 
(4.86 vs. 4.37, 4.38, or 4.15, p < 0.05).  
 
On the other hand, these seven programme types and four SABP grades might not make 
a significant difference in the extent to which the performance budgeting system attracts 
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high level managerial support. 
 
Table 7-13 shows the ANOVA results for differences in the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to changes in high level managerial support depending on the 
four types of user of SABP results. There was a significant difference between users in 
attracting high level managerial support. As has already been noted for other factors, the 
multi-purpose use of assessments had a greater effect on drawing the support of senior 
management than the two single-purpose types of use (4.69). Among single-purpose 
users, the use of SABP scores for programme management produced higher mean 
scores than their use for personnel performance management (4.37 vs. 3.92, p < 0.01). 
This suggests that multi-purpose use of SABP results might have a stronger impact on 
high level managerial behaviour than single-purpose uses. 
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Table 7-13 ANOVA results for perceived changes in support from senior managers 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job 
1. Budget 234 4.48 1.04 4.34 4.61 
2. Programme 539 4.38 1.00 4.30 4.47 
No. of 
programm
es in 
charge 
1. No programme 256 4.32 0.89 4.21 4.43 
2. One or more programmes 337 4.44 1.07 4.32 4.55 
Organizati
on size*** 
1. Ministry 530 4.27 1.01 4.19 4.36 
2. Agency 245 4.72 0.94 4.60 4.84 
Organizati
on 
mission*** 
1. Economy Org. 343 4.56 0.96 4.46 4.67 
2. Social welfare Org. 270 4.35 1.04 4.22 4.47 
3. Administration Org. 161 4.21 1.03 4.05 4.37 
Departme
nt 
1. Headquarter 726 4.43 1.01 4.36 4.51 
2. Regional agent 48 4.18 0.91 3.91 4.44 
Programm
e types 
1. SOC 11 4.88 1.46 3.90 5.86 
2. Capital acquisition 32 4.55 0.71 4.30 4.81 
3. Other direct programme 126 4.40 1.06 4.21 4.59 
4. Investment 16 4.70 0.80 4.27 5.12 
5. Loan 5 4.27 1.00 3.03 5.50 
6. Subsidy to private sector 62 4.24 1.08 4.00 4.51 
7. Subsidy to local government 51 4.35 1.33 4.00 4.73 
Programm
e ages*** 
1. 5 years or less 135 4.18 1.00 4.02 4.35 
2. 6 to 10 years 97 4.70 1.03 4.50 4.91 
3. 11 to 15 years 30 4.66 1.27 4.19 5.14 
4. 16 years or more 45 4.16 1.18 3.81 4.52 
Budget 
size** 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 108 4.37 0.84 4.21 4.53 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 84 4.38 0.98 4.16 4.59 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 68 4.15 1.47 3.79 4.50 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 39 4.86 1.12 4.50 5.23 
Programm
e grades 
by SABP 
1. Effective 35 4.56 1.01 4.22 4.91 
2. Somewhat effective 72 4.40 1.17 4.13 4.68 
3. Modest 157 4.39 0.93 4.24 4.54 
4. Poor 34 4.19 1.63 3.62 4.76 
Use of 
SABP 
results*** 
1. Programme management 340 4.37 1.09 4.25 4.49 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
15 3.92 1.41 3.14 4.71 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2)  
104 4.69 0.73 4.55 4.83 
4. Others 8 4.15 1.80 2.64 5.65 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in a one-way ANOVA. 
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7.3.5 Conclusion 
 
As described earlier, institutions may cause organizational personnel to change their 
mode of behaviour (Giddens; 2007). Similarly, a performance budgeting system, itself 
an institution, may affect the programme-managerial practices of managers in the public 
sector.  
 
This study measured the extent of the contributions which Korean performance 
budgeting has made to changing seven programme-managerial practices: goal clarity, 
goal difficulty, budget participation, procedure formalization, support from senior 
management, budget adequacy, and budget flexibility. The first five practices had mean 
scores of greater than four, indicating that performance budgeting makes more of a 
contribution to changing them than expected. The two remaining practices saw mean 
scores of slightly lower than four (3.95 and 3.98). However, it is not easy to determine 
that the budget system does not affect them, taking into account that the mean scores 
came close to four. In the end, it is suggested that Korean performance budgeting has 
made a slight contribution to changing managerial practices within the Korean central 
government. 
 
On the other hand, Korean performance budgeting appears to bring changes of different 
extents to these seven managerial practices, depending on the organization, the 
programme, and the uses to which SABP results are put. Table 7-14 summarizes the 
results of the ANOVA test for differences in changes to these seven managerial practices.  
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Table 7-14 Summary of the ANOVA results 
 
Goal 
clarity 
Goal 
difficulty 
Budget 
adequacy 
Budget 
participation 
Budget 
flexibility 
Procedure 
formalization 
High level 
support 
Manager‟s job ** *  *    
No. of programmes 
in charge 
   *    
Ministry or agency *** ***  ***  *** *** 
Organization 
mission 
  *** *** *** *** *** 
Headquarters or not        
Programme types   * *    
Programme ages *  *** *** ** *** *** 
Budget size  ***  **  * ** 
Programme grades 
by SABP 
 * ***   *  
Use of SABP results *** * *** * *** * *** 
Note: *, **, and *** denote that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups i
n a one-way ANOVA. 
 
What public managers do within organizations is not likely to be critical for changes to 
managerial practices. Budget managers‟ perceptions of managerial practices are not 
likely to be significantly different from programme managers‟; and also, it does not 
make a significant difference to changes in these practices whether programme 
managers manage programmes with or without SABP.  
 
As for organizations, significantly different contributions by Korean performance 
budgeting to changing the practices of different types of organization are found. There is 
a significant difference between practice changes in ministries and those in agencies, 
and also between the three groups classified by organizational mission. In general, 
agencies had higher mean scores than ministries. This suggests that performance 
budgeting makes a greater contribution to changing the managerial practices of agencies 
than those of ministries. Out of the three groups classified by mission, organizations 
whose work is related to the economy might have higher mean scores than the other 
groups (social welfare-related or administrative organization). This suggests that 
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performance budgeting might have a greater effect on the practices of these 
organizations than the other types of organization.  
 
In terms of the characteristics of programmes, programme age tends to affect the 
contribution of Korean performance budgeting to changes in practices. Mid-age 
programmes (6-15 years) are likely to experience a greater degree of change in every 
practice but goal difficulty. The budget amount of programmes might affect the extent 
of changes to four practices: goal difficulty, budget participation, procedure 
formalization, and support from senior management.  
 
As expected, what the SABP results are used for is critical to all these seven practices 
Out of the two possibilities for single-purpose use, use for programme management, 
including budget management activities, may mean that performance budgeting makes 
more of a contribution to changing managerial practices than use for personnel 
performance management. Both these single-purpose uses might have a smaller effect 
on managerial practices than multi-purpose use of SABP results, that is use for both 
programme and personnel performance management.  
 
As a consequence, this survey might make some suggestions as to how the performance 
budgeting system could make a contribution to changing managerial practices in public 
organizations. However, the author has not yet identified what impacts it has had on 
performance of programmes. The next section describes what improvement in 
programme performance has been brought about by performance budgeting, examining 
managers‟ perceptions of this. Additionally, the section identifies what kinds of the 
278 
 
managerial practices have had an effect on programme performance, regressing 
performance of programmes on the seven managerial practices.  
 
7.4 Impacts on Programme Performance 
 
7.4.1 Impacts on Programme Performance 
 
A performance budgeting system aims to improve performance of programmes and, 
eventually, operations of government. As described earlier, after the Korean central 
government introduced performance budgeting, it added SABP, so that the budget 
system could strengthen links between budget decisions and performance of 
programmes. These efforts are expected to make some changes to managerial practices 
and performance of programmes. As described previously, public administrators 
perceived that performance budgeting made a slight contribution to adjusting 
programme-managerial practices within the Korean central government.  
 
In addition, administrators observed a slight contribution by performance budgeting to 
improving performance of programmes. In this area, they showed, as shown in Table 7-
6, mean scores of 4.38, indicating that performance budgeting made a slightly greater 
contribution to improvement in performance of programmes than expected. In particular, 
the mean had a confidence interval of 4.31 - 4.45 at the level of 95%. It could be 95% 
determined that programme performance had been improved more than expected, 
because this indicates that the mean for programme performance was greater than 4.00 
95 out of 100 times, 
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Similarly to what was demonstrated with the seven managerial practices, there were 
significant differences in administrators‟ perceptions of the contribution of Korean 
performance budgeting to programme performance, depending on the administrators‟ 
organizations and programmes, and on the uses to which they put SABP assessments.  
 
Table 7-15 below presents the results of the ANOVA for differences perceived in the 
contribution of the performance budgeting system to performance of programmes 
among respondent groups.  
 
Firstly, what roles administrators played within organizations might make a difference 
to their perceptions of performance of programmes. The results, in Table 7-15, indicate 
that budget managers awarded significantly higher mean scores than programme 
managers (4.50 vs.4.33, p < 0.05). This suggests that budget managers might assess the 
effects of performance budgeting more positively than programme managers. However, 
there were no statistically significant differences between managers who managed 
programmes with and without SABP. 
 
Public administrators‟ observations of the contribution of Korean performance 
budgeting to improving programme performance varied depending on the organization 
to which they belonged. Table 7-15 shows comparisons of the perceived contribution to 
improving programme performance among organizations. As in the case of the 
managerial practices discussed above, agencies gave higher mean scores than ministries 
(4.67 vs. 4.24, p < 0.01). Among the three groups classified by organizational mission, 
ministries and agencies whose work was related to the economy had higher mean scores 
than other organizations (4.56 vs. 4.24 or 4.25, p < 0.01). This suggests that different 
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organizations may experience different contributions by performance budgeting to 
improving their programme performance. 
 
However, no statistically significant differences were shown between administrators 
who worked at headquarters and regional agents. 
 
As described in Chapter 6, different types of programme may have different links 
between budget allocations and performance. Similarly, programme types may have a 
different effect on performance. Table 7-15 presents the ANOVA results for differences 
in the perceived contribution of performance budgeting to improving programme 
performance among various groups of programmes. This indicates that different groups 
of programmes experienced different contributions by performance budgeting to 
improving their programme performance.  
 
Administrators perceived that there were significant differences shown in the mean 
scores for the seven types of programmes (p < 0.05). SOC-type programmes had the 
highest mean scores (5.00), whereas programmes which subsidized local governments 
had the lowest mean scores (4.01).  
 
For programmes of different ages, the results also showed a significantly different effect 
on their programme performance. Mid-age programmes (6-15 years) had higher mean 
scores than the other age groups (4.64 or 4.60 vs.4.21 or 3.93, p < 0.01).  
 
The budget amounts of programmes also had different effects on improvement in 
programme performance (p < 0.01). Large-sized programmes experienced the greatest 
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effect of performance budgeting on programme performance (4.74), whereas 
programmes with budgets of 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won were affected less than expected 
(3.93).  
 
Also, differences in the SABP grades achieved by programmes were significantly linked 
with differences in the effect of Korean performance budgeting on improving 
programme performance (p < 0.05). Programmes with a grade „Effective‟ had the 
highest mean scores (4.45), whereas programmes with a grade „Poor‟ had the lowest 
mean scores (3.86). This suggests that the higher the grades programmes achieved, the 
greater the contribution of the performance budgeting system to their programme 
performance.  
 
Korean performance budgeting may have a different effect on performance of 
programmes depending on which of the four types of use of SABP assessments an 
organization chooses. Table 7-15 presents the ANOVA results for comparisons of mean 
scores among these four types of SABP user. Out of the two single-purpose users (for 
programme management or for personnel performance management), those using SABP 
results for programme management perceived a greater contribution to improving their 
performance than those using them for personnel performance management (4.34 vs. 
3.94). Groups which used SABP assessments for managing both programmes and 
personnel performance (multi-purpose use) had the highest mean scores of the four 
groups. This suggests that multi-purpose use of SABP assessments made a greater 
contribution to improving the performance of programmes than the two single-purpose 
uses. 
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To sum up, public administrators, as tabulated in Table 7-6, recorded mean scores of 
4.38 for the contribution of Korean performance budgeting to improving performance of 
programmes. It is suggested that performance budgeting might make a slightly greater 
contribution to improving the performance of programmes than expected.  
 
More specifically, the results of the ANOVA test indicate that administrators had 
significantly different perceptions of the contribution of Korean performance budgeting 
to performance, depending on their organizations, programmes, and the uses to which 
they put SABP assessments. The performance budgeting system had a greater effect on 
the performance of programmes in agencies than in ministries. In terms of programmes, 
the budget system had a greater impact on SOC-type and large-sized programmes. 
 
The different types of use of SABP assessments may lead to different impacts of Korean 
performance budgeting on performance of programmes. Out of the two single-purpose 
uses, the use of SABP results for programme management had a greater effect on 
performance of programmes than their use for personnel performance management. 
Multi-purpose use of these results brought a greater contribution to improving 
performance of programmes than the two single-purpose uses. This suggests that, for 
Korean performance budgeting, what SABP assessments are used for is critical for 
performance of programmes. 
 
  
283 
 
Table 7-15 ANOVA results for differences in performance among groups 
 Valid cases Mean Std. Deviation 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Manager‟s 
Job** 
1. Budget 235 4.50 1.09 4.36 4.64 
2. Programme 556 4.33 1.02 4.24 4.41 
No. of 
programmes 
in charge 
1. No programme 264 4.31 0.97 4.19 4.43 
2. One or more programmes 346 4.37 1.05 4.26 4.48 
Organizatio
n size*** 
1. Ministry 538 4.24 1.03 4.15 4.33 
2. Agency 2.55 4.67 1.00 4.55 4.80 
Organizatio
n mission*** 
1. Economy Org. 354 4.56 0.98 4.45 4.66 
2. Social welfare Org. 274 4.24 1.09 4.12 4.37 
3. Administration Org. 164 4.25 1.04 4.09 4.41 
Department 
1. Headquarter 743 4.39 1.04 4.31 4.46 
2. Regional agent 49 4.27 1.01 3.80 4.56 
Programme 
types** 
1. SOC 11 5.00 1.57 3.95 6.05 
2. Capital acquisition 33 4.56 0.63 4.33 4.78 
3. Other direct programme 131 4.36 1.00 4.18 4.53 
4. Investment 16 4.75 0.57 4.44 5.06 
5. Loan 6 4.31 0.36 3.93 4.68 
6. Subsidy to private sector 63 4.31 1.00 4.06 4.56 
7. Subsidy to local government 52 4.01 1.32 3.64 4.37 
Programme 
ages*** 
1. 5 years or less 141 4.21 0.97 4.05 4.37 
2. 6 to 10 years 99 4.64 0.90 4.46 4.82 
3. 11 to 15 years 30 4.60 1.38 4.09 5.11 
4. 16 years or more 45 3.93 1.10 3.60 4.26 
Budget 
size*** 
1. 2.3 billion Won or less 110 4.39 0.81 4.24 4.55 
2. 2.4 to 7.7 billion Won 87 4.43 0.89 4.25 4.62 
3. 7.8 to 30.8 billion Won 70 3.93 1.34 3.61 4.25 
4. 30.9 billion Won or more 40 4.74 1.24 4.34 5.13 
Programme 
grades by 
SABP** 
1. Effective 35 4.45 0.99 4.11 4.79 
2. Somewhat effective 75 4.42 1.13 4.15 4.68 
3. Modest 160 4.40 0.91 4.26 4.54 
4. Poor 35 3.86 1.45 3.36 4.35 
Use of 
SABP 
results* 
1. Programme management 344 4.34 1.10 4.22 4.46 
2. Personnel performance 
management 
15 3.94 1.49 3.12 4.77 
3. Programme and performance 
management (1+2) 
107 4.57 0.74 4.43 4.72 
4. The others 8 4.06 1.90 2.47 5.65 
Note: *, **, and *** mean that there was a significant difference at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 between groups in a one-way ANOVA. 
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7.4.2 Differences in the Impact of Managerial Practices on Programme 
Performance 
 
By this point, it has been identified that Korean performance budgeting has made a 
slight contribution to changing the seven managerial practices and to improving 
performance of programmes. However, there is as yet no description of how the 
performance of programmes is related to the seven managerial practices. For this 
analysis, this study focused on managerial practices which may affect the performance 
of programmes, on the basis of existing researches and the SABP checklists. 
Accordingly, it is presumed that the seven practices selected for this study might have 
an impact on the performance of programmes. Indeed, these eight variables, as seen in 
Table 7-5 (Pearson correlation), appeared to be closely related. Also, the impact of the 
practices on performance may vary because the practices tend to have been adjusted 
differently to performance budgeting. Ordinary least squares multi-regression analysis 
may identify the relationships and impact differences of these seven managerial 
practices on programme performance.   
 
The majority of zero-order correlation coefficients between managerial practices and 
performance perceived by administrators, as presented in Table 7-5, were statistically 
significant at p < 0.01. The prevalence of significant relationships may suggest some 
weakness in the measures in this survey. To determine whether ordinary least squares 
multi-regression analysis is the appropriate estimator, multicollinearity was tested by 
collinearity statistics. Seven independent variables had variance inflation factor (or VIF) 
values lower than 10.00, indicating that there is no severe multicollinearity among 
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independent variables (Menard, 1995; Hair et al., 1995; Neter et al., 1989; Mason et al., 
1989; Marquardt, 1970; Kennedy, 1992; cited O‟Breien, 2007; Basioudis and Ellwood, 
2005). 
 
The results of regression analysis for improvement in programme performance appear 
in Table 7-16. The adjusted R
2
 for the model, the coefficient of determinant, was 0.73, 
and the equation achieved statistical significance at the p < 0.01 (F = 268.69). All the 
seven independent variables in the equation had positive (+) coefficients.  
 
Of these variables, five (the exceptions were goal difficulty and budget flexibility) had a 
statistically significant correlation with the dependent variable, the performance of 
programmes.  
 
Table 7-16 Relationships of programme-managerial practices with programme performance 
 
Unstandardized  
Regression Coefficients 
Standardized  
Regression Coefficients 
Standard error t 
Goal clarity 0.238***  0.229 0.038 6.329 
Goal difficulty 0.032  0.032 0.033 0.962 
Budget adequacy 0.066*  0.070 0.035 1.875 
Budget participation 0.147***  0.133 0.053 2.766 
Budget flexibility 0.030  0.029 0.043 0.683 
Procedure formalization 0.172***  0.156 0.045 3.854 
Support from senior 
management 
0.342***  0.328 0.044 7.746 
(Constant) -0.053  - .109 -0.486 
F  268.687*** 
R2  0.728  
Adjusted R2  0.726 
N  709 (Listwise) 
Note: 1. Dependent variable is the performance of programmes. 
     2. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests.  
 
Among the two goal-setting variables, goal clarity was positively associated with 
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performance of programmes (p < 0.01). That is to say, administrators who had strong 
perceptions of goal clarity reported higher levels of performance of programmes than 
administrators who did not. It is suggested that when programmes had a high level of 
goal clarity, this might create high levels of performance. Goal difficulty did not have a 
significant correlation with programme performance. 
 
As for the three variables related to budget management, the results of regression 
analysis indicate that two, budget adequacy and budget participation, had significantly 
positive (+) correlations with performance of programmes, whereas budget flexibility 
did not. This means that managers who perceived a high level of budget adequacy were 
more likely to express improvement in performance of programmes (p = 0.1). 
Administrators with strong perceptions of budget participation were likely to convey 
higher levels of programme performance (p < 0.01). It is implied that increasing 
participation of programme managers in budgeting might cause budgets to be adequate, 
and that, when programmes have adequate budgets, this might enhance areas of 
performance such as economy and efficiency. However, budget flexibility was not 
significantly associated with performance of programmes. 
 
The results of regression analysis indicate that the levels of procedure formalization and 
high level managerial support had positive (+) effects on performance of programmes. 
This means that administrators who reported a high level of procedure formalization 
were more likely to perceive a high level of programme performance (p < 0.01). 
Administrators with strong perceptions of high level managerial support tended to 
report a high level of performance of programmes (p < 0.01). This suggests that it is 
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necessary to formalize operational procedures and to attract senior management‟s 
support in order to improve the performance of programmes.  
 
As for the levels of impact of the seven managerial practices on programme 
performance, the results of regression analysis showed that the support of senior 
management had the largest standardized regression coefficient. This suggests that the 
support of senior management was the area which showed the strongest effect of 
Korean performance budgeting on the performance of programmes. The finding 
confirms the argument that high-level managerial support is critical if performance 
budgeting is to make a contribution to improving performance of programmes (Jun and 
Park, 2002). 
 
Ministries and agencies in Korea differ in many of their characteristics: for example, in 
the structure and culture of their organizations, and in the attributes of their programmes. 
This may cause Korean performance budgeting to have different impacts on 
programme-managerial practices, and in turn to produce differences in their impacts on 
performance of programmes. To confirm this, the present study conducted two separate 
ordinary least square regression analyses for ministries and agencies. The results of 
regression analysis for ministries and agencies are each presented in Table 7-17. 
 
Firstly, on the left side of Table 7-17, there are the results of regression analysis for 
ministries. The results are similar to those shown in Table 6-40 for pooled data. The 
results indicate that goal clarity (p < 0.01), budget adequacy (p < 0.01), budget 
participation (p < 0.1), procedure formalization (p < 0.01), and the support of senior 
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management (p < 0.01) had significantly positive (+) correlations with the performance 
of programmes in ministries. Goal difficulty and budget flexibility, however, did not 
have significant relationships with performance of programmes.  
 
The results of regression analysis for agencies are presented on the right side of Table 7-
17. The results show that goal clarity (p < 0.01), procedure formalization (p < 0.1), and 
high level managerial support (p < 0.01) were significantly correlated to the 
performance of programmes. However, the three variables related to budget 
management might not have a significant correlation with the performance of 
programmes. This suggests that, if programmes set goals that were clear and specific 
and had formal operational procedures, they might find it easier to improve their own 
performance.  
 
Table 7-17 Results of regression analyses comparing ministries and agencies 
 Regression Coefficient for Ministries (β) Regression Coefficient for Agencies (β) 
Goal clarity 0.164*** (.043) 0.415*** (.074) 
Goal difficulty 0.043 (.041) -0.019 (.058) 
Budget adequacy 0.163*** (.040) -0.110 (.067) 
Budget participation 0.107* (.064)  0.037 (.097) 
Budget flexibility 0.077 (.052)  0.084 (.083) 
Procedure formalization 0.135*** (.054)  0.136* (.082) 
Support from senior  
management 
0.311*** (.051) 0.347*** (.085) 
F 211.730*** 63.135*** 
R2 0.756 0.677 
Adjusted R2 0.753 0.666 
N 486 (Listwise) 219 (Listwise) 
Note: 1. Dependent variable is the performance of programmes. 
     2. * is statistically significant at the 0.10 level; ** at the 0.05 level; and *** at the 0.01 level in two-tailed tests.  
     3. Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, this study has investigated variations in, and the relationship of 
programme-managerial practices with, performance of programmes operated under the 
Korean central government‟s system of performance budgeting. To achieve its aims, the 
study administered an opinion survey of public administrators which looked at seven 
managerial practices and at programme performance using a questionnaire with 53 
questions. The survey collected 808 questionnaires and excluded one questionnaire 
which was not completely answered.  
 
The survey results show that these seven managerial practices had mean scores of 
slightly below or above 4.00. This suggests that Korean performance budgeting makes 
at least as great a contribution to improving managerial practices as expected.  
 
The results of ANOVA tests show significant differences in mean scores, suggesting that 
performance budgeting makes a different contribution to adjusting managerial practices 
depending on organizations, programmes, and uses of SABP assessments. Performance 
budgeting brings greater changes to managerial practices in agencies or organizations 
whose work is related to the economy than to those in ministries, organisations that deal 
with social welfare, and administrative organizations.  
 
Clearly, the uses to which SABP results are put make a significant difference in the 
effect of performance budgeting on all seven managerial practices. Of the two single-
purpose uses, the use of SABP results for programme management meant that 
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managerial practices were affected more strongly than they were when the results were 
used for personnel performance management. Multi-purpose use of SABP results (for 
programme management and personnel performance management) meant that 
performance budgeting had a greater effect on managerial practices than the two single-
purpose uses. 
 
According to the survey, administrators perceive that Korean performance budgeting 
has made a slight contribution to enhancing performance of programmes. The results of 
ANOVA tests indicate that performance budgeting makes a different contribution to 
improving performance of programmes, depending on organizations, programmes, and 
the uses to which SABP results are put. Administrators in agencies had stronger 
perceptions of performance improvement than those in ministries. Of the two single-
purpose uses of SABP assessments, use for programme management made a greater 
contribution than use for personnel performance management. The multi-purpose use of 
SABP assessments made a greater contribution to improving performance than single-
purpose uses. 
 
These seven managerial practices are likely to have a correlation with performance of 
programmes. The results of regression analysis indicate that goal clarity, budget 
adequacy, budget participation, procedure formalization, and support from senior 
management had statistically significant correlations with performance of programmes. 
However, no statistical significance was found in goal difficulty and budget flexibility. 
 
Furthermore, ministries and agencies are likely to experience different impacts of 
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managerial practices on programme performance. It is indicated that five practice 
variables (the exceptions were goal difficulty and budget flexibility) had a significant 
relationship with programme performance in ministries, whereas four variables (the 
exceptions were goal clarity, procedure formalization, and support from senior 
management) were not statistically significant in agencies. In particular, administrators 
are likely to perceive that senior management‟s support is one of the critical factors for 
improving performance of programmes in both ministries and agencies.  
 
Several limitations of this research should be noted. The measures used in this study are 
cross-sectional, perceptual and subjective rather than objective. A more complete 
analysis would require longitudinal data on performance budgeting dynamics and 
patterns within ministries and agencies of the Korean central government. Finally, it is 
required to specifically analyse the organizational process by which the performance 
budgeting system changes programme-managerial practices and performance of 
programmes.  
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
8.1 Summary of the Thesis 
 
This study has aimed to identify the impact of Korean performance budgeting on 
government operations which have an important budgetary element. It set out to 
examine what influence performance budgeting in Korea has had on the links between 
programme budget decisions and programme performance, and on the changes in 
programme-managerial practices and programme performance. In order to achieve these 
objectives, this research mainly employs a quantitative approach, using ANOVA 
(analysis of variance) and regression analysis.  
 
The author of this thesis found several kinds of evidence relating to the impact of 
Korean performance budgeting on government operations. The following is a summary 
of the key research findings in response to the research questions.  
 
Firstly, this study found that budget decisions have a statistically significant correlation 
with the performance of programmes or the scores (or grades) of Self-Assessment of 
Budgetary Programmes (SABP) 
 
This study regressed budget percentage changes on SABP assessments, controlling 
other factors. Regression results indicated that there was a correlation between budget 
294 
 
allocations and programme performance during the three budget years 2006, 2007, and 
2008. Programme performance (or SABP assessments) was usually considered in 
relation to budget decisions at the three budget stages: budget request, budget proposal, 
and final budget allocation. However, impacts varied a little between the three budget 
stages. It is at the budget proposal stage that SABP scores tend to have their greatest 
impact on budget decisions, whereas they appear to have their smallest impact at the 
budget request stage.  
 
Of the four grades by the SABP: „Poor‟, „Modest‟, „Somewhat effective‟, and 
„Effective‟, the grade „Poor‟ appears to have the strongest impact on budget decisions. 
This is consistent with the recommendations of the annual Budget Request Guideline 
that spending ministries and agencies should reduce by more than 10% the budgets of 
programmes assessed as „Poor‟ by SABP. With regard to the three programme 
components that SABP is used to assess – planning, implementation, and results – the 
results component, which represents programme performance most directly (Gilmour 
and Lewis, 2005, 2006), tends to show the least correlation. Rather, it is the 
management component that analysis shows to have the greatest effect on budget 
decisions.  
 
Secondly, this study found that Korean performance budgeting tends to initiate changes 
in programme-managerial practices within spending ministries and agencies, and that 
the extent to which Korean performance budgeting makes a contribution to changing 
these practices may depend on programme characteristics, particular organizations, 
and the uses to which SABP assessments are put. 
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The survey was conducted in order to identify the extent to which Korean performance 
budgeting has made a contribution to changes in seven managerial practices: 
programme goal clarity, programme goal difficulty, programme budget participation, 
programme operation procedure formalization, support from senior management, 
budget adequacy and budget flexibility. According to the survey, the first five of these 
practices had mean scores greater than 4.00 on a seven-point Likert scale, indicating 
that Korean performance budgeting has made more contribution to changing them than 
expected. However, the final two had mean scores of slightly lower than 4.00, 
suggesting that Korean performance budgeting had not had the expected effect on them.  
 
Results of the ANOVA using data from this survey indicate that administrators had 
slightly different perceptions of the extent to which the performance budgeting system 
had made a contribution to changing managerial practices, depending on the type of 
programme which they managed, the type of organization which they belonged to, and 
the purposes for which they used SABP assessments. Consistently in the seven 
practices, those who belonged to agencies perceived a greater contribution than those 
who belonged to ministries. Multi-purpose use (for both programme management and 
personnel performance management) had a greater effect on changes in managerial 
practices than single-purpose use (for programme management or for personnel 
performance management).  
 
Thirdly, this study suggests that Korean performance budgeting can improve 
programme performance, and that its contribution to improving programme 
performance may vary depending on programme characteristics, organizations, the 
296 
 
uses of SABP assessments, and so on. 
Results of the survey suggest that Korean performance budgeting may make a greater 
contribution to improving programme performance than expected, in the sense that 
mean scores for this were greater than 4.00 on a seven-point Likert scale.  
 
In terms of managers‟ jobs, those who were in charge of managing budgets perceived a 
greater contribution of performance budgeting to the improvement of programme 
performance than others. There was a significant difference in perceived contribution, 
depending on the organization which administrators belonged to and the programmes 
which they managed. Administrators perceived that different uses of SABP assessments 
might make a significant difference in the contribution of performance budgeting to the 
improvement of programme performance. Use for programme management, including 
programme budget management, had a stronger impact on performance than use for 
personnel performance management. Multi-purpose use (for both programme and 
personnel performance management) was stronger than single-purpose uses (for either 
programme management or personnel performance management). 
 
Finally, this research suggests that some managerial practices may have a significant 
effect on programme performance, and that they may make a difference in the extent to 
which programme performance is improved.  
 
This study regressed programme performance on the seven managerial practices listed 
above, in order to identify performance factors. The results of the regression analysis 
indicate that five practices – goal clarity, budget adequacy, budget participation, 
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operation procedure formalization, and support from senior management – had 
significant correlations with the performance of programmes, whereas goal difficulty 
and budget flexibility did not.  
 
Results of the regression analysis suggest that ministries and agencies may have 
different performance factors. Administrators in ministries perceived that the above five 
practices had a significant relationship with performance, whereas those in agencies 
perceived this to be true of just three of these practices – goal clarity, procedure 
formalization, and support from senior management. 
 
As summarized above, this research has provided empirical evidence for the association 
of budget decisions with programme performance, and for changes in programme-
managerial practices and performance. While linking budget decisions with SABP 
assessments, Korean performance budgeting tends to make a contribution to the 
improvement of managerial practices and programme performance. Furthermore, these 
findings, as will be shown below, provide several clues for designing and implementing 
performance budgeting.  
 
8.2 Policy Implications 
 
These findings suggested that Korean performance budgeting may have an impact on a 
variety of government activities. As summarized above, not only has it made a link 
between budget decisions and programme performance, it has also made a contribution 
to changing programme-managerial practices and to improving programme 
298 
 
performance. It is implied from these findings that the checklists used for SABP and 
proper use of SABP results for performance management played a critical role in 
making the impacts. As a result, designers of performance budgeting should give 
deliberate consideration to creating assessment items and accountability systems for 
programmes‟ results. First of all, designers need to develop assessment items in a 
specific and objective way, in order that they can have an intended impact on specific 
practices. As seen from these findings, having a close relationship with the checklists 
used for SABP, the seven managerial practices are beginning to have been changed by 
Korean performance budgeting. Furthermore, it is required that the Korean performance 
budgeting system be designed to strengthen accountability for the results of programme 
implementation. It needs, for instance, to have proper links to budget decision, or to 
enlarge the use of SABP assessments.  
 
From an implementation point of view, performance budgeting tends to be associated 
with difficulties in three main areas: performance measurement, links between budget 
decisions and performance, and responsibility or accountability for resource use 
(Andrews, 2003). Korean performance budgeting too is likely to cause problems in 
these areas. On the basis of findings focusing on these areas, this thesis proposes several 
solutions for addressing the problems in Korean performance budgeting, as follows. 
 
Firstly, Korean performance budgeting needs to improve the procedures involved in 
SABP. In the process of assessing programmes using SABP, spending ministries and 
agencies show a „leniency tendency‟. As noted in Chapter 3, they tend to award scores 
of about 90 points out of 100 to their programmes, making these scores, on average, 30 
299 
 
points higher than those awarded by the MPB. In other words, SABP scores awarded by 
spending ministries and agencies vary little between programmes, so that they cannot 
provide useful pieces of performance information for prioritising programmes in 
making budget decisions. As a result of this leniency, managers may neglect SABP 
assessments at the stage of making budget requests. Accordingly, the Korean 
government should seek procedures or instruments which encourage spending 
ministries and agencies accurately to assess the real performance of their programmes.  
 
Secondly, the Korean government should strive to strengthen the uses of performance 
information – SABP assessments – for making budget decisions, although the findings 
do give a comprehensive suggestion that Korean performance budgeting has linked 
budget decisions with performance. The use that Korean performance budgeting has 
made of SABP grades in linking budget decisions with programme performance varies 
between different types of organization and different types of programme. For example, 
the „Poor‟ grade is likely to have a stronger impact on budget decisions than the other 
three grade levels („Modest‟, „Somewhat effective‟, and „Effective‟). In a sense, this 
implies that Korean performance budgeting tends to concentrate on using SABP 
assessments as a tool for cutting the budgets of programmes with the grade „Poor‟. 
Weakening the links of programmes with the other grades may have the effect of de-
emphasizing the importance of results, „as managers continue to view the results-
emphasis as an add-on instead of the core focus of the budget‟ (Andrews, 2003).  
 
Thirdly, this research suggests that, in the long run, the Korean government should need 
to create a more specific and clearer accountability framework for managers, so that 
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they can focus on performance budgeting. According to this study, the different uses of 
SABP assessments have made different contributions to changing managerial practices 
and programme performance. Multi-purpose use (for both programme management and 
personnel performance evaluation) has had a stronger effect on changes in practices and 
performance than single purpose use (for programme management or for personnel 
performance evaluation). In addition, the contribution which Korean Performance 
budgeting has made to changing practices and performance differs between ministries 
and agencies. Thus, the Korean government needs to develop further uses for SABP 
assessments, so that they can play a role in establishing incentives and sanctions to 
stimulate managers to increase their efforts (Diamond, 2005). Furthermore, budget 
reformers should take a different approach to designing incentives and sanctions for 
each type of organization.  
 
Fourthly, the survey results add several implications for Korean performance budgeting. 
One of these relates to the fact that Korean administrators perceived that Korean 
performance budgeting made only a small contribution to expanding managers‟ 
flexibility in executing their budgets. Taking into account that budget flexibility is 
critical for implementing performance budgeting (Diamond, 2001), the Korean 
government should explore ways to ensure flexibility in executing budgets. Another 
implication relates to support from senior management, which can be a key factor in 
improving programme performance under Korean performance budgeting. The survey 
indicates that support from senior management has had the largest impact on 
programme performance of the seven practices. Hence, the Korean government needs to 
find ways of drawing more support from senior management.  
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For Korean performance budgeting to take a step forward in the future, the Korean 
government should continue to make regular checks on several areas of managerial 
performance, as described below. 
 
Programme managers should set clear and specific goals for their programmes, so that 
the relationship between goals and programme outcomes may be clearly seen. Many 
governments fail in this area – outcomes are not considered; outputs are confused with 
inputs; targets lack a „real-world‟ value, are poorly detailed, and are disconnected from 
the activities and projects needed to achieve them (Andrews, 2003). As suggested by the 
experience of SABP assessments so far, Korean performance budgeting may fail to 
measure actual performance of programmes. 
 
The Korean government should continue to check whether Korean performance 
budgeting encourages budget managers to link budget decisions to performance. Along 
with reviewing the strength of the link between budget decisions and performance 
regularly, the Korean government could reorganize programmes for the assessment. In 
several groups of programmes, managers working within Korean performance 
budgeting may have little opportunity to use their SABP assessments in budgeting. For 
example, the SABP assessments may not affect budget decisions on programmes, as is 
the case with the national insurance programme and the unemployment benefit 
programme, because their budgets are allocated by law. Assessing these programmes 
may require additional time and cost. The National Assembly Budget Office (2007) 
reported that the Korean government paid 6.2-8.1 billion Won for evaluating 
government performance each year.  
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8.3 Future Research Areas 
 
It is significantly meaningful that this research has provided a more comprehensive 
analysis of the impacts of Korean performance budgeting than any research previously 
undertaken in Korea. Along with an analysis of whether or not Korean performance 
budgeting has linked budget decisions to programme performance, this study has 
examined the extent to which Korean performance budgeting has made a contribution to 
changing programme-managerial practices and to improving programme performance.  
 
Several interesting questions arising from this analysis, however, can be expected to 
provide clues as to which areas require further research in the future.  
 
This thesis examines the extent to which Korean performance budgeting has made a 
contribution to changing the seven programme-managerial practices which may have an 
influence on programme performance. However, it would be possible to make further 
studies of the reasons why Korean performance budgeting has made different 
contributions to changing these, depending on organizational culture, Korean 
administrative traditions, and other factors.  
 
Additionally, further research could examine the organizational process of the 
performance budgeting system and how this changed programme-managerial practices 
and performance of programmes. Further research might examine longitudinal data on 
performance budgeting dynamics and patterns within ministries and agencies of the 
Korean central government. 
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Further study could work with a specific focus on SABP assessments themselves, so 
that it can specifically define the characteristics of SABP scores (or grades). A useful 
idea for future research is whether or not SABP scores represent the „actual‟ 
performance of programmes. SABP may, as noted earlier, share some of the problems 
identified in other tools designed for measuring performance.  
 
As for the regression models used for analysing the links between budget decisions and 
performance in Chapter 5, they consider various factors which affect budget decisions. 
It was not easy, however, for these models to consider macro-data such as the inflation 
rate – although another model to which a GDP deflator was added made little difference 
to the results of regression analysis. It is for this reason that the regression models did 
not have very high coefficients of determination (R
2
). Further study should explore 
techniques with which regression models can include these factors. 
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APENDICES 
 
APENDIX 1  A QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH) 
 
Survey of the Performance Budgeting System in Korea 
 
 
 
This survey is conducted to examine the features of the performance budgeting system, 
including the Self-Assessment of Budgetary Programmes, which comes under the 
control of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance.  
I declare that information collected here will be used only for this research and will be 
kept confidential. 
Thank you very much for your help and cooperation. 
 
                      Nohwoon Park, Korean Institute of Public Finance 
                      Incheul Cho, Ph.D student, Birmingham University 
                                 Contact  Telephone: 02-2186-2267 
                                         Email: jweon@kipf.re.kr 
 
I. In respect of your organization. Please tick appropriate answer. 
 
  I-1. To what area does your organization‟s mission belong? 
    ① Economic             ② Social                ③ Administrative 
management 
  I-2. Your organization? 
    ① Ministry                              ② Agency  
  I-3. Your department? 
324 
 
    ① Headquarters              ② Regional agent                ③ Other  
  I-4. Your career years?  
    ① Fewer than 3               ② 3-5                 ③ 6-10    
    ④ 11-15                     ⑤ More than 15  
 
  I-5. Your career years on current programmes? 
    ① 1 or shorter         ② 1-2         ③ 3-4             ④ 5 or longer  
  I-6. Your grade? 
    ① 6 or lower        ② 5         ③ 4         ④ 3 or higher           
⑤ Other  
  I-7. Your age? 
    ① 29 years or younger     ② 30-39      ③ 40-49        ④ 50 or older 
  I-8. What is the main function of your job? 
    ① Budgeting (administrators in charge of budget in Bureau or Budget Office) 
    ② The others 
♪♪♪ If you ticked the answer of ① in question I-8, please go to Section II-9. 
 
II. Please write or tick appropriate answer. 
 
  II-1. How many programmes on which SABP is used do you have? 
    ① 0         ② 1         ③ 2          ④ 3            ⑤ 4 or more 
♪♪♪ If you ticked the answer of ①, go to Section III. If you ticked one of ②, ③, ④, or 
⑤, go to II-2 to II-10, and give an answer about the specific programme that you judge 
is most critical in your mission, having used SABP to assess more than one programme. 
  II-2. Was your programme assessed using SABP during 2005-2007? 
①  Yes                                       ② No  
♪♪♪ If you ticked the answer of ② in question II-2, please go to Section III. 
  II-3. When was your programme assessed using SABP? 
    ① 2005               ② 2006                    ③ 2007  
  II-4. What was the budget amount of your program in the assessment year?    
    ① 2.3 billion Won or less                      ② 2.4 – 7.7 billion Won 
    ③ 7.8 – 30.8 billion Won                      ④ 30.9 billion Won or more 
  II-5. What was the SABP score of your programme rated by the MPB?  
    ① 50 or less              ② 51-60               ③ 61-70 
    ④ 71-80                  ⑤ 81-90               ⑥ 91-100 
  II-6. What was the SABP grade of your program rated by the MPB? 
    ① Effective      ② Somewhat effective       ③ Modest       ④ Poor 
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  II-7. Which type of the 7 programme types on which SABP is used does your 
assessed programme relate to?     
   * When your programme relates to more than 1 type, please tick just the main type 
out of the 7 types.  
    ① SOC     ② Capital acquisition      ③ Other direct program     ④ 
Investment    
    ⑤ Loan        ⑥ Subsidy to private sector         ⑦ Subsidy to local 
government                              
  II-8. What is the age of your programme in the assessment year?  
    ① 5 years or less        ② 6-10         ③ 11-15         ④ 16 years or 
more 
  II-9. For what purpose were your assessment results used? 
    ① Budgeting                               ② Personnel performance 
evaluation   
    ③ Programme management   
    ④ Budgeting, and personnel performance evaluation 
    ⑤ Budgeting, and programme management 
    ⑥ Programme management, and personnel performance evaluation 
    ⑦ Budgeting, personnel performance evaluation, and programme management 
    ⑧ Other 
(                                                                    ) 
 
  II-10. If you used the SABP results for budgeting, how much impact did they make 
on budget decisions of your programmes? Please tick (V) the appropriate box below. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very low   Modest   Very high 
 
 
III. Tick (V) the box below, which offers a subjective assessment of variations 
in ‟goal setting practices‟ related to your programme since the implementation of 
performance budgeting or SABP. 
 
<Measurement unit> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low   Modest   Very High 
 
No. Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
III-1 The strategic objectives and performance targets of 
my programme have been further clarified. 
       
III-2 My programme targets were made more ambitious.        
III-3 The target groups of my programmes have been more 
specific. 
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III-4 I had to invest more effort in order to achieve 
programme goals. 
       
III-5 My programme has clearer objectives.        
III-6 I have understood the strategic objectives and targets 
of my programme better. 
       
III-7 My programme targets have become more difficult to 
achieve.  
       
III-8 My programme goals were more quantitative and 
measurable using performance indicators. 
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IV. Tick (V) the box below to indicate your opinion of how „budgeting practices‟ 
have changed as a result of the implementation of performance budgeting. 
 
<Measurement unit> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low   Modest   Very High 
 
No. Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IV-1 My participation in budgetary decision-making has 
increased. 
       
IV-2 I have chosen specific projects under my authority 
within the budget. 
       
IV-3 The frequency of programme budget-related 
discussions initiated by me or my seniors has 
increased. 
       
IV-4 My opinions have been more important in setting my 
budget targets of programme. 
       
IV-5 My autonomy of budget implementation has been 
increased. 
       
IV-6 My seniors have listened more to my opinions in 
budgeting. 
       
IV-7 My superiors have provided better reasons when my 
programme budget has been revised.  
       
IV-8 My programme budget has allowed me to achieve 
better performance. 
       
IV-9 My budget-related opinions have been more 
important in making budgetary decisions.  
       
IV-10 My programme budget has been sufficient for 
achieving goals. 
       
IV-11 My influence on specific budget implementation has 
increased. 
       
IV-12 My programme has been allotted a budget more in 
accordance with the target level of programme.   
       
 
 
V. Tick (V) the appropriate box below to indicate your subjective assessment of 
variations in “other managerial practices” related to your programme since the 
implementation of performance budgeting. 
 
<Measurement unit> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low   Modest   Very High 
 
No. Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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V-1 My seniors have cared about my programme more.        
V-2 Operation procedures or stipulations have been more 
important for my programme. 
       
V-3 Operation procedures or stipulations of my 
programme have been more specific formally. 
       
V-4 My seniors have given advice or opinion on my 
programme more actively. 
       
V-5 In the process of my programme management, rules 
have increased. 
       
V-6 My seniors have been more interested in setting the 
objectives and targets of my programme. 
       
V-7 My seniors have presented more concerns about my 
programme performance.  
       
V-8 My seniors made an effort to provide as appropriate 
resources as possible for achieving my goals. 
       
V-9 My seniors have paid more attention to performance 
management such as budget and assessment. 
       
 
 
VI. Tick (V) the appropriate box below to indicate your subjective assessment of 
variations in your programme performance since the implementation of 
performance budgeting. 
 
<Measurement unit> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Low   Modest   Very High 
 
No. Questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VI-1 The level of customer satisfaction with my 
programme has increased. 
       
VI-2 The efficiency of my programme has been enhanced.        
VI-3 The effectiveness of my programme has been 
improved. 
       
VI-4 My programme has used less labour in order to 
achieve the same goals. 
       
VI-5 My programme has spent less money on achieving 
the same goals. 
       
VI-6 My programme has achieved the objectives that had 
been set for it. 
       
Thank you very much. 
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APPENDIX 2  A QUESTIONNAIRE (KOREAN) 
 
성과예산제도 (재정사업 자율평가제도)에 관한 설문조사 
 
 
안녕하십니까? 
 
바쁘싞 업무 중에도 귀중한 시갂을 내어 설문조사에 참여해주싞 데에 대하
여 먼저 깊이 감사드립니다. 
 
동 조사의 목적은 재정사업 자율평가제도 등 성과예산제도가 재정사업의 
계획, 집행 등 욲영관리행태에 미칚 영향을 종합적으로 짂단하여 효율적읶 
예산배분제도를 모색하는데 있습니다. 귀하의 답변은 우리나라 재정운용 방
식 개선을 위한 귀중한 자료가 된다는 점을 감안하여, 자율평가제도 등 성
과예산제도에 따라 사업을 평가하고 예산편성 등에 반영하면서 귀하께서 
평소 느끼싞 바에 대해 다소 시간이 걸리더라도 성실한 답변을 부탁드립니
다.  
 
본 설문조사는 익명으로 실시되고 개읶의 의견은 보호됩니다. 귀하께서 답
변하싞 내용은 통계 목적 이외에는 타 용도로 사용되지 않을 것입니다. 
 
귀하와 귀 부처ㆍ청의 무궁한 발젂을 기원합니다. 
 
감사합니다. 
 
                     박노욱, 한국조세연구원 성과관리센터 센터장 
 
                                    연락처 젂화: 02-2186-2267 
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I. 귀하의 싞상과 관련하여 해당번호에 V 표시해 주시기 바랍니다. 
  I-1. 귀하께서 귺무하는 부/청은 다음 어디에 속합니까? 
     ① 경제부처/청          ② 사회부처/청          ③ 읷반행정부처/청  
  I-2. 귀하께서 귺무하고 계싞 기관은?  
     ① 부처                         ② 청 
  I-3. 귀하께서 귺무하고 계싞 부서는? 
     ① 본부         ② 소속기관          ③ 기타  
  I-4. 귀하의 공무원 재직기갂은? 
     ① 3년 미만           ② 3년이상-5년미만                 ③ 5이상-10년미만     
     ④ 10이상-15년미만           ⑤ 15년 이상           
  I-5. 귀하의 현보직 귺무년수는? 
     ① 1년 미만       ② 1-2년       ③ 3-4년       ④ 5년이상 
I-6. 귀하의 직급은? 
     ① 6급 이하         ② 5급         ③ 4급        ④ 3급 이상       ⑤ 기타  
  I-7. 귀하의 연령은? 
     ① 20대 이하         ② 30대          ③ 40대            ④ 50대 이상 
I-8. 정부업무를 „예산업무‟와 „비예산 업무‟ 등 두 가지로 분류할 때, 귀하의 업무
는 어느 업무에 해당합니까? 
     ① 예산업무(재정기획관실, 각 실국 예산담당자)       ② 예산외의 다른 업무 
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☞ 위 문항 I-8에서 ①번에 답하싞 경우에는 II-9로 가십시오. 그리고 개별사업이 아
닌 재정사업 전반에 대해 답해 주시기 바랍니다. 
 
 
II. 귀하의 사업과 관련하여 해당번호에 V 표시 또는 해당사항을 기재해 주시기 바
랍니다. 
 
  II-1. 귀하께서 담당하고 있는 재정사업 자율평가 대상사업은 몇 개입니까? 
    ① 0         ② 1         ③ 2          ④ 3            ⑤ 4 이상 
 
☞  위 문항 II-1에서 ①번에 답하싞 경우에는 섹션 III으로 가십시오. 그리고 ②, ③, 
④, 또는 ⑤에 답하싞 경우에는 II-2로 가시되, II-2 부터 II-10 까지는 평가받은 사업 
중 귀하의 임무와 관렦하여 1개의 핵심사업으로 한정하여 답변해 주시기 바랍니다. 
 
  II-2. 2005-2007년중 귀하의 사업은 재정사업 자율평가를 받은 적이 있습니
까? 
    ① 예                                    ② 아니오 
  II-3. 얶제 평가를 하셨습니까?  
     ① 2005년          ② 2006년          ③ 2007년   
  II-4. 평가 실적년도의 예산은 얼마였습니까?     
     ① 23억원 이하     ② 24–77억원     ③ 78–308억원      ④ 309억원이상 
  II-5. 기획재정부의 최종 평가점수는 몇 점이었습니까?     
     ① 50점이하              ② 51-60점               ③ 61-70점 
     ④ 71-80점              ⑤ 81-90점               ⑥ 91-100점 
  II-6. 기획재정부의 최종 평가등급은 무슨 등급이었습니까? 
     ① 효과          ② 다소 효과           ③ 보통            ④ 미흡 
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  II-7. 귀하의 사업은 자율평가제도상 7가지 사업유형 중 어느 것에 해당합니까? 
    * 두 가지이상 유형에 동시에 속하는 경우에는 주된 사업유형 하나만 
표시바랍니다. 
     ① SOC          ② 시설구매          ③ 기타 직접          ④ 출자출연  
     ⑤ 융자              ⑥ 민갂보조                    ⑦ 지방자치단체 보조 
  II-8. 귀하의 사업의 평가년도 당시 사업년수는?  
     ① 5년이하        ② 6-10년         ③ 11-15년         ④ 16년 이상 
  II-9. 귀하의 사업에 대한 자율평가결과가 정부업무평가 이외에 어떤 목적으로 활
용되었는지 V 표시하거나 (   )에 기재해 주시기 바랍니다. 
     ①  예산편성                        ②  개읶 읶사고과평정 및 성과급       
     ③  사업계획수립 및 집행관리        ④  ① + ② 
     ⑤  ① + ③                          ⑥  ② + ③ 
     ⑦  ① + ② + ③  
     ⑧ 기타 (                                                         ) 
  II-10. 자율평가결과를 예산편성시 활용한 경우, 평가결과가 귀하의 사업예산 변화
에 영향을 미칚 수준은 어느정도읶지 적당한 박스에 V 표시바랍니다. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
매우낮음   보통   매우높음 
 
III. 다음은 귀하의 사업운영과 관련한 “목표설정 관행”에 재정사업 자율평가제도 
등 성과예산제도가 미친 영향에 관한 사항입니다. 적당한 박스에 V 표시를 해주시
기 바랍니다. 
☞ 예산담당자의 경우(I-8에서 ①에 답하싞 경우) 재정사업 전반에 관한 관행의 변
화에 대해 응답해 주시기 바랍니다. 
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<평가기준> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
매우낮음   보통   매우높음 
 
번호 질문 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
III-1 내 사업의 젂략목표와 성과목표가 보다 더 명확해
졌다. 
       
III-2 내 사업은 목표치가 보다 의욕적으로 설정되어 예
젂에 비해 달성이 어려워졌다.  
       
III-3 내사업이 목표하는 대상이 더욱 분명해졌다.         
III-4 내 사업의 목표수준 달성을 위해서는 보다 많은 노
력이 요구되었다. 
       
III-5 내 사업이 추짂하려는 의도가 보다 명확해졌다.        
III-6 나는 내 사업에 대한 젂략/성과목표(치)를 보다 잘 
읶식하게 되었다. 
       
III-7 내 사업의 목표수준은 보다 더 어려워졌다.         
III-8 내 사업목표는 성과지표 이용 등 계량적 측정가능
성이 보다 더 높아졌다. 
       
 
IV. 다음은 귀하의 사업운영과 관련한 “예산관행”에 재정사업 자율평가제도 등 성
과예산제도가 미친 영향에 관한 사항입니다. 적당한 박스에 V 표시를 해주시기 바
랍니다. 
☞ 예산담당자의 경우(I-8에서 ①에 답하싞 경우) 재정사업 전반에 관한 관행의 변
화에 대해 응답해 주시기 바랍니다. 
<평가기준> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
매우낮음   보통   매우높음 
 
번호 질문 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
IV-1 나는 내 사업의 예산편성과정에 보다 많이 참여
하게 되었다. 
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IV-2 나는 예산범위 내에서 내 사업의 세부사업을 보
다 자율적으로 결정했다. 
       
IV-3 내 사업은 예산과 관렦하여 내가 참석하는 회의
가 보다 많아졌다. 
       
IV-4 내 사업은 예산목표 설정시 내 의견이 보다 중요
해졌다. 
       
IV-5 내 사업의 예산 집행시 젂용 등 나의 자율성이 
보다 높아졌다. 
       
IV-6 내 사업의 예산편성시 상급자들이 내 의견을 보
다 졲중해 주었다. 
       
IV-7 내 상급자는 내 예산요구를 수정할 경우 그 사유
를 보다 충분히 알려 주었다. 
       
IV-8 내 사업의 예산은 사업목표를 달성하는 데 보다 
충분해졌다. 
       
IV-9 내 사업의 예산규모 결정시 내 의견이 보다 중요
해졌다. 
       
IV-10 내 사업은 임무를 달성하는데 있어 예산부족 문
제가 완화되었다. 
       
IV-11 내 사업은 예산 집행에 관한 내 영향력이 더욱 
커졌다. 
       
IV-12 내 사업은 성과목표 수준을 고려해서 예산규모가 
합리적으로 결정되었다. 
       
 
 
V. 다음은 귀하의 사업운영 관행 중 일부와 관련하여 재정사업 자율평가제도 등 성
과예산제도가 미친 영향에 관한 사항입니다. 적당한 박스에 V 표시를 해주시기 바
랍니다. 
☞ 예산담당자의 경우(I-8에서 ①에 답하싞 경우) 재정사업 전반에 관한 관행의 변
화에 대해 응답해 주시기 바랍니다. 
335 
 
 
<평가기준> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
매우낮음   보통   매우높음 
 
No. 질문 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
V-1 내 사업에 대한 상급자의 관심이 증가했다.        
V-2 내 사업은 예젂에 비해 욲영젃차나 규정이 보다 중
시되었다. 
       
V-3 내 사업과 관렦된 욲영젃차, 지시, 명령체계 등이 
더욱 구체화되었다. 
       
V-4 내 상급자는 내 사업에 대해 적극적으로 자문/조얶
해 주었다. 
       
V-5 내 사업을 추짂하는 과정에서 지켜야하는 공식적읶 
규칙이 더 늘었다. 
       
V-6 내 사업의 성과목표(치) 설정시 내 상급자의 관심
이 높아졌다. 
       
V-7 내 상급자는 예젂에 비해 내 사업의 성과에 대해 
더 많은 관심을 가졌다.  
       
V-8 내 상급자는 내 사업 목표 달성을 위해 예산, 읶력 
등 자원을 가능한 한 충분히 공급하려고 노력했다. 
       
V-9 내 상급자는 예산의 집행 및 평가와 같은 성과관리
에 대한 관심이 많아졌다. 
       
 
 
VI. 다음은 재정사업 자율평가제도 도입 등 성과예산제도 시행 이후 귀하의 사업 
성과와 관련된 사항입니다. 적당한 박스에 V 표시를 해주시기 바랍니다. 
☞ 예산담당자의 경우(I-8에서 ①에 답하싞 경우) 재정사업 전반에 관한 관행의 변
화에 대해 응답해 주시기 바랍니다. 
<평가기준> 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
매우낮음   보통   매우높음 
336 
 
 
번호 질문 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
VI-1 내 사업의 고객은 내 사업의 서비스에 대해 더 만
족하게 되었다. 
       
VI-2 내 사업은 예젂에 비해 보다 효율적(efficient)으로 
수행되었다. 
       
VI-3 내 사업은 예젂에 비해 보다 효과적(effective)으로 
수행되었다. 
       
VI-4 내 사업은 읶력투입에 비해 보다 경제적(economic)
으로 수행되었다. 
       
VI-5 내 사업은 투입된 예산에 비해 경제적(economic)으
로 수행되었다. 
       
VI-6 내 사업은 설정된 목표를 충분히 달성하였다.        
 
수고하셨습니다. 대단히 감사합니다. 
 
